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 In this study, I present an analysis of frontier as a modern imaginary. I argue that if we 
want to understand this popular imaginary then it is necessary to analyze how frontier is used as 
a metaphor in narrative. By investigating how new a spatial metaphor has emerged with the 
circulation of narratives, we are able to gain insights into a uniquely modern geographical 
perspective. As a concept-metaphor, frontier can reveal pre-theorized understanding about 
certain spatial dynamics.   
 The frontier imagination emerged first in the United States of America as part of the 
discursive self-centering of the new country. The frontier narrative provided the new nation with 
a spatial cosmology, a mythico-geography. It narrated the country’s transformation from a 
colonial periphery to a modern imperial power. This collective narration of this transformation 
was an act of national self-fashioning. 
As the primary purpose of the frontier narrative was to discursively establish the United 
States as the post-European center, the narrative regarded the native peoples as irrelevant. When 
it was still uncertain whether or not colonial settlers would prevail, overcoming the primitive 
tribes was regarded as heroic and pioneering. When this uncertainty was no longer, the heroic 
narrative came to be castigated as chauvinistic and insensitive towards the indigenous people. 
The triumphant narrative of frontier conquest, and tragic accounts of frontier destruction 
emerged.   
 Despite the spread of counter-narrative, the frontier imagery, based on a stereotypical 
understanding of the American West, remained a very popular metaphor, not because we live in 
a fundamentally racist world but because there is a widespread awareness that the tribal world 
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has been thoroughly transformed in the modern era. Today frontier is a global metaphor because 
we are aware that such transformations have taken place not only in the United States but also in 
countless places, including the Kachin between Yunnan and Myanmar, where a tribal society 
encountered modernity. The frontier metaphor rests on the common narrative that is taken for 
granted: where modernity—the bureaucratic state, mature capitalism, distance-demolishing 
technology, the rule of law, the discourse of global norms—entered a tribal sphere, there is no 
contest. The tribal world is overwhelmed by modernity. In act this narrative pre-determines that 
the tribal world is incapable to coping with the forces of modernity.    
In this study I have examined how the Kachin people themselves appropriated this 
rhetoric of modern transformation. They have endorsed the narrative of modern transformation 
by fashioning themselves as a people who have transformed themselves. According to them, they 
used to be tribal but now they are modern. This discursive centering of the Kachin has been 
achieved through collective self-fashioning called religious conversion. By converting to 
Christianity—by conducting missions into remote places and by narrating how they identified 
their own frontiers; they have fashioned themselves as a group of pioneers.  
Frontier narrative and conversion story naturally go together because both of them are 
narrative of radical transformation. In fact frontier has become a central imaginary in the 
evangelical culture in general. The evangelical urgency requires a frontier to become a new 
mission base, which must identify a new frontier as soon as possible. It does not allow centers to 
remain centers; it doesn’t even allow a frontier to remain a frontier for a long time. The 
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Note on Terminology  
 
In Myanmar, it is often said that “Kachin” refers to a union (“wunpawng” in Jinghpaw) of 
six tribes: Jinghpaw: Lawngwaw, Lashi/Lachik, Rawang, Zaiwa and Lisu. The Jinghpaw 
language is widely used as the lingua franca among the Kachin, although not every one speaks 
the language. It must be noted, however, that speakers of the Jinghpaw language are found in the 
adjacent regions in the Yunnan Province of China (where they are known as “Jingpo”) and in 
Arunachal Pradesh of northeast India (where they are known as “Singpo”) too. In China, 
Jinghpaw (Jingpo), Zaiwa and Lisu are officially recognized as separate ethnic groups.  
  
In this study, “the Kachin region” refers to the areas in Kachin State and Shan State of 
Myanmar, in which the vast majority of the Jinghpaw-speaking communities are found. 
For the sake of brevity and consistency, I use “Myanmar” as opposed to “Burma” for the 
name of the Southeast Asian country. I use “Burman” as an ethnonym referring to the ethno-
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Introduction: What do we mean when we say “frontier”? 
  
 In this dissertation, I investigate frontier not as an analytical category but as an 
imaginative metaphor. In the late twentieth century, “frontier” became a very popular metaphor. 
Whether we talk about colonialism, democracy, terrorism, urbanization, capitalism, or science 
and technology, we cannot avoid this metaphor today. Academic researchers too are very fond of 
this term. But we have hardly interrogated this spatial metaphor and the collective imagination 
that enables the widespread usage of it. In this study, “frontier” will be approached as a popular 
spatial imagination. This approach will allow us to raise new questions.    
I noticed that frontier was a ubiquitous metaphor when I was following news articles on 
Myanmar after its 2010 election. There have been hundreds, if not thousands, of articles 
characterizing the country as a frontier. In what sense is Myanmar a frontier? For example, on 
July 2, 2013, the BBC reported a story about the Southeast Asian country of Myanmar (Burma) 
with the headline:  
Burma: Asia’s last frontier is opening up: Investors call the country the ‘final frontier.’ The 
Star Trek reference aside, there is a sense of the yet-to-be-explored about Burma (Yueh 
2013).  
 
In order to understand this sense of frontier, the Dictionary of Human Geography, which treats 
“frontier” as an archaic word for boundary, isn’t helpful. Neither is the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED). While the OED presents six definitions and dozens of examples for “frontier” 
as a noun, none of them can elucidate in what sense Myanmar is a “final frontier.” If we turn to 
The American Heritage Dictionary, we find a more helpful definition: “an undeveloped area or 
field for discovery or research.” The Merriam Webster dictionary presents an even better one: “a 
new field for exploitative or developmental activity.”  
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Geographers have long been familiar with this metaphorical sense of “frontier.” As far as 
I know, however, David Livingstone is the only geographer who has written a substantive 
analysis of this geographical metaphor. In the discipline of geography, frontier has been 
increasingly marginalized as a topic of past decades, as “frontier” seems to have been effectively 
replaced by “borderland” as a geographical concept.1 In this dissertation, I seek to rescue 
“frontier” from this marginalization not by attempting to resurrect the old frontier studies but by 
exploring frontier as a modern spatial imaginary. How has this imaginary come to be so popular 
in the twentieth century?        
 
Frontier as a Concept-Metaphor 
“Frontier” is what Henrietta Moore has called “concept-metaphor.” It is a well-
established metaphor but not yet a firm concept. An analysis of a concept-metaphor can point to 
not-yet-articulated collective insights; it can reveal pre-theoretical awareness and reasoning.   
Figuring out what a metaphor means is not always easy, however. As Livingstone and 
Harrison have pointed out, our use of metaphor is fundamentally based on analogical 
imagination. A speaker can introduce a new metaphor, and she can make herself understood by 
the listener, if he (the listener) is able to figure out the analogical association. When a metaphor 
is relatively common, this figuring out is not difficult. If she says “Your study was the key to my 
discovery,” he immediately understands the figurative sense of the “key,” because it is a such a 
common metaphor. Indeed it is so common that we can even find it in a dictionary. When she 
                                                
1 The 2000 edition of the Blackwell Dictionary of Human Geography carries a short (less than half a 
page) entry for “frontier.” It identify only one title as suggested reading: Political Frontiers and 
Boundaries by J. R. V. Prescott, whose first edition was published in 1966 (Prescott 1987). 
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presents an uncommon metaphor, however, then the figuring out of its sense requires more 
imagination. Looking up the word in a dictionary isn’t helpful. Let me present an example.  
“Next time you walk through a forest, look down. A city lies under your feet.” These are 
the opening sentences of an essay written by Anna Tsing. What she means by “city” is not 
immediately clear. But as we read on, we begin to understand that she is speaking about fungi. 
The city metaphor allows Tsing to talk about the fungi world as “a lively scene of action and 
interaction” and as “a site of cosmopolitan transactions” (Tsing 2011). From this association, 
Tsing opens a perspective to think differently about the relation between nature (symbolized by 
fungi) and the human world (symbolized by city). Her metaphor here is not a substitutive word. 
It creates a new category, a new way to look at things.2  
Tsing is an unusually gifted and skilled scholar who can both produce and explicate a 
new metaphor. Usually, however, it is not through elaborate thinking that we arrive at a new 
metaphor; nor are we able to give the precise definition of a new metaphor. We find a metaphor 
intuitively without being able to articulate its meaning. (This is why a good poet is not 
necessarily a good theorist.) We are able to make a new metaphorical association in our minds 
without being able to articulate the association. This happens because metaphorical imagination 
is foundational in our cognition and meaning-making. Livingstone and Harrison characterized 
this cognitive faculty as “initial, embryonic insights” (Livingstone and Harrison 1980, 95). 
According to Paul Ricouer, metaphor “allows us a glance at the general procedure by which we 
produce concepts.” Metaphors emerged in an embryonic stage of concept-formation, where the 
semantic categories have not been established: it is a stage prior to “the level of conceptual peace 
and rest” where the production of categories “remains caught in the war” (Ricoeur 1978, 148–
                                                
2 In Models and Metaphors, Max Black made this distinction between “substitution” and “interaction” 
(Black 1962). Livingstone and Harrison pointed out that “frontier” is an “interactive” metaphor.   
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149). A new metaphor is thus a suggestion of a new semantic category. It proposes a new way of 
(re)describing the world (Ricoeur 1978, 154).  
Recognizing this foundational role of metaphor in human cognition, Livingstone and 
Harrison call for analysis of “the role of metaphor in the development of geographical 
epistemology” (Livingstone and Harrison 1980, 95). In their 1982 paper “The Frontier: Metaphor, 
Myth, and Model,” Livingstone and Harrison extended their analysis of metaphor to myth, 
because myth-making is also based on “the same form of mental conception—metaphorical 
thinking.” They pointed out that metaphor is contracted myth and that myth is expanded 
metaphor (Livingstone and Harrison 1980, 98). They illustrated this relation between metaphor 
and mythical narrative with the example of “frontier”—how the frontier metaphor and the 
frontier myth emerged and travelled together hand in hand. Through the circulations of metaphor 
and narrative, a new collective imagination is formed (Livingstone and Harrison 1980, 104). In 
other words, the wide circulation of the frontier metaphor has been made possible by the spread 
of the frontier narrative, and they together reflect a new pre-theoretical social imagination.  
In their 1982 papers, Livinstone and Harrison’s inquiry into metaphor and myth ended 
rather abruptly as they shifted the discussion to another formidable topic of “time geography.” 
Unfortunately, their papers did not gain much traction among scholars, and their insightful 
inquiry has not been furthered in the past thirty years.3 In this dissertation, I pick up their 
insights and suggest a way to move forward by conducting an in-depth study of frontier as a 
popular myth, a collective imaginary, a new way to describe the world. My inquiry will focus on 
                                                
3 Yi-Fu Tuan wrote “Sign and Metaphor” in 1978 (Tuan 1978). And in 1982, four papers—including the 
two by Livingstone and Harrison—were published in three geography journals on the topic of metaphor 




narratives because this imaginary has been formed through popular stories—rather than 
theoretical treaties.  
I use “tragic” and “comic” to identify the two contrasting plots of narratives. By “comic” 
I refer not to the sense of “funny” or “laughter provoking” but the dramaturgical sense of “drama 
with a happy ending,” as used in Date’s Divine Comedy as well as Northrop	 Frye’s	 Anatomy	 
of	 Criticism. Although tragedy and comedy contradict each other in terms of the plot, they 
both narrate a process of transformation. I will study variations of frontier comedy and tragedy to 
make sense of the ubiquity of frontier narratives.          
By far the largest volume of scholarship on frontier narratology has been produced in the 
field of US-American history.4 ⁠ Ever since Frederick Turner presented his famous study in 1893, 
US-American historians have debated his “frontier thesis.” The rhetorical dimension of Turner’s 
thesis has been critically scrutinized, and “frontier” has been examined as a mythical imagining 
of the United States by studies like Kerwin Lee Klein’s Frontiers of Historical Imagination: 
Narrating The European Conquest of Native America, 1890-1990. Klein characterizes Turner as 
“an American Dante” who wrote a divine comedy of the United States’s history. It is necessary 
to engage with the Turnerian narrative not because it presents a historical truth but because it 
presented a novel way to talk about spatial transformation. Even the fiercest critics of the 
Turnerian narrative often unwittingly adopt the same plot structure and metaphor. My inquiry 
will focus its attention especially on a tribal frontier—where a civilizing state meets a tribal 
people. I analyze various narratives of tribal frontier to analyze the plot of transformation. And I 
                                                
4 Throughout this dissertation, I use “US-American” when I am talking about the United States of 
America. I found this expression in Hjorleifur Jonsson’s writings.  
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will show that even a tribal upland people in northern Myanmar—the Kachin people—have 
picked up this trope of frontier transformation by adopting the rhetoric of Christian evangelism.         
The evangelical agency of the tribal people, however, has been an elusive topic in 
academic studies. Even the studies that highlight the highlanders’ agency usually leave Christian 
evangelism alone. In fact the agency stressed by the existing studies appear to be incompatible 
with conversion to Christianity. Scott in particular made a strong case for the upland ethos of 
heterodoxy and autonomy in The Art of Not Being Governed; he characterized highlanders as 
political agents who historically escaped the states, civilizations, and religious establishments to 
maintain independence. While the lowland society eagerly adopted world religions (in Southeast 
Asia, Buddhism or Islam, most typically) and endorsed cultural cosmopolitanism (especially 
through writing), the upland tribal peoples refuted such lowland influences in favor of religious 
and cultural autonomy. Civilization couldn’t climb the hills, as Scott nicely put it (Scott 2009, 
21). Neither Buddhism or Islam climbed the hills of Southeast Asia. It is true that the Kachin 
people did not endorse Buddhism, Islam, or Chinese religions, although they were introduced to 
them before Christian missionaries arrived in the late 19th century. But then how do we explain 
the fact that they have endorsed Christianity? What explains this exception? How has 
Christianity alone made it to the Kachin hills? How do the Kachin view the history of 
Christianity?  
It is worth recalling that these questions of subjectivity have been raised among historians 
of Southeast Asia. Many years ago, David Wyatt urged us to think about “what was happening 
inside people’s heads” (Wyatt 1997, 245). Commenting on Victor Lieberman’s “externalist 
approach,” Wyatt wrote that it is “necessary and useful,” but he also suggested that historians 
also investigate “internal” change—how people’s views and perspectives changed over time.” 
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Such a goal would require us to engage with the historical accounts that are appreciated by the 
studied people themselves. We would like to know better how the Kachin people talk about their 
history among themselves as they endeavor to make sense of their present predicament and to 
envision their collective future. In order for us to write a Kachin history, it seems necessary that 
we seek to understand the “method” of the Kachin historial narratives, however erroneous they 
are from the empirical positivist perspective. This study will investigate a social imaginary. With 
this approach, we move “frontier” away from the studies of boundary and borderland, and 
explore the much less established field of geographical imaginaries.  
The dissertation consists of seven substantive chapters. The first two chapters will present 
two sets of methodological discussions. In the first, I will present a descriptive analysis of my 
fieldwork as a process. Highlighting the adjustment I made during the process, I will illuminate 
how one’s fieldwork is both temporarily and spatially unbounded. A fieldwork is full of surprises, 
confusions, negotiations, and reorientations. By illustrating a series of orientations and 
reorientations I made, I will explain the rather odd mixture of ethnographic, historical, and 
theoretical approaches the reader will find in this dissertation. In the second chapter I will 
articulate my approach to frontier as a geographical imaginary. By treating “frontier” as a 
concept-metaphor, I draw a contrast between “history of ideas” and “geography of ideas.” I make 
a case for a “geography of imaginaries” approach. 
In the third chapter, I will present a literature review of Kachin studies in terms of their 
treatment of the spread of Christianity. I will make a contrast between the vibrant evangelical 
activities that I encountered among the Kachin and the Kachin scholarship that is largely silent 
on the theme of Christianity. The studies by the English anthropologist Edmund Leach, the 
Japanese ethnographer Toshihiro Yoshida, and the English historian Mandy Sadan will be 
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discussed in detail in terms of their understandings of what counted as indigenous in the Kachin 
society. 
In the fourth chapter, I highlight in particular the importance of studying frontier as an 
emplotting imaginary and analyze frontier narratives in terms of two contradictory plots: comedy 
and tragedy. Rather than dismissing Frederick Turner’s historiography as an anachronistic and 
ethnocentric narrative, I analyze the Turnerian comic history as a mythical narrative, and analyze 
the rise of the metaphor as a condensed myth. I review several major critiques of the Turnerian 
narrative but point out that the criticisms—tragedies of frontier—too depend on the same 
narrative structure of transformation, reinforcing the metaphor. I will show that the frontier 
imaginary has gained currency because there is a widespread understanding that we live in an 
age of unprecedented transformation—comic or tragic.  
In the fifth chapter, I will review a recent trend in the Yunnan historiography in which the 
place is characterized as a space of acculturation. I call into question the emphasis on 
acculturation, and offer a revisionist account of the region as a modern colonial frontier. I will 
show how “frontier” can be a meaningful and useful metaphor in China’s historical geography. 
 In the sixth chapter, I point to the unique contribution made by Protestant evangelism in 
the development of frontier as a modern imaginary. Tracing back the geography of Protestant 
missions from upland Myanmar to the Atlantic world, I investigate how mission frontiers were 
repeatedly reproduced by Protestant evangelism. The manner in which Protestantism has 
diffused globally illustrates the unique dynamics of frontier reproduction, in which centers and 
peripheries both keep moving on from one place to another.   
In the seventh chapter, I come back to the Kachin frontiers and present a detailed analysis 
of the Kachin divine comedy. Based on primary data, I show how the Kachin evangelism utilized 
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the frontier reproductivity during the insurgency, and created a nation-wide movement of frontier 
evangelism. I argue that the collective conversion to Christianity—including the repetitive 
conversion narratives—have played a central role in the formation of the Kachin nation. The 






Chapter 1. Orientations and reorientations: fieldwork as a processs 
 
 In this chapter I will present an account of my fieldwork as a process. Initially I was 
hoping to conduct intensive ethnographic research in the Kachin region—hopefully in the 
Kachin State of Myanmar—but this plan did not materialize because of a political crisis, which 
resulted in the breakout of a war in the Kachin State in the summer of 2011. I conducted my 
research in 2010 and 2011 while constantly negotiating with the political situation; I had to shift 
the direction of my inquiry and make a series of adjustments. I will analyze this contingent 
nature of my fieldwork, emphasizing the value of surprise and confusion.  
 
Orientation (1): Encountering tribal frontiers in New Mexico and Chiang Mai:  
It is perhaps useful to trace back my interest in the indigenous and tribal people to its 
nascent days and reveal what kind of motivations led me to conduct a serious research project 
about the Kachin people. It goes back fifteen years; I was living in Santa Fe, New Mexico in the 
southwestern region of USA then. New Mexico has beautiful open fields, high mountains, and a 
stunningly blue sky. There are many native Americans and Latinos, who would use the word 
“Anglo” to refer to Caucasian people. In fact New Mexico has the highest ratio of Native 
Americans in the continental United States: about 10% of the population.  
From the people in New Mexico I learned about the geography of nuclear waste. The 
largest radioactive waste repository in the country is located in this state that borders Mexico. Its 
population density and the GDP per capita were both also among the lowest in the country. 
There were many uranium mines on or near the Native American reservations. The largest 
radioactive accident in US history took place in New Mexico when the tailing dam at a uranium 
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mill broke in 1979.5 I learned that a frontier was a place where nuclear waste was dumped and 
natives suffered from radiation exposure.  
In Santa Fe I was a full-time college librarian and a part-time human rights activist. I was 
spending a lot of time as a volunteer member of Amnesty International USA. I was so active that 
the organization flew me to events and conferences across the country, through which I met a 
number of human rights activists. Working with Sister Dianna Ortiz, a Roman Catholic nun from 
New Mexico, greatly influenced me and made me want to become a full-time human rights 
activist. In 1987 Sister Dianna Ortiz joined nuns working with the indigenous population in San 
Miguel Acatan in Guatemala. In 1989 she was abducted and tortured by the military. When I met 
her, she was demanding—and continues to do so today—the release of the documents relevant to 
her abduction. In 2001, we went to the U.S. Congress in Washington D.C. to meet with a senator 
from New Mexico on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture.   
Through these activities, I also met torture survivors from Myanmar: former student 
activists who were imprisoned by the government. I thought I might be more useful to work on 
the Asian country than on Central America, especially because back then Japan still was 
considered to be an influential actor in Southeast Asia. In 2000, I translated a long human rights 
report on Myanmar by Amnesty International into Japanese. My interest in the Southeast Asian 
country steadily grew, and in January 2002, I moved from New Mexico to northern Thailand to 
join a small NGO, which was founded by a Karen activist from Myanmar and two human rights 
lawyers from the United States. From 2002 to 2005, I worked for NGOs in Chiang Mai. And 
from 2005 to 2008, I worked at Chiang Mai University.    
 
                                                
5 See, among others, Brugge and Goble 2002; Graf 1990. 
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In Chiang Mai, I primarily investigated large infrastructure projects in tribal peoples’ 
land. I found myself particularly involved in advocacy against the planned mega-dam projects on 
the Salween River and and the Irrawady River. These were the last of the great rivers in 
Southeast Asia that were still not damned. In the northwestern corner of Yunnan Province, 
adjacent to the Kachin State, a plan to inundate the Salween/Nujiang river was rapidly pursued.   
In April 2004, I went to the northwest corner of Yunnan Province to travel along the 
Salween/Nujiang river with a local intern from Green Watershed, a Chinese environmental NGO 
based in Kunming. We moved upstream along the Chinese-Myanmar border, and stayed in the 
Lisu Autonomous Region. During the visit, heavy landslides suddenly rendered the road along 
the river unusable, blocking our way back to Kunming. So we extended our visit in the Lisu 
country, but in the end we ended up hiking in the mountains along the river for two days to get 
out of the valley. Our party was led by a couple of young Lisu men who knew the trails. The 
Lisu guys—of extraordinarily gentleness and strength—told me that for them it was easy to go 
over to the Myanmar side. Smiling, they said that when they wanted to meet young women they 
would go over the mountains, because on the Myanmar side, where there was no policy on birth 
control, there were more women.      
The mega-dams on the Salween (Nujiang) River caused national debates in China, in 
which Yunnan-based NGOs like Green Watershed had a surprisingly significant impact through 
grassroots networking and sophisticated campaigning. In 2004 the debates led Premier Wen 
Jiabao to suspend the planned dams. This shocked many people and greatly raised the moral of 
the activists. We would soon realize, however, that this suspension meant that the dam projects 
would move westward from the Salween, located within China, to the Irrawaddy, across the 












It was at this time that Kachin youths began to organize their NGOs, executing fact-
finding projects and releasing multi-lingual advocacy publications. Kachin News Group set up 
an office in Chiang Mai and launched the first Kachin-focused news website in 2003. Kachin 
Development Networking Group (KDNG) was formed in 2004, also with an office in Chiang 
Mai. From the beginning, the planned mega-dam at Myitisone on the Irrawaddy River in Kachin 
State was a major concern to these organizations. This project would impound the Irrawaddy 
River for the first time at Myitsone, which was about 40 kilometers north of Myitkyina, the 
capital of Kachin State.  
The Myitsone dam project visibly picked up pace in 2006. In that year, the China Power 
Investment Corporation and the Myanmar Ministry of Electric Power signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding for a 6,000 megawatt project at Myitsone. The generated electricity would be 
transmitted across the border to China, which would make handsome payments to the military 
dictatorship of Myanmar, who would relocate people from the project site, the vast majority of 
whom were Kachin. In 2007, the Kachin Development Networking Group released the first of 
their investigative reports on the controversial dam, a 60-page document titled Damming the 
Irrawaddy, stating that they “join those who have already spoken out to call for an end to the 
Irrawaddy Myitsone dam project” (KDNG 2007, 2).   
I developed a plan to write an in-depth large report that would document the Myitsone 
dam project and the efforts made by Kachin people against it. The Kachin activists were already 
releasing hard-hitting reports and statements rapidly. My idea was to produce an extensive 
analysis that juxtaposed the deceptive schemes of the governments and companies with the 
grassroots activism of the Kachin. 
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A model for my project was the Morse Report on the Sardar Sarovar dams in India, 
which I first read about in Arundhati Roy’s powerful essay titled “The Greater Common Good.” 
The report on the controversial dam project in India, written by a former UN officer, Bradford 
Morse, is described by Roy as follows:   
It unpeels the project delicately, layer by layer, like an onion. Nothing was too big, and 
nothing too small for them to enquire into. They met Ministers and bureaucrats, they met 
NGOs working in the area, went from village to village, from resettlement site to 
resettlement site. They visited the good ones. The bad ones. The temporary ones, the 
permanent ones. They spoke to hundreds of people. … What the Morse Report reveals, in 
temperate, measured tones (which I admire, but cannot achieve) is scandalous. It is the 
most balanced, un-biased, yet damning indictment (Roy 2007, 44).  
My hope was to write a similarily balanced, measured, yet damning document, based on 
meticulous fact-finding. In order for me to write such a study, I needed to talk with both good 
ones and bad ones. 
I was also very inspired by the work by James Scott, whom I was fortunate to meet in 
2007 in Chiang Mai. He was finishing the manuscript for The Art of Not Being Governed: An 
Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, of which he kindly gave me the entire draft. I found 
it a powerful assessment of the upland frontier of mainland Southeast Asia, or “Zomia” as he 
called it. Scott argues that “Zomia” has been “internally colonized” by the modern nation-states, 
as it became:  
suddenly of greatat value to the economies of mature capitalism [because of its] valuable 
resources—oil, iron, ore, copper, lead, timber, uranium, bauxite, the rare metals essential 
to the aerospace and electronics industries, hydroelectric sites, bioprospecting and 
conservation areas—that might in many cases be the linchpin of state revenue. … All the 
more reason to project state power to the nethermost reaches of these ungoverned regions 
and bring their inhabitants under firm control (Scott 2009, 11).  
 
Around this time, I also found a similar assessment in Anna Tsing’s article “Natural Resources 
and Capitalist Frontiers.” Tsing uses the phrase “resource frontier” to refer to the places where 




The late twentieth century saw the creation of new “resource frontiers” in every corner of 
the world. Made possible by Cold War militarization of the Third World and the growing 
power of corporate transnationalism, resource frontiers grew up where entrepreneurs and 
armies were able to disengage nature from local ecologies and livelihoods, “freeing up” 
natural resources that bureaucrats and generals could offer as corporate raw materials 
(Tsing 2005, 28). 
The Kachin region of northern Myanmar illustrated the dynamics of the “internal colonialism” 
and the “resource frontier” most vividly. The Kachin State had been already ravaged by 
entrepreneurs who cut forests to produce timber, as exposed in detail by Global Wittness’s 2003 
report. If the logging had been carried out by a multitude of small-scale traders, now gigantic 
dams were pursued by bureaucrats, armies, and multi-nationals, who were descending together 
on Kachin State like vultures. It was difficult to find a better illustration of what Scott calls the 
“last great enclosure” than the Kachin region, which was being steadily squeezed by China and 
Myanmar.  
 These destructive projects are built in places like New Mexico or Kachin State because 
the interests of the tribal peoples like the Navajo or the Kachin are not taken into account. In the 
upland frontier of mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern USA, a frontier was a place that the 
rich and powerful pillage the tribal peoples’ land for the purpose of extracting natural resources 
for their own benefits. In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott acknowledged this pattern of 
internal colonialism as a global phenomena. He declared: “Zomia is the largest remaining region 
of the world whose peoples have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states. Its days are 
numbered” (Scott 2009, ix). I thought that my role was to document the last days of Zomia.   
I conceived a plan to conduct extensive fieldwork in the Kachin State. It appeared then 
that such a fieldwork might just be feasible. In fact there was already a doctoral student from the 
US (Curtis W Lambrecht at Yale) who was conducting fieldwork in Myitkyina. Another doctoral 
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student, Nicholas Farrelly at Oxford, had already started to post a series of observations from 
Myitkyina in the pathbreaking blog New Mandala. I spoke with researchers (such as Kevin 
Woods, who later went to UC-Berkeley) who were familiar with the scene and learned more 
about what it was like to stay in the Kachin State. Already there were both domestic and 
international NGOs operating in the region.6 It semed that I would be able to stay in Myitkyina 
for an extended period, as long as I was not identified as an activist but a non-political 
university-based researcher.   
In 2007 I also met Carl Grundy-Warr, a political geographer at the National University of 
Singapore. He was carrying out an in-depth study of displacement in upland Myanmar himself. 
He had already supervised a doctoral student (Karin Dean) who wrote a dissertation about the 
Kachin. It made great sense to conduct a doctoral research project about the Kachin under his 
supervision. The next year I found myself in a doctoral program at the university in Singapore.  
 
Orientation (2): Meeting the Kachin in Singapore 
I knew that my perspective had heavy activist biases. I needed to broaden my horizons 
and sources by meeting people with different backgrounds and opinions. I was also hoping to 
make Kachin friends who could potentially help me prepare for my fieldwork. I had Kachin 
friends in Chiang Mai, but all of them were activists. I did not want to bother them for various 
reasons.        
I chose Singapore also because there were many migrants from Myanmar in the city state. 
It turned out to be very easy to find Kachin in Singapore. When I was leaving Chiang Mai a 
                                                
6 The two largest domestic NGOs in the Kachin region are Metta Foundation led by a Kachin 
woman (Lapahi Seng Raw) and Nyein (Shalom) Foundation also led by Kachin civilian leaders, 
especially Rev. Lahtaw Saboi Jum and his daughter Lahtaw Ja Nan. The largest international 
NGO was the Christian group World Concern 
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Kachin friend asked me if I could deliver a small package to her friend, a Kachin, in Singapore; I 
received an envelope and a phone number. Upon arriving in Singapore, I called the number and 
talked with this Kachin person. Zau Naw, as it turned out, was a student at the Singapore Bible 
College and the music director of the Kachin church in Singapore. Zau Naw told me on the 
phone that he was not able to meet me, because he was about to fly to Tokyo to visit the Kachin 
church there. Realizing that I was at the National University of Singapore he suggested that I 
meet his friend who, it turned out, was attending the same university. That is how I met Kum Ja, 
a doctoral student in engineering.   
Kum Ja was surprised to meet someone who knew something about the Kachin, “our 
tribe” as he put it in English. We often met for lunch or coffee and chatted for hours. A great 
story-teller, Kum Ja would tell me fascinating tales about life in Myanmar. Understanding that 
my interest in the Kachin was serious, he asked me if I wanted to see his Kachin (Jinghpaw) 
langauge books. I eagerly followed him to his desk in the engineering building. In a large room 
shared with many other students, Kum Ja had a small cubicle. On one side on his desk was a 
heap of dissertation drafts and relevant scientific papers. On the other side was an equally tall 
pile of Jinghpaw-language publications. “A lot of KIA [Kachin Independent Army] propaganda, 
ha ha ha!” laughed Kum Ja. ⁠ At the most prominent spot on his desk was a sheet of paper, pinned 
down on the front wall of his cubicle. It read: " Commit your way to the Lord; trust in Him, and 
He will act. Psalm 37:5” This was the first time that I realized that he was a devout Christian.     
While Kum Ja and I were talking, he was frequently receiving phone calls from Kachin 
friends. I gathered that it was usually about the church. Kum Ja also introduced me to some other 
Kachins living near the university. They all belonged to the same Kachin Christian congregation 
in Singapore. I wanted to meet more Kachin people, but I was hesitant because I considered the 
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church to be their private space. I felt that because I was neither Kachin nor Christian I should 
not bother them at their place of worship. In Chiang Mai, I knew that there was a Kachin church 
but I never bothered to visit there. But I was too curious. One day I asked him about the church, 
and I cautiously asked Kum Ja if I may possibly visit in the future because I wanted to meet 
more Kachin people. He was very pleased to hear this question, and told me emphatically that I 
would be most welcome.    
My first visit to the Kachin Singapore Christian Fellowship at the Bethesda Chapel in 
October 2008 turned out to be a Kachin holiday, their Kachin Thanksgiving Day. The Bethesda 
Chapel is located in the eastern part of the city, where four worship services are held on Sunday: 
two English services in the morning, one Chinese (Mandarin) service in the afternoon, and then 
the Kachin (Jinghpaw) service in the evening. Because the Kachins gather there in the evening, it 
is customary that they have dinner (delicious Kachin food) before the service. On that day, the 
Kachin worship service included a special Thanksgiving show with a group of children dancing 
on the stage. There was also a power-point presentation of the history of the Kachin Christians in 
Singapore. I learnt that the Singapore Kachin Christian Fellowship had been holding its 
Jinghpaw-language service every Sunday at this chapel since 2001. About one hundred people 
were there. There were men and women, young and old, rich and poor, but a majority of them 
were young women; I was told that most of them were working as nurses. I had never seen so 
many Kachin people together, so I observed aloud: “Your church has a a lot of people!” Then 
every person who heard me immediately responded: “O, this is very small. We have much bigger 




In the spring of 2009, Kum Ja invited me to a wedding at the church. The groom and the 
bride were both from Kachin State in Myanmar, but it was at the church in Singapore that they 
first met. Many people put on traditional clothes; women wearing bright red skirts, and men were 
donning the purpose Kachin headband. The highlight of a Kachin wedding is the giving of a long 
sword and a traditional bag from the bride to the groom. They had all the traditional Kachin 
items in Singapore. Countless mobile phones were flashing, and designated videographers were 
recording the whole ceremony.  
 
Figure 1. A wedding at the Kachin church in Singapore (2009) 
 
Back then there were two Kachin graduate students at the National University of 
Singapore. One was Kum Ja and the other was Dan Hkung Awng, who was attending the Lee 
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Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Because his school was located on a separate campus, I 
usually met him at the church, where he was also a very active member. Dan Hkung Awng was a 
graduate of the recently established liberal arts program at the Myanmar Institute of Theology in 
Yangon. He was the first Kachin ever to join a graduate program in public policy. This young 
man of exceptional intelligence was then writing his Masters thesis on Rwanda, where he had 
stayed and conducted fieldwork on energy policy. Because of our common interest in energy 
issues, we had animated discussions and debates about energy issues in Myanmar, especially 
about hydropower developments in Kachin. Dan Hkung Awng ended up changing the topic of 
his masters thesis from Rwanda’s national energy policy to the Myitsone dam in his homeland. 
Upon graduation in 2010, he returned to Myitkyina, his hometown. He would be the most 
important person who gave me invaluable assisatance in Myitkyina and elsewhere during my 
research. Dan Hkung Awng even travelled with me in Thailand and Yunnan, visiting various 
Kachin communities.The two people who helped me most in preparing my fieldwork were 
graduate students at my university. I spoke with them countless times before, during, and after 
my fieldwork.  
 
Orientation (3): Preliminary trip and making a mistake 
While I was preparing for my fieldwork, however, the political situation in the Kachin 
region of northern Myanmar was rapidly deteriorating. Even at the wedding at the church in 
Singapore, the people were incessantly talking about the political crisis in their homeland. The 
relationship between the Kachin Independence Army and the Myanmar government began to 
unravel in 2009, when the latter announced a new policy to subsume the Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA) under the command of the Myanmar military forces (Tatmadaw). 
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The KIA was originally founded in 1961.7 It carried out guerrilla warfare against the 
Myanmar military across Kachin State and northern Shan State for three decades, until the 
signing of a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government in 1994.8 The ceasefire 
agreement allowed the KIA to officially open a liaison office in Myitkyina and conduct non-
military enterprises while prohibiting the organization from recruiting new soldiers.   
The 2009 policy stipulated that the ceasefire groups be incorporated into the command of 
the Myanmar national military as “Border Guard Forces.” From the perspective of the Myanmar 
government, which had installed a new Constitution in 2008, this new policy was a necessary 
step toward national reconciliation and post-conflict normalization of the Union of Myanmar. 
The Myanmar government demanded compliance with this policy as a prerequisite for the 
participation in the upcoming election scheduled in 2010. With this policy the government sent a 
message to the ceasefire groups: “If you want to join the election, dismantle your army first.” All 
the groups were told to comply by October.  
From the perspective of the ceasefire groups, of which there were seventeen in the 
country, the new policy presented a choice between participating in the planned national election 
and returning to guerrilla warfare. On the one hand, non-compliance with the new policy meant 
that they would miss the first election to be held in 20 years. They knew better than anyone that 
the prospect for military victory was grimmer than ever. On the other hand, dismantling their 
own military forces meant the end of armed resistance. They knew better than anyone the 
limitations of non-military means in dealing with the Myanmar army. They did not think the 
                                                
7 Technically, there are two organizations: the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the 
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The former is the military and the latter the civilian 
governing body. In this study, I will use “KIA” for the sake of brevity and consistency.  
8 The primary reason that the KIA made the ceasefire agreement was that they lost access 
to arms when the Burmese Communist Party collapsed in 1989. 
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election would fair or free. Nor were they convinced that the new parliament would enable 
meaningful participation for the minority populations. Only a few groups, such as the 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, which had enjoyed an amicable relationship with the 
government from the beginning, accepted the new policy of the Border Guard Forces. The real 
question was how the two largest and strongest of the ceasefire groups—the United Wa State 
Army and the Kachin Independence Army—would react.      
When I joined the graduate program, Kachin State was considered an exceptionally 
accessible area among the ethnic minority areas in Myanmar. By the time I was writing my 
dissertation proposal and preparing for the qualification exam, however, the stability of the 
ceasefire came into question.  
 I visited Myitkyina in January 2010 as soon as I passed the qualification exam in 
Singapore. In Myitkyina, Kum Ja’s family welcomed me with much hospitality. Kum Ja’s 
brother-in-law, Zau Tu, in particular took me to many places including the site of the Myitisone 
dam project. Dan Hkun Awng was there himself. He introduced me to his friends, with whom I 
spent many evenings. The most important purpose of my trip then was to make an arrangement 
for a long-term stay in Myitkyina. I realized, however, that the political situation had already 
deteriorated further than I had appreciated. Every one was concerned about the future of the KIA.  
Many people I met assumed that I was interested in contemporary politics, and I was 
often asked whether or not I wanted to meet political leaders. I was certainly interested but I 
declined the offers simply because I thought it might be risky for my long-term purposes. I only 
saw the KIA’s liaison’s office—which was essentially the KIA’s embassy. It was located in front 
of the famous Manau Park. This is the venue of the Kachin State Day, a big holiday celebrated 
every year in mid January with a Kachin traditional dance. Having toured around the park, we sat 
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down to rest at a tea shop on the road near the park’s main entrance. As we were sipping tea, Dan 
Hkung Awng told me that the large building across the street from us was the liaison office of 
the KIA. He told me that a surest way for me to get deported was to enter the building.  
When I confided to a few people that I was hoping to stay for an extended period of time 
they suggested that it would be better to wait until the BGF problem was somehow resolved. No 
one knew how and when this problem could be solved, however. The KIA responded to the BGF 
policy by submitting a series of counter-proposals, which were swiftly rejected by the Myanmar 
government. After one particular experience, I decided to heed the advice and postpone my 
future visit indefinitely.  
One day, Zau Tu asked me if I wanted to visit his wife Seng Ja (that is, Kum Ja’s sister) 
at work. I had known that she worked at Myitkyina University. The family was proud of the fact 
that she was one of the few Kachin members of the university faculty. I was interested in paying 
a visit because it is the only national university in Kachin State. I knew that visiting a university 
could be tricky; because of the history of student activism, foreigners were basically not allowed 
to visit a university campus in the country.  
I knew from my experience in Yangon, however, that if you were invited, then it was 
possible to visit a campus. In fact, in the spring of 2008, shortly after Cyclone Nargis devastated 
the Irrawaddy Delta, I was invited to Yangon University’s main campus by a Burmese friend 
who was a member of the faculty. They were having a meeting about the Delta and he thought 
that I should come and observe. I was welcomed by a group of researchers, most of them from 
the Chemistry Department. They even took me on an overnight field trip to the Delta the 
following week. This happened during an extremely tense period. The Myanmar government 
was roundly condemned for its failure to make relief efforts; it was even openly suggested that 
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foreign governments make a humanitarian intervention to the country.9 Given this experience, I 
thought that a visit to Myitkyina University would not cause a serious problem; after all I was 
invited by the spouse of a faculty member. So Zau Tu and I went over to the campus.  
When we arrived, Seng Ja looked rather surprised but she was gracious to introduce me 
to her colleagues. Because I wanted to give a good impression to them at the university, I made 
sure to greet them in a most respectful manner. While I was conversing with Seng Ja’s 
colleagues, however, Seng Ja pulled Zau Tu aside and whispered to his ear. In response, Zau Tu 
suggested that we leave. I noticed that he looked concerned, and so did Seng Ja. As we were 
hurriedly leaving the campus, Zau Tu told me that Seng Ja’s boss was not pleased that a 
foreigner had suddenly showed up. I saw that he was worried and upset. Zau Tu and I conversed 
in Burmese, but because my Burmese was poor, I was not able to understand exactly what went 
wrong. Did I do or say something wrong? What I understood was that Seng Ja was potentially in 
trouble and that she would have to apologize for the incident to her supervisor. I felt terrible. The 
experience confirmed that I was not capable of navigating my research project in the intricate 
political landscape of Myitkyina.   
I talked with my Kachin friends about this incident. They told me that it was not serious 
and that I did not need to be worried. They blamed the university and the government, which 
were dominated by Burmans who enjoyed intimidating the Kachin. They said that their stupid, 
nonsensical rules were to blame. One thing was clear to me: I was not able to make judgment 
with comfort and confidence. I decided to wait until the political tensions subsided.    
The situation went from bad to worse, however. The negotiations between the KIA and 
the Myanmar government did not go forward. The deadline, postponed from October 2009 to 
                                                
9 The proponents included Bernard Kouchner, then the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and a former founder of Médecins Sans Frontières. 
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February 2010, was again extended to April 2010. The government declared that the deadline 
would not be postponed again; past April 2010 the ceasefire agreements would be nulled and that 
groups like the KIA would be considered illegal armed organizations.  
On April 17, 2010, ten days before the final deadline, a series of bombs exploded in the 
Myitsone dam project site, killing four and injuring a dozen. There were conflicting news reports, 
especially whether or not the dead were Chinese dam workers. The details remain unconfirmed 
to this day. No one claimed responsibility for the explosions, and the government interrogated 
hundreds of local people (Kachin News Group). According to Human Rights Watch, a total of 43 
Kachin youths were detained for weeks; several youths in detention were beaten and severely 
injured. Some remained in detention for many months. At the same time, the relocation project 
began, removing 1,000 villagers from the vicinity of the Myitsone dam project site (U.S. 
Department of State 2011,16). 
In August, the Myanmar government took a drastic military action against another 
ceasefire group. They sent troops to Laukkai, the town in eastern Shan State, where the 
headquarters of the Kokang ceasefire group were located. In three days the Tatmadaw took over 
the town, causing 30,000 civilians to flee across the border; they were placed in refugee shelters 
on the Chinese side. My Kachin friends were all saying that this was a message to the Kachin: 
“You are the next target.”       
During this time, I based myself in Chiang Mai, making trips to Yangon regularly. As the 
tensions only increased, I was concerned whether or not I would be able to obtain a visa to the 
country so many times. It was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain a tourist visa to the 
country. A good Burmese friend of mine in Yangon ran a private company and was kind to issue 
a letter of invitation so that I would be able to obtain a business visa. Knowing that I was a 
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researcher, he told me that I did not have to tell him what I was really doing in the country. But I 
was very concerned that I might put him in trouble.  
As the November 2010 election approached, the government began to expel foreigners 
whom they deemed suspicious. A friend of mine, an English-language teacher from Ireland, was 
expelled suddenly. I knew him quite well because we had taken an intensive Burmese course 
together and we were often conversation partners in the class. I knew for sure that he was not any 
sort of political player. My Burmese-language teacher in Chiang Mai, Nance Cunningham, from 
whom I was taking a daily lesson, was also banned from entering Myanmar indefinitely. Nance 
had lived in Yangon for many years; she married a Burmese writer, and is fluent in the language. 
She was not an activist either. My former bosses at EarthRights International were also 
permanently banned. I was concerned whether or not I could secure a visa to Myanmar and 
conduct substantive research about the Kachin. I thought that I could be expelled from the 
country quite easily, since I had actually been an activist very publicly and it was easy to look up 
my activism on the internet.  
 In June 2011, the war between the KIA and the Tatmadaw resumed. The KIA liaison 
office in Myitkyina was closed. Many of the youths I met in Myitkyina joined the military or 
humanitarian efforts. In November 2011, a bomb exploded in the city of Myitkyina, killing many 
students.10 By this time I completely gave up the idea of conducting a long-term fieldwork in the 
Kachin region. I was forced to make major adjustments to continue my research project. First of 
all, a preliminary survey in Chiang Mai led me to interact with minority groups within the 
“Kachin” category and recognize the importance of ethnic churches as reflections of social 
                                                
10 In the first half of 2012, I visited Myitkyina twice, where I visited an IDP camp. I also visited 
a refugee camp on the Chinese border in early 2011. My experiences during these visits are 
largely outside the scope of the present study; I hope to write about them after I conduct 
additional research and when the war is over. 
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relations among various “Kachin” groups. Secondly, instead of focusing on contemporary issues 
(such as the ongoing mega-dam projects) I spent much time in archives and pursued a more 
historical inquiry. Thirdly, I had to give up my initial idea of a long stay in Myitkyina; instead I 
made short trips to many places. As a result of these reorientations, instead of focusing on the 
Kachin as a resource frontier, I came to investigate the Kachin as an evangelical frontier. In the 
following, I delineate and analyze the course of my fieldwork. 
 
Reorientation (1): Visiting ethnic churches  
In 2010, I was primarily based in Chiang Mai, making trips to Myanmar regularly. In 
Chiang Mai, I hired a young Kachin man named Ah La, as an assistant on a full-time basis for 
three months, and I conducted structured interviewed with 50 Kachin individuals, collecting their 
life-histories. (I had known Ah La’s brother because he worked for an NGO and we had worked 
together briefly.) Although the sampling was not random and there were several sources for 
selection bias, I thought that the data from fifty Kachin might give me something to start with in 
an early stage of my research.  
I wanted to understand better especially what it was like to grow up in the Kachin region, 
asking in particular about family life, schooling, and livelihood activities. The data collected 
showed a wide range of livelihood activities and a high-level of mobility. What surprised me 
most, however, was the fact that the interviewees spoke such a variety of languages. The 
interviews were conducted in the Jinghpaw language, thanks to my assistant-translator; so 
everyone spoke Jinghpaw (with the sole exception of a Wa man who was married to a Kachin 
woman; he was interviewed in Burmese). I had anticipated that they all also spoke Burmese 
because of school education, and I was right. But a surprisingly many of them also spoke 
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additional minority languages such as Laungwaw/Lhaovo (Maru), Lashi, Zaiwa, and Achang. 
Perhaps this should not have surprised me, because “Kachin” is a name given to a diverse group 
of highlanders whose lingua franca was Jinghpaw. But the intriguing fact here was that there 
were almost no speakers of Lisu or Rawang—two major “Kachin” languages. I asked Ah La and 
other Kachin friends about this, and I found out that the Lisu and the Rawang had their own 
separate churches and communities in Chiang Mai. My assistant and other Jinghpaw-Kachin 
friends were not familiar with the Lisu and Rawang communities.  
I knew only two Rawang in the Chiang Mai activist network, and I knew no Lisu. I was 
able to contact the Rawang friends and I went to their church to meet more people. The worship 
service was conducted in Rawang language but surprisingly it provided simultaneous translation 
to Burmese. It turned out that the worship service was conducted in one “central” Rawang, but 
there were quite a few in the congregation who were not able to understand this particular 
Rawang language; they needed to use the Burmese translation, which was aired through wireless 
earphones. Some understood the Jinghpaw language but others didn’t. The Jinghpaw speakers 
tend to say that the Jinghpaw is the lingua-franca for the entire Kachin including Rawang and 
Lisu, but I was learning in Chiang Mai that this was not such a clear-cut case.     
At the Rawang church, I also met a pastor who was a Lisu-Rawang (his parents were a 
Lisu and a Rawang, and he spoke both languages fluently). He told me that the Lisu had multiple 
churches in Chiang Mai and they were much more scattered and decentralized. This made sense 
because the Lisu settlements were indeed extremely scattered across western Yunnan, northern 
Myanmar, northeastern India, and northern Thailand. I learned that there were many Lisu from 
Myanmar working on particular streets in a very touristy part of Chiang Mai, working at 
restaurants and bars that catered to foreign tourists. I visited these places, chatted with the Lisu 
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workers, and confirmed that only a few of them spoke Jinghpaw and interacted with the 
Jinghpaw community in Chiang Mai, while all of them spoke Burmese.  
The Jinghpaw-Kachin would like to talk about “wunpawng,” which means “union” in 
Jinghpaw. “Wunpawng” refers to the union of six major tribes: Jinghpaw, Lashi/Lachik, 
Lawngwaw, Zaiwa, Rawang, and Lisu. In fact, the Kachin church in Chiang Mai is officially 
named “Wunpawng Christian Church” (wunpawng hkristan nook hpung). But certainly there are 
many, especially among Rawang and Lisu, who claim that they are not Kachin and that they do 
not belong to “Wunpawng.”  
These findings about the delicate nature of the “wunpawng” union made me wonder 
whether or not I should learn the Jinghpaw language or the Burmese language. Because I was not 
sure when I would be able to stay in the Kachin region, I thought it might be better for me to 
learn the Burmese language rather than the Jinghpaw language. I wrote a long email to Mandy 
Sadan, the renowned historian at SOAS, whom I had already met. She thought that learning 
Jinghpaw might be very difficult because there was no textbook or a trained teacher. I decided to 
learn Burmese instead of Jinghpaw.11 
The most significant learning for me from my research in Chiang Mai was that the 
Protestant churches reflected the social and ethnolinguistic relations among the upland peoples of 
                                                
11 The choice of Burmese was based on my desire to speak with peoples of a wide ethno-
linguistic backgrounds. It was also influenced by the book of oral history written by Burmese 
authors. Several of the books by the famous writer Ludu U Hla (1910-1982) were available in 
English and Japanese translations. He collected and published a number of oral histories in the 
1950s by interviewing marginal figures in society such as prisoners (Ludu U Hla 1958, 1960).  
They were uniquely powerful because of their attention to details and engagement with emotions. 
Ludu U Hla was able to publish oral histories before the military dictatorship installed harsh 
censorship. Even under the military censorship, however, Mya Than Tint (1929-1998), another 
well-known author, managed to published a volume of oral histories; his sensitive observations 
in his On the Road to Mandalay [Annyattara Yoke Pon Hlwa] also greatly impressed me. These 
oral histories published by Burmese authors made me think that detailed individual life-stories 
would be a particularly effective way to write the histories of a marginalized people. 
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northern Myanmar. I had known that there were Rawang groups that had antagonistic relations 
with the Kachin insurgency movement. But the Rawang remained rather invisible to me until I 
paid a visit to their church. I realized that the churches were important sites not only to meet the 
Kachin in Singapore but to meet many other upland groups elsewhere.         
 
Reorientation (2): Turning to history and historiography  
 Initially, I had no particular plan to conduct an in-depth historical inquiry. I was 
preoccupied with contemporary political issues, which gave me a sense of urgency. In order to 
stay in places like Myitkyina for weeks, however, I needed to offer to the authorities a plausible 
reason for my stay. My solution to this problem was to present myself as an amateur historian, 
who was interested in the past of the Kachin region. It was true that I was interested in history. 
When I was pressed to explain why I was interested in the history of the Kachin region, I would 
say that my uncle had died in this region during the Second World War. This was not true at all; 
no one in my family had been to Myanmar. But this answer—that I was visiting my dead 
uncle—seemed to work well; it satisfied the questioning person every time. I actually I met a 
Japanese man of my age at the Myitkyina airport one day, who told me that his uncle had died in 
Myitkyina in 1944. I also met a number local people in Myitkyina who told me about the fierce 
battles fought between the Japanese and the allied forces across the town. An elderly man even 
gave me to a tour of the major battlefields. So I began to present myself as an amateur historian 
with a tie to the region through my dead uncle, when I had to give a reason of my extended stay 
to the authority. I thought that my Kachin friends who were helping me could also use this story 
if and when they were approached by the authority and asked about me.  
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 I visited the archive at the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) in Myitkyina simply 
because I thought a historian was supposed to visit archives. I thought that I should act like a 
historian as an alibi. After I visited the Kachin State Cultural Museum (which bored me), I duly 
paid a visit to the archive at KBC without any expectations. When I arrived, the door of the 
archive was shut; it appeared that no one was ever using the archive. Eventually we found the 
staff person to open the door. Once inside, I found myself fascinated with an eclectic collection 
of items in there. The archive had, for example, an almost complete set of the oldest Jinghpaw-
Kachin language newspaper, which was published in the 1920s. After all it was the Baptist 
church who invented the orthography for the language and began printing in the early period of 
the 20th century; so they had all sorts of vernacular publications. What drew my attention in 
particular was the collection of small booklets—local church histories. These booklets have been 
produced by the churches for their anniversary (“jubilee”) events. I had never seen a history book 
authored and printed by the Kachin. Suddenly there were countless local histories across the 
Kachin region in front of me.  
 In the summer of 2010, I spent a month in Yangon and frequented the Myanmar Institute 
of Theology (MIT). MIT is the largest theology school in the country. Many of the Kachin 
pastors I had met—as well as my friend Dan Hkung Awng—graduated from this school. At MIT, 
the graduate students must write their theses in English. Therefore they had hundreds of MA 
theses that I was able to read without assistance. The theses written by Kachin students on 
Kachin-related ranged from historical studies such as “History of Shan State Kachin Baptist 
Association,” “History of Kachin Baptist Women’s Department,” and “Life of Colonel Paphai 
Khun Naung,” to more social studies such as “Kachin Women Leaders” and “Opiate Abuse 
among Kachin People.” There were also a number of theses that focus on the Lisu (for example, 
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“History of Lisu Christian Church of Myanmar,” “Poverty and Development of Lisu People in 
Myanmar,” and “Gynong Rawang People in Myanmar”). The theses were allowed to be taken 
outside of the archive. So I read dozens of the theses, pouring sweat in the archive room without 
an air-conditioning. I also collected and went through all the doctoral theses written by Kachin in 
theological schools in the US (predominantly at the Fuller Theological Seminar in Pasadena, 
California). 
 This was how I was introduced to a literary genre that was entirely new to me—
evangelical historiography. I began to realize that that the vast majority of the Kachin historical 
texts were produced and preserved by the Protestant (predominantly Baptist) churches and that 
the Kachin history was told by the Kachin chiefly as an evangelical story. Each thesis typically 
begins with a quotation of a verse from the Bible, and an acknowledgement saying that the thesis 
could not have been written without the love of Jesus Christ, etc. In the beginning, I read these 
theses in order to identify and extract what I considered to be factual information. I looked for 
verifiable data such as dates, places, persons, and organizations. Basically, I was hoping to 
construct a long chronology and a large map of the Kachin region. That is, I was translating a 
evangelical text into a secular text of empirical history. Later, when I received privately 
published memoirs from some Kachin families, I realized that this extractive approach was 
probably misdirected, however.    
 Hearing that there was a foreign researcher interested in local history, several Kachin 
individuals kindly contacted me—some in person and others by email. I received a variety of 
writings in English. Some wanted me to proofread their manuscripts, but others gave me 
completed texts in English. I was surprised that there were such substantive English-language 
texts written by Kachin elites, but I was reminded that the official languages of the KIA and the 
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Kachin Theological College were Jinghpaw and English. Two of the publications I was given in 
particular caught my attention. Petition of the Sluggard: Essay by Tertius Doi and My Life and 
Times: A Journey in Faith by Lahpai Khun Awng. Petition of the Sluggard, a 75-page booklet, 
was written by an author who used the pseudonym of “Tertius Doi.” My Life and Times, a 141-
page book, was written by an author who migrated to the United States at the end of his life. I 
found these private publications written by two Kachin elders in jargon-free, straightforward 
styles particularly revealing. Both of the authors were politically active individuals, but they 
offer in their writings unusually frank opinions on a variety of issues that the Kachin people are 
facing. As the titles suggest, however, both of the authors are ultimately concerned with their 
faith in Christianity, and they present the books as testimonies of their evangelism. I had to think 
more seriously about the fact that these elders decided to dedicate their memoirs to the cause of 
evangelism, and I found it altogether inappropriate to extract the data from these texts without 
reference to their evangelical nature. How have evangelical narratives become so powerful 
among the Kachin? Even if the influence is limited to the Kachin elite, I thought that this was a 
worthy question.   
 That I am not able to engage more deeply with the Kachin vernacular literature and 
media is an obvious shortcoming of this research. Although I had a number of vernacular articles 
translated by several Kachin friends (especially Dan Hkung Awng), I was not able to find 
compositions that were as engaging as the above-mentioned texts written in English.12 Therefore, 
I relied quite heavily on the English-language writings by Kachin authors. My readings of these 
materials might be able to give only partial and preliminary findings, but I hope that they can 
point to promising directions for further research.   
                                                
12 The only exception might be the series of research studies published by the independent Kachin scholar 
Pungga Ja Li. Unfortunately I was not able to meet this prominent scholar until late 2011, because he relocated to 
the China-Myanmar border. 
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  I was initially only pretending to be interested in history but, ironically, I found myself 
fascinated with obscure materials—those collecting dust in Baptist archives and those given to 
me by Kachin friends personally. If there is a lesson here, it is that an archive can be a field of 
ethnographic encounter. I never got to live in a rural village in Kachin State. Instead, I met 
countless urban Kachins and spent countless hours in decrepit rooms, searching and reading 
obscure texts written by Kachin Christians. But this was how I encountered the compositions by 
dozens of Kachin elites, all of whom dedicated their writings to evangelism.          
 
Reorientation (3): finding a “field” in many places 
 The political crisis in the Kachin region forced me to make short trips to more accessible 
Kachin communities in various places. Within Myanmar, I repeatedly visited the Kachin 
community in Yangon, which was surprisingly large. When I went up to the Kachin region in the 
northern part of the country, I usually stayed in the two cities with hotels for foreigners: 
Myitkyina and Lashio. Later, in 2011, at the end of my fieldwork period, I also travelled to Laiza, 
the town on the Myanmar-China border where the KIA’s headquarters were located. I saw a few 
familiar faces there. Many Kachin youths moved to the border to assist the humanitarian efforts. 
I had met some of them in Yangon and Myitkyina before. They drove me from Laiza to refugee 
camps that were dotted along the river that marked the international boundary between China 
and Myanmar.  
 I also visited all the major overseas Kachin communities. In Thailand, many Kachin live 
in Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Baan Mai Samaki (the only Kachin village in Thailand).13 I 
visited the very active Kachin communities in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Tokyo. I also 
                                                
13 I also visited and talked with Kachin persons in Mae Sai (a town with a large 
population of migrants from Myanmar) and at a refugee camp in Tak Province. 
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contacted and interviewed certain Kachin individuals in Canada and the USA, who had written 
memoirs.  
 While I travelled to various Kachin communities, I noticed that I was not alone in making 
these trips. Again and again, I ran into the same Kachin pastors, who were also visiting the same 
communities. These pastors were constantly traveling. Zau Nau, whom I first contacted upon my 
arrival in Singapore, was a popular musician and music teacher. He was invited by various 
churches all the time. He was visiting Japan far more frequently than I was.    
 Rev. Latt Awng, a Bangkok-based pastor from the Kachin Baptist Convention was 
another itinerant pastor whom I kept running into in various places. I met him for the first time in 
Singapore in 2009 when he came from Bangkok to stop by the Kachin church briefly. His main 
destination was actually Kuala Lumpur, so I took the long-distance bus ride from Singapore to 
Kuala Lumpur with him. During the ride, he told me, laughing, that he was always on the bus. 
He did not speak much Thai but he had mastered the bus system in and around Bangkok. Every 
week he got on a bus to visit Mahachai in Samut Prakan province (a port town near Bangkok 
with a huge number of Burmese migrants) and then to Pattaya (a large beach-side city near 
Bangkok) to lead the worship services. He would also visit Kuala Lumpur occasionally, because 
the Kachin community was exceptionally large there.14  
 When I had a chance to visit Rev. Latt Awng at his house in Bangkok later, he proudly 
showed me video footage of the service in Mahachai. The service is conducted in Burmese there, 
because there are many non-Kachin Baptists in Mahachai. He told me that he was proud to have 
the service in Burmese because as an evangelist he wants to spread the Gospel not just to the 
Kachin people but to everyone. He is perfectly fluent in Burmese because he had worked for 
                                                
14 It is estimated that there are about 4,000 Kachin people in and around Kuala Lumpur. 
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decades for the Myanmar government as a civilian officer. When he had a car accident, he 
reflected on his life and decided to retire from government work. He went to the Myanmar 
Institute of Theology in Yangon. When he was ordained as a Baptist pastor, he began his 
ministry. He said that his dream was always to be an evangelist. Today Bangkok is this Kachin 
pastor’s mission field.   
 Bangkok is only one of many frontiers for the Kachin evangelists. Today the Kachin 
Baptist Convention appoints full-time overseas pastors in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Tokyo. 
There are also self-supporting Kachin churches in Chiang Mai, Singapore, and Tokyo15. When I 
visited the Kachin Baptist church in Tokyo, I learned that they translated the entire worship 
service into Japanese, encouraging their Japanese friends to come. When I met KBC’s General 
Secretary, Rev. Samsung in Tokyo, he told me that he was in fact hoping to send missions to 
Europe and North America, because he thinks Christianity is seriously declining in the West. 
 The peripatetic extent of the pastors also amazed me when I visited Lashio in northern 
Shan State in early 2012. Rev. K.D. Brang Ja took me around and helped me interview a dozen 
people during my stay. He too had been to Japan repeatedly, and he had even stayed in Kenya as 
a visiting pastor there. He introduced me to another pastor, Rev. Maran Sing Gawng, who was 
from a small town called Kutkai north of Lashio. I was pleased to meet someone from Kutkai 
because foreigners were not permitted to go there. Noticing that I was from Japan, Rev. Sing 
Awng told me that he was very sorry about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. I felt that I should 
explain what the nuclear disaster was all about to this pastor, who was from a remote town in a 
war-tone region. While I was giving a detailed account, I noticed that he seemed to already know 
everything I was saying. It turned out that he himself had visited Fukushima on a relief effort 
organized jointly by Japanese and Kachin Baptist churches. It was him, not me, who knew what 
                                                
15 Tokyo has two Kachin churches: one Baptist and another non-denominational. 
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was happening in Fukushima. His church had also collected donations and sent money to the 
Baptist church in Japan. 
 My research thus ended up being a multi-site project. Again this was not so much a 
choice but a result of my desperate attempt to find and talk with as many Kachin people as 
possible. I did not design my research project as a multi-site project, and I was deeply 
disappointed that I was not able to spend more time in the Kachin region. It was only when my 
fieldwork ended that I read about “multi-site fieldwork” (Marcus 1995).  
 I realized that my “field site” was everywhere. My “fieldwork” effectively traced the 
itineraries of the traveling Kachin migrants, refugees, and evangelists. I found a Kachin 
geography that is not confined to Kachin State, Myanmar, or Zomia. By visiting multiple Kachin 
communities I was able to gain insights into the ways in which the Kachin etwork and maintain a 
strong sense of solidarity despite the long distances that separate them. 
 Prior to my fieldwork I had assumed that the Kachin people were in the trenches, 
defending their homeland from external enemies. As it turned out, the Kachin Christians were 
vigorously conducting evangelical missions not only within but also beyond Zomia. Contrary to 
my expectation, the Kachin people had appropriated the modern discourse of frontier on their 
own. From them I had expected to hear about tragedy. But they told me much more about their 
frontier comedy. I realized that that my own plan to write a tragedy needed to be reconsidered 
and I needed to take more seriously this comic power of the frontier imagination. 
 The Art of Not Being Governed, a great book of the frontier tragedy, told only one half of 
the story. The other half, left unexplored by Scott, is about the contemporary activities that the 
upland people carry out in order to create new frontiers of their own. The Art of Not Being 
Governed in fact discusses this power of an alternative cosmology, which inverts the order of the 
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world and gives hope to the downtrodden. Scott even briefly analyzes the contemporary 
popularity of Christianity by characterizing it as a latest form of the age-old millenarian 
prophetism. In the final chapter titled “Prophets of Renewal,” he argues that the upland 
prophetism, with a “radical bias for hope,” has a unique ability to instill among the marginal and 
dispossessed the “conviction that the world is headed their way.” Scott characterizes prophecy as 
“the most comprehensive and ambitious form of escape social structure,” and “the capacity of 
hill peoples to strike out, almost overnight, for new territory—socially, religiously, ethnically” 
(Scott 2009, 313–315), he makes it sounds like a magical ability. Despite his determination to 
“‘deexoticize’ prophetic movements,” Scott’s characterization effectively re-exoticizes the hill 
peoples as if they were endowed with a supernatural ability to transform and “turn on a dime” 
(Scott 2009, 232). 
   
Conclusion: fieldwork as a series of reorientations 
 It is said that when a crisis hits in a Third World country the anthropologist leaves and 
the journalist arrives (Malkki 1997, 93). In the Kachin region, however, there was not an 
anthropologist in the first place. No one has conducted a long-term fieldwork for an academic 
study there since Edmund Leach. I hoped to be a pioneer researcher in the Kachin State. I went 
to the Kachin to record the tragedy of the Kachin people. I encountered multiple difficulties, 
however, and was not able to overcome them. It is not unusual that a doctoral student leaves for 
the field with one topic, and returns with another. I was worried that in my case I left for the field 
with one clear topic and came out with none.  
 During my fieldwork period, I was in constant negotiation with the ever worsening 
situation in northern Myanmar. I improvised tentative measures, thinking that they were only 
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provisional solutions. I looked for a more manageable topic, and as a result my focus changed 
change frequently. One month, it was the history of jade mining and the network of cross-border 
traders. The next month, it was the KIA’s early years and the massacre of Rawang villages in the 
1960s. And the next month, it was the border casino economy. At one point I found in Thailand a 
group of migrants from one particular Kachin village, and I spent several months trying to write 
a microhistory of their village. I told myself that these mini-research projects were initial 
orientations; I would sooner than later hit the treasure trove, which would give me a definite set 
of data for my dissertation. 
 I knew that I was spending much time at Kachin churches, but I did not think that I would 
write about Kachin Christianity, simply because Christianity was so far from my original 
research proposal. Even when I found myself very interested in this new topic, felt that I was 
simply too ignorant about Christianity. I kept going to the churches and hanging out with people 
there, because it was the easiest way to meet the Kachin. Every day there were discoveries, but 
my fieldwork was disorientating. Eventually it had to end, when I had to leave for the United 
States to write up my dissertation. I ended up with a heap of notebooks with data that I did not 
know how to process.   
 It is usual that a fieldwork is not followed as planned and designed and that a researcher 
is confronted with a series of unexpected problems. My own experience certainly presents one 
such example. Mine is perhaps an extreme case in that my fieldwork as planned never even 
properly started. In the fall of 2012, I moved to the United States on a fellowship. Sitting with 
my notebooks in a splendid academic library, I felt lost: How am I supposed to write a 
dissertation when fieldwork failed from the beginning? 
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  But when was exactly the beginning of my fieldwork? Where was my field and when 
did my fieldwork begin? Indeed it is not easy to pin down what place and what time my 
fieldwork began. In retrospect it was already happening by the time I found myself in Singapore, 
talking regularly with Kum Ja and Dan Hkung Awng—two of my most important “informants.” 
Or was it in Chiang Mai that this began—where I got to know Kachin and other activists through 
meetings and weekend soccer matches? Maybe it was in New Mexico that this inquiry into tribal 
and resource frontiers first began?  
 A winter in New England made me realize that I lived in Southeast Asia continuously for 
ten years; it forced me to reflect on the decade-long stay, during which I was constantly 
preoccupied with Myanmar’s frontiers. I began to think retrospectively how this preoccupation 
somehow began. From the beginning, whenever and wherever it was, this research project was 
driven by the theme of frontier. But the sense of frontier that preoccupied me changed during the 
course of my fieldwork. Initially I wanted to investigate how a tribal frontier became a resource 
frontier by studying hydropower development in the Sino-Myanmar borderland. As I spent time 
with the Kachin during my fieldwork, however, I began to hear about a different kind of frontier, 
an evangelical frontier. I went to hear a tragedy from the Kachin, but instead they told me their 
comedy—the comic narrative of their evangelism.  
 In December 2012, I went to Rochester in upstate New York to be with my in-laws for 
the winter holidays. Flipping through the local newspaper, I found a posting for a jazz concert at 
a Baptist church in downtown Rochester. I thought that I would ask if there were any church 
members from Myanmar. It turned out that the Lake Avenue Baptist Church was full of refugees 
from Myanmar—many Karen and Chin but also a few Kachin. One of the Kachin, we found out, 
was my mother-in-law’s neighbor.  
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 After the winter holidays, I attended a conference in Japan and went to see my family 
near Yokohama. By this time, K.D. Brang Ja, whom I had met in Lashio, was living in Japan as 
the main Kachin pastor at Tokyo Peace Church. He told me that he had an extra room in his 
church residence in Tokyo and that I was welcome to use it. So I stayed there during my stay in 
my home country. I was no longer sure where my home and where my field was.  
 I have realized that it is not easy to locate my own field. It is difficult to delineate the 





Chapter 2. Frontier in motion: from fixed ideas to traveling imaginaries 
 
Introduction 
Frontier is an old topic, about which there are already countless studies.16 It appears that 
by today we have already moved on from this outdated topic to other more relevant and pressing 
matters. In this study, I wish to demonstrate that in fact we have not even begun to properly 
appreciate what we can learn from “frontier.”      
In the past scholars have approached “frontier” as an analytical category and made 
countless attempts to “fix” its meaning. In such efforts, they typically propose a definition—
claiming, implicitly or explicitly, that it is more precise than the previous ones. In this study, I 
propose a new approach, which treats “frontier” first and foremost as a concept-metaphor. This 
approach allows us to understand “frontier” as a modern geographical imaginary, which is 
essentially ambiguous. 
What is remarkable about “frontier” is that its meaning has been shifting dramatically 
over both time and space. What “frontier” meant in London 200 years ago is quite different from 
what it did in 1950 in Los Angeles.17 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the English 
word “frontier” primarily meant border. Its primary sense was of the term was: “the part of a 
country which fronts or faces another country; the marches; the border or extremity 
conterminous with that of another.”18 During the nineteenth century, however, “frontier” came 
                                                
16 Major geographical studies of frontier in the conventional sense include Febvre 1973; Kristof 1959; 
Prescott 1965.  
17 For studies that investigate the changing meanings of the English term “frontier,” see Mood 1945; 
Mood 1948; Juricek 1966; Kellerman 1997. 
18 The latest edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, gives more quotations to illustrate this sense than 
any others. The years of the quotations range from 1413 to 1870.  
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to acquire significantly different senses in the United States. “Frontier” came to associated with 
the “wild west,” especially with the pioneering qualities of the colonial settlers. Eventually, a 
powerful national mythology would emerge around this particular geographical imaginary, 
producing a new metaphor as an effect. “Frontier” acquired a new sense in the American English. 
And today, when the United State is the sole superpower, American vocabulary such as “frontier” 
well beyond the United States.  
Today most English-speakers around the world exclusively use “frontier” in the 
American sense. In fact, one does not even need to be an English speaker to know this word. 
Every Japanese dictionary today has an entry for “furontia,” the transliterated term that has 
become common in Japan. In order for us to understand the genealogy of “furontia,” one would 
have to trace the word not only historically but also geographically. Such an investigation would 
have to trace how the word travelled from Britain to North America and to Japan. It is a moving 
target.      
Methodology: geography of imaginary  
This study of frontier is based on what I call a “geography of imaginary” approach. It 
traces the movement of the object (an imaginary) not only in time but also in space. A model is 
presented by Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon, edited by Carol Gluck and Anna Tsing, 
which examines how words—such as “indigenous,” “custom,” “secularism,” “minority” 
“terrorism,” and “community”—have traveled from one place to another (Gluck and Tsing 2009). 
Words can travel a very long distance, but when a word travels for a long distance, its meaning 
unavoidably changes. Words travel in multiple, often unexpected, directions; they do not simply 
spread from an European metropolis to its colonies. Tracing such movements requires us to 
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observe “not simply the … dissemination from the West to the rest, but across spaces that do not 
match current maps of power” (Moyn and Sartori 2013, 18).  
Historians today are actively uncovering hitherto little known geographical connections 
around the world. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, for example, has been showing hitherto neglected 
geographical connections that played vital roles between the mid-fourteenth and the mid-
eighteenth century. During this age of travel and discovery, according to him, there was a sort of 
global shift,” which had various sources and roots (Subrahmanyam 1997, 737). Subrahmanyam’s 
“connected histories” project challenges the conventional understanding of modern geographical 
boundaries, based on which our historical knowledge is organized today. In this sense, his is a 
profoundly geographical project. Moyin and Sartori, scholars of the history of science, who track 
the long-distance migration of method and theory, have been particularly productive in 
connecting various world regions that have been considered as separate, bringing to light “the 
global percolations of the theories they once studied in drastically restricted geographical locales” 
(Moyn and Sartori 2013, 3).19 Moyn and Sartori wish to call this emerging field of inquiry 
“global intellectual history,” but it might as well be called “intellectual geography” or “historical 
geography of ideas.” Perhaps it might as well be called “geography of imaginaries.”  
I borrow the term “imaginary” from Charles Taylor, who in his Modern Social 
Imaginaries identifies three distinct features of imaginary, in contrast with theory. (1) “imaginary” 
is enjoyed by ordinary people and it is expressed not in theory but more typically in stories like 
myths and legends. (2) “imaginary” is shared by large groups of people, and (3) “imaginary” is a 
common understanding that makes possible common practices. Analyzing “imaginary” enables 
                                                
19 See Secord 2004, and the Isis special issue in 2010 (vol.101; no.1) on global histories of science. 




us to study widespread social practices—as opposed to intellectual projects conducted by a small 
group of people. It allows us to investigate how “largely unstructured and inarticulate 
understanding” travels (Taylor 2004, 23–24). The conventional intellectual does not make a 
methodological contribution to the discipline of geography. I will critically appraise the 
historical bias in Stuart Elden’s scholarship.      
Limits of the “history of ideas” approach: Stuart Elden 
Trained in political theory, Elden has repeatedly called for more historical and conceptual 
approaches in the discipline of geography. The culmination of his scholarship, to date, is the 
Birth of Territory, a 500-page monograph published in 2013. I use this work to illustrate the 
limitations of the conventional Eurocentric “history of ideas” approach.    
For my purpose, the most relevant section of the Birth of Territory is the first chapter. In 
it he first reviews a range of existing studies, from Robert Sack’s Human Territoriality: Its 
Theory and History to Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped: a History of the Geo-body of a 
Nation. He swiftly concludes that the “problem with this mode of analysis … is that it is both 
historically and geographically imprecise. … there is no sense of a history of the concept (Elden 
2013a, 5).” He argues that the “history [of territory] needs to be reconstructed, and in detail, in 
order to provide the foundation” (Elden 2013a, 8; italics added). Then Elden introduces his own 
project as follows: “This book therefore seeks to offer an account of the emergence of the 
concept of territory in Western political thought. It does so primarily through a contextualized 
reading of the texts of that tradition” (Elden 2013a, 10; italics added). Here I want to draw 
attention in particular to how the word “Western” creeps in, without any explanation. Having 
concluded that the existing studies lack “a history of the concept,” which serves as “the 
foundation,” Elden says he is “therefore” going to examine Western thought.   
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 What does Elden mean by the geographical term “west”? He comes back to elaborate on 
this word towards the end of the same chapter:  
This is an approach derived from, and directed toward, Western political thought. The 
problematic term West is of course open to question, but it is intended here to be read in 
relation to a chronology of thought that can be traced from Ancient Greece, to Roman 
appropriations and late medieval Latin rediscoveries, providing the conceptual frame 
within which the emergence of the modern state and its territory occurred (Elden 2013a, 
15).  
  
In a nutshell he is saying that “West” is where the modern state and its territory have emerged. 
This, however, is an assertion rather than an explanation; he is simply repeating the cliché that 
assumes that the “modern” was born in “the West.”  
This “chronology of thought” from Ancient Greece is supposed to provide us with the 
“conceptual frame,” with which we can think more precisely about territory. One of the very few 
books that Elden finds as a model in the extensive review is Casey’s 1997 study The Fate of 
Place: A Philosophical History: “Territory … requires the same kind of historical, philosophical 
analysis that has been undertaken by Edward Casey. … There is simply no study of territory 
comparable to Casey’s” (Elden 2013a, 7). Casey’s work discusses how place and space have 
been conceptualized in the European intellectual tradition, from Plato and Aristotle to Heidegger 
and Derrida, in a chronological order (Casey 1997). Why such a work is “required” is never 
explained, however.  
Of course there is nothing wrong with studying European intellectual history. I think the 
studies done by Casey and Elden are very valuable. But the problem is that Elden seems to think 
that these studies are somehow methodologically superior. The titles of his publications—such as 
“Thinking Territory Historically,” “Thinking Territory Politically,” “How Should We Do the 
History of Territory?” and The Birth of Territory—indicate that his approach—history of 
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European ideas—is presented as a general methodological contribution (Elden 2010a; Elden 
2010b; Elden 2013b). This self-positioning unavoidably raises a number questions, which he 
himself never bothers to acknowledge. Questions remain: What is the relevance of the 
chronology of European ideas to the studies of the non-West? This question is never addressed in 
the Birth of Territory. After this above-quoted passage, Elden never comes back to “the 
problematic term “West” in the entire book. What is the relevance of the European intellectual 
tradition to those studying non-European places? What is its usefulness to, say, a Thai scholar 
studying the historical geography of Thailand?   
Elden himself never explicitly defends his exclusively European focus. He does not seem 
to think a justification is warranted. We can only find certain clues to his rationale in his study 
“Why Is the World Divided Territorially?” which is a book chapter in the new textbook  Global 
Politics: A New Introduction (Elden 2009). Despite the titles of the book and his chapter, Elden’s 
focus is, once again, Europe. The historical section of this study is titled “the development of the 
European territorial state,” which consists of three sub-sections:  
(1) “Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages”  
(2) “The Treaties of Westphalia”   
(3) “Imperialism and empire”  
 
Only in the third section does the non-European come in to the picture.  
In Elden’s version of world history, the non-European world enters only in the era of 
European empires. It enters the history of the world when “the Western European model … was 
exported to much of the rest of the world.” He stresses this point by repeating in the same page: 
“the European model … was gradually spread across the world between the fifteenth and 
twentieth centuries” (Elden 2009, 202). It is implied that the European intellectual tradition is 
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singularly important because it is the source of the models that have come to circulate and 
dominate the world. In this chapter Elden mentions more than a dozen European intellectuals 
(Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Galileo, Newton, Marx, 
Engels, Weber, Foucault) but he doesn’t identify a single non-European individual.20 As Dipesh 
Chakrabary put it, a Western scholar, however, “is under no obligation … to be able to name 
with any authority and specificity” when he refers to things non-European (Chakrabarty 2008, 
28). 
The non-Europe is never specified in The Birth of Territory either. In “Introduction,” 
Elden acknowledges that his focus, the “Western tradition,” is one among many traditions in the 
world, and continues as follows: 
Other traditions would have very different histories, geographies and conceptual lineages. 
The specificity of the analysis begun here militates against generalization and pretensions 
to universalism. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the historical conceptual approach and its 
specifics would be useful in other such analyses, even it would need to be supplemented, 
developed, and critiqued (Elden 2013a, 15–16).21 
 
The sudden mentioning of “specificity” here is confusing, because we were told that he was 
offering “the foundation.” In the above passage, he is saying that his “conceptual historical 
approach” is specifically European but that it can be meaningfully applied to non-European 
intellectual traditions. He seems to be saying that while he is going to take care of one tradition, 
other scholars should take care of other traditions using a similar approach. But he does not 
specify any “other traditions”; nor does he cite a single study of a non-European tradition.22 The 
                                                
20 Not a single female is identified either. 
21 The same passage is also found in Elden 2010c (13). 
22 The closest thing I can find in Elden’s scholarship is presented in the chapter “Territorial Strategies of 
Islamism” in Terror and Territory. There is no discussion of an Islamic intellectual tradition here either. 
Elden’s treatment of non-European traditions makes such a contrast with Edward Said’s study in the 
  
 50 
non-European, which he calls “the rest of the world,” remains nameless. Reviewing a range of 
studies, Elden laments that “there is no sense of history of the concept” (Elden 2013a, 5), but 
what is most troubling about his own scholarship is that there is no sense of geography.  
While Elden insists that we need to more rigorously interrogate geographical concepts, 
somehow the concepts of “Europe” and “West” entirely escape his critical scrutiny. He uses a 
Eurocentric intellectual history in an attempt to explain a geographical concept, but what needs 
to be explained first is how the category of Europe is constantly naturalized through certain 
discursive devices like chronology. The “history of ideas” approach, as Elden’s studies illustrate, 
traces the object of inquiry back in time. This tracing back in time by the rhetoric of chronology 
discursively produces static spatial units like “Europe.” By privileging particular events that can 
be arranged and presented as a lineage of influences in a chronological order, the conventional 
“history of ideas” approach excludes influences from outside the assumed spatial frame. By 
relying on this approach, we may fail to notice synchronic patterns between different places, and 
we may easily dismiss non-textual traditions.   
 Rather than relying on the “history of ideas” model, I suggest that we geographers 
propose and pursue “geography of ideas”—how ideas and imaginaries travel across space rather 
than how they evolve across time; how words, stories, images make long-distance travels.     
2.2. Geographical setting of “intellectual history”  
As Chakrabarty has pointed out, the theories that have shaped the discipline of social 
sciences have been developed by thinkers who knew little about those living in non-Western 
cultures (Chakrabarty 2008, 29). It is still possible for Western scholars to write about “the world” 
                                                                                                                                                       
intellectual history, Freud and the Non-European, which opens with a detailed explanation of the word 
“non-European” (Said 2003, 13). 
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and “humanity” with little knowledge about a non-Western society. Non-Western scholars 
cannot afford such ignorance about the West. If a Thai scholar, for example, publishes a study in 
English about the formation of political territory in Thailand, then he is subject to the charge that 
he is using the term imprecisely. Indeed, on Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped, Elden 
comments that “there is little that investigates the term territory conceptually or historically” 
(Elden 2013a, 3). If Elden means, as he seems to do, that Siam Mapped does not sufficiently 
investigate the emergence of “territory” in the European intellectual history, it is an ill-placed 
remark, given the book is about Thailand. It would be a sensible comment if it related to the Pali 
or Thai concepts, which Winichakul discusses in his work.  
As Chakrabarty has pointed out, the dominance of Eurocentrism is indicated by the 
accepted habit of omitting geographical references like “Western” and “European.” A book 
entirely devoted to the European tradition does not need to be titled The Birth of Territory in 
Europe; the geographical reference—“in Europe”—can be safely omitted because that goes 
without saying. “Europe” is routinely “a silent referent.” If an equivalent study is conducted by a 
scholar who studies the Chinese intellectual history, it would certainly be titled The Birth of 
Territory in China. And such a work would not be considered as a theoretical or conceptual 
study unless it presents a comparative framework and explicitly relates to the European 
intellectual tradition.  
This lack of reciprocity is implicitly accepted because there is a widespread assumption 
that intellectual ideas and theories that are genuinely worthwhile have origins in the European 
tradition. Philosophical ideas and theories are born first in the West and then are spread to the 
“rest” later. The “rest of the world” has to wait until Europe “has already declared itself to be the 
original version” (Chakrabarty 2010). The Eurocentrism enables “possible completely internalist 
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histories of Europe, according to which genuinely worthwhile ideas are generated from within 
the internally closed dynamics of European intellectuals. Europe is understood as the site of the 
first occurrence of capitalism, modernity, or Enlightenment” (Chakrabarty 2008, 7).23 The “rest” 
and “other traditions” can be studied “in terms of their differences from” the European originals. 
“European” and “Western” are the names that designate the only “intellectual tradition” 
that can be presented as a coherent, unbroken, autonomous lineage today. It is the only one of 
which a chronology is made without reference to other traditions. This internally coherent and 
complete chronology discursively creates “Europe” and “the West” as a geographical unit that 
only influences and is never influenced by external forces. We imagine Europe as a place of an 
intellectual autonomous tradition, because such chronologies are constantly made and remade by 
scholars like Elden.24  
Of course it would be entirely wrong-headed to reject or discard the European intellectual 
tradition. This tradition is inescapable for a researcher who writes in English and attempts to 
engage in scholarly conversations at universities around the world today. As Chakrabarty has 
noted, “‘the European intellectual tradition’ stretching back to the ancient Greeks is a fabrication 
of relatively recent European history. … The point, however, is that, fabrication or not, this is the 
genealogy of thought in which social scientists find themselves inserted.” He argues that in order 
to study a place like India, which has been transformed by a European colonial power, “the 
categories and strategies we have learned from European thought … are both indispensable and 
inadequate” (Chakrabarty 2008, 19).   
                                                
23 He cites in particular Jurgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. 
24 As James Sidaway pointed has out, “the convoluted course of geography, its norms, definitions and 
closure (inclusions and exclusions) and structure cannnot be disassociated from certain European 
philosophical concepts of presence, order and intelligibility” (Sidaway 2000, 593). 
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The “post-colonial studies” pursued by scholars like Chakrabarty has made only modest 
impacts on human geography. Said’s Orientalism, published in 1978, generated limited debates 
among geographers on the whole, although the questions raised by Said were fundamentally 
geographical.25 Of course there have been noteworthy engagements made by geographers. Anne 
Godlewska and Neil Smith put together a remarkable volume titled Geography and Empire in 
1994. In 2002, the first edited volume in human geography that explicitly addresses the theme of 
“postcolonial geography” came out (Blunt and McEwan 2003). In 2003, the Singapore Journal 
of Tropical Geography presented a special issue of “geography and postcolonialism.” These 
efforts, however, have been few and far between, as the editors of these volumes acknowledged 
themselves. Godlewsk and Smith observed: “geography’s ‘colonial encounter’ is only beginning 
to be re-evaluated critically” (Godlewska and Smith 1994, 4). Blunt and McEwan, the editors of 
Postcolonial Geographies, too noted: “it is only in recent years … that geographers have begun 
to develop a critical engagement with the … challenges [of postcolonial studies” (Blunt and 
McEwan 2003, 2). The late and limited engagement is regrettable, because there is much to be 
investigated about the relationship between geography and colonialism.   
Geography and European Colonialism 
The historical origin of the geography as a modern research discipline can be easily 
traced back to the European efforts to accumulate the knowledge of unfamiliar places. As the 
European powers rapidly expanded its spheres of control and influence, their research efforts of 
studying unfamiliar places and peoples were institutionalized. Professional organizations for 
geography were formed in Europe, Russia and North America during the nineteenth century: The 
                                                
25 Surely geographers like Felix Driver, Derek Gregory, and James Sidaway have engaged with this 
literature and made genuinely geographical contributions. The problem I am highlighting here is that 
there aren’t more geographers like them. 
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Société de Géographie was formed in 1821, the Royal Geographical Society in 1830, Russian 
Geographical Society in 1845, American Geographical Society in 1851, and the National 
Geographic Society (which published the popular magazine National Geographic) in 1888 
(Freeman 1962, 49–56).26 The Royal Geographical Society of Britain sponsored a number of 
imperial explorations and expeditions around the world (Driver 2001). During its heyday 
between the middle of the nineteenth century and World War I, British expeditions brought 
front-page news to the public. Some of the explorers such as David Livingstone gained 
international fame—like astronauts did in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 In the words of Johnston and Sidaway, colonialism was “a major … preoccupation during 
the early decades of the modern period, especially in Britain whose empire was being 
consolidated and developed into a spatial division of labor based on its metropolitan hub and 
covering a considerable proportion of the earth’s surface.” (Johnston and Sidaway 2004, 43; see 
also Freeman 1962, 19–20). Geography journals in Britain published intelligence collected from 
edges of the expanding empire. Indeed active servicemen of the British military wrote many of 
the articles. Let us, for example, take a look at an article published Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography in 1892 about the Kachin region. The 
article, titled “Expeditions among the Kachin Tribes on the North-East Frontier of Upper Burma,” 
was “compiled by General J. T. Walker … from the Reports of Liutenant Eliott, Assistant 
Commissioner.” It opens as follows: 
The annexation of Burma has necessitated the geographical exploration of large areas of 
country which had never previously been visited by Europeans, and of which our 
                                                
26 Geographers explored and described foreign places, while anthropologists described foreign peoples. 
Their professional societies were formed about the same time. In Britain, for example, the Ethnological 
Society of London (which later became the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland) was 
formed in 1837, only seven years after the geographical society. 
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knowledge has been generally of a very vague description, and frequently none at all. 
They are mostly inhabited by tribes of independent races (Walker 1892, 161). 
 
While an anthropological expedition would have moved on to describe the humans as “tribes of 
independent races,” the focus of the geographical study was the biophysical aspects of the 
region—how to negotiate not with the people but with the terrain. The article’s main contribution 
was a map of the region made by the expedition team. The Kachin and other local inhabitants 
were mentioned as potential local guides for the imperial forces. Much of the fourteen-page 
descries the terrain that is now cartographically captured. The article ends as follows: “There is 
thus a large area of which the geography is still unknown, even in its faintest outlines; it presents 
a field of investigation for future explorers; but until it has been explored there can be no 
certainty whether the Lu river s the source of the Irawadi or the Salwin” (J. T. Walker 1892, 173). 
The entire article does not even pretend to indicate any interest in theory or concept. The task of 
these geographers was to provide the colonial empire with useful transformation information.   
Varied geographies of imperialisms and colonialisms 
This relationship between geography and imperialism, however, is certainly not unique to 
modern Europe. In recent years, more studies have investigated the imperial geography of non-
European powers such as the Japanese cartography of the early twentieth century (Elliott 2000; 
Fedman 2012; Kobayashi 2012; Matsusaka 2012; B. L. Walker 2007). These studies have greatly 
broadened the geographical scope of imperialism and colonialism. 
As historian Michael Adas has pointed out in “Imperialism and colonialism in 
comparative perspective,” studies of colonialism has been fundamentally Euro-centric in that 
they have only discussed European colonial powers and the struggles against them: 
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One of the more prominent symptoms of the persistence of Western-centrism is the 
conceptualization and writing of global history is the tendency to equate colonialism with 
European expansion and European domination of overseas peoples and cultures. … The 
term ‘colonialism’ itself has come to refer almost exclusively to historical processes 
involving western Europeans (Adas 1998, 371). 
 
This remark points to a rarely discussed limitation of the “post-colonial studies,” which has paid 
scant attention to non-European forms of colonialism.  
 The United State of America as an imperial and colonial power presents a curious case. It 
presents a peculiar difficulty when it comes to the application of the term “colonial.” Anne 
Mcintock suggest that we see the United States as a “break-away settler colony,” in which 
colonial control was transferred from the metropolis to the colony but where decolonization has 
never happened and it extremely unlikely to ever happen (McClintock 1992, 295). As Michael 
Warner has observed in “What’s Colonial about Colonial America,” we know actually little 
about the territorial imagination in Anglo-American culture of the era compared to Latin-
American cultures (Warner 2000). There is an irony in the fact that while a number of scholars 
from former British and French colonies based in the United States produce excellent “post-
colonial” studies about the European empires, we rarely see studies of “post-colonial” insights 
applied to the history of the United States.27     
 The preoccupation on the European colonial powers has effectively marginalized the 
studies of non-European empires. “On the impossibility of a postcolonial theory of Taiwan,” the 
last chapter of her study Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and 
Pictures, 1683-1895, Emma Teng points out the “assumption that imperialism was a singularly 
Western phenomenon” (Teng 2004, 253) and explains how difficult it is for Taiwanese to even 
                                                
27 The obvious exception here is Ann Stoler. See especially Stoler 2006. 
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frame its “post-colonial” era. “Was it with the end of Japanese rule in 1945? With the end of 
martial law and the KMT’s “internal colonial” rule in 1987? Or is Taiwan still under American 
‘neocoloial’ rule? If Taiwan is not truly ‘postcolonial,” can it possibly have postcolonial theory?” 
(Teng 2004, 250). These debates over seemingly basic factual questions make it effectively 
impossible for the Taiwanese scholars to “enter the conversation” on post-colonialism because 
the conversation so often assumes “the dichotomy of the West/colonizer and the non-
West/colonized” (Teng 2004, 257).  
 If we cease to view the European forces as the only imperial powers, then we are able to 
see different historical geographies. Thongchai Winichakul’s contribution has been to 
problematize the one-dimensional understanding of Thailand as a country that fought the 
aggressive Europeans. Siam can be presented as a formidable Bangkok-based power that 
successfully expanded its territory, utilizing modern colonial forms of knowledge. Challenging 
the conventional view that Thailand lost parts of its historical territory to the British and French 
empires, he described how the political elites in Bangkok took advantages of a new technology. 
A historical episode deserves a closer look.     
In 1893, after long and intense contest between Siam and France, the latter crossed the 
Mekong River and occupied a hill area as part of French Indochina. The state-sanctioned 
narratives of Thailand have persistently characterized this incident as a national tragedy, in 
which an integral part of their territory was stolen by a ruthless and greedy European power. 
According to Winichakul, however, this event should not be seen one country’s gain over the 
other’s loss. Rather, it is as an event through which the rules in Bangkok solidified its territorial 
power . The Siamese king supposedly fell ill over this territorial loss and said as follows: “[t]he 
loss of those margins along the border of the phraratcha-anachak [the royal kingdom], which we 
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could not look after anyway, was like the loss of our fingertips.”  The significance of the 
corporeal imagery is unmistakable. Such language and imagery contributed to the establishment 
of Siam as a single geographic entity whose head was Bangkok. Winichakul thus presented an 
analysis of Siam as a colonial power (Winichakul 1994, 134).28  
Imperialism and colonialism were not by any means the sole purview of the modern 
European powers. The techniques of territorial expansion were already circulating fast among 
the states across Asia in the nineteenth century. In “The Legacy of Empires and Nations in East 
Asia,” Prasenjit Duara also illuminates the formation of the Japanese expansive empire in the 
mid-nineteenth century. In the 1870s, for example, the Japanese government learned about 
certain disputes between the Ryukyu Islands (today’s Okinawa) and the Gaoshan indigenous 
people of Taiwan regarding fishing. Tokyo turned to the Qing court in Beijing to figure out who 
was responsible. The Qing court replied to Tokyo that at the frontier they let the barbarians deal 
with each other. Then Tokyo in turn replied and asked the Qing to confirm that the area in 
question was not part of the Qing’s territory. Li Hongzhang, the Qing statesman, astutely 
understood the implication of this question. He made Taiwan into a province in 1885 and 
annexed it as a sovereign territory formally (Duara 2005, 43). 
Japan of course presents an obvious non-European case of modern imperialism. Duara 
has boldly argued that the Japanese rule over Manchukuo represents, far from a simple imitation 
of European imperialism, a new kind of imperialism. He characterizes Manchukuo, the Japanese 
puppet-state in northeast China (1932-45), as the first full-blown case of what he calls the “new 
imperialism,” which is the kind of imperialism pursued by the United States, the Soviet Union, 
                                                
28 Grabowsky 1995 also presents an exceptionally rich collection of studies that illustrate the history of 
the territorial expansion by the rulers in Bangkok. Vandergeest and Peluso 1995 also offers an insightful 
analysis on state territorialization. 
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and Japan, rather than in those of the older European colonial powers (Duara 2006, 48). He goes 
so far as to suggest that we consider Manchukuo as a prototype for much of the post-colonial yet 
imperial projects in the late twentieth century including the US occupation of Iraq.  
The art of building and operating an empire was learned and imitated by polities, 
European and non-European. In “Considerations on Imperial Comparisons” and elsewhere, Ann 
Stoler has persuasively urged us to examine the “modular” character of imperial formations to 
uncover “counterintuitive” connections (Stoler 2009, 46). What Barnard Cohn has called 
“colonialism and its forms of knowledge” never exclusively belonged to European powers. 
There have always been borrowings of knowledge among the empires. Recent studies have 
revealed that the Qing-Chinese government utilized modern colonial ideologies and technologies 
in ways similar to the European powers. In Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and 
Cartography in Early Modern China, Laura Hostetler compares the political technologies 
between Qing China and contemporary European empires and concluded that Beijing in the early 
Qing period was as resourceful and innovative—in other words, as modern—as London, Paris or 
St. Petersburg as an imperial meteropole.29 These studies have also shown that the developments 
of imperial technology should be understood as a mutually influencing, parallel processes rather 
than an exclusively European event that was later diffused to the rest of the world.  
Hostetler has argued that Qing China possessed advanced cartographic skills, especially 
because of Kangxi emperor’s enthusiasm about knowledge aquisition. By 1717, a complete set 
of maps of the Qing empire was produced. This was the first state-wide cartographic project 
using trigonometry and astronomy in the world; it took France another twenty-seven years before 
                                                




they conducted an equivalent project (Hostetler 2001, 74). The so-called Jesuit Atlas maps were 
quickly sent out from Beijing to European empires. France received the maps by 1725 and in 
turn these made-in-China maps were duplicated in numerous versions across Europe.30 They 
circulated far and wide across Eurasia and beyond.31 It is known, for example, “Manchuria” as a 
toponym most likely emerged from the circulation of a Japanese misreading of a Russian map in 
the eighteenth century. (Originally “Manchu” was only an ethnonym and never used as a place 
name.) This misreading travelled to Europe and was adopted in European maps. Ironically, this 
misread name was eventually adopted by the Chinese as a place name by the late nineteenth 
century (Elliott 2000). 
In certain regions, Qing China’s frontier administration was in many ways as “modern” 
as the Western counterparts. This was particularly the case in the regions in the north where they 
interacted with Russia. When the Russian ambassador, Nikolai Spafarii, was asked by the 
Manchu officials to return a certain insubordinate Tungus chieftain named Gantimur who had 
defected from Manchu to Russia, he replied: “The frontier was wide, and every one was free to 
go over the many roads and frontiers of Russia. Your case is quite other, for your country is shut 
in by lofty mountains and on the mountains by a mighty Wall, and every man who enters a 
frontier town is written in a book, so that you can tell much better than we can” (Perdue 1998, 
                                                
30 These “Jesuit maps” were treated as state secrets and they were not made available to the public 
(Elliott 2000a, 624). The imperial court in Beijing found that the European-style maps did not fit the 
Chinese geographical cosmology; therefore, as the impact of the maps was minimal, according to Richard 
Smith (Smith 2013). This use of modern cartography makes a sharp contrast with the case made by 
Winichakul and Anderson on the use of the national map as a logo (Winichakul 1994; B. R. O. Anderson 
2006, 170–178).   
31 Unfortunately, how the early modern maps that travelled across the Eurasian continent reached 
Southeast Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is still not known well. Thongchai does not 
explore this question in Siam Mapped; he only states “it is difficult to say at this stage how strong the 
Chinese influence was on Siamese mapmaking” (Winichakul 1994, 30). It is not difficult to imagine that 
the political elites in Bangkok learned about the Chinese cartographic projects before their encounter with 
the British imperialism; but further research is needed on this route of knowledge transfer.  
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270). These words by the diplomat must contain a good degree of strategic rhetoric, but 
according to Perdue it was on the whole the Qing that maintained tighter administrative control 
than Russia over its mobile population in the frontier region. 
Qing China reached a boundary agreement and signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. 
While the first treaty of international boundary demarcation in Europe, the Treaty of the 
Pyrenees between Spain and France of 1659, was first and foremost a peace treaty to end the 
long and devastating war between the two countries. The negotiators of the Nerchinsk treaty 
were proactive in the pursuit of territorial demarcation. It stands out in world history as a 
remarkable case of multi-cultural diplomacy and exchange (Perdue 2010, 341). 
Studies of imperialism needs more comparative approaches. In Taiwan’s Imagined 
Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures 1683-1905,” Emma Teng too 
suggests a comparative perspective from which we examine various imperial formations. She 
introduces us to a nineteenth-century Chinese travel writer named Ding Shaoyi, who wrote a 
particularly revealing travelogue. Ding visited Taiwan and stayed for eight months in 1847, and 
published an ethnographic account titled Brief Record of the Eastern Ocean. In the section titled 
“Savage customs,” Ding quotes a long passage from Unofficial Records of a Geographer by 
Giulio Aleni about “wild people” in North America: “By custom they are fond of drink. 
Attacking and killing are their daily business. … They cut off the enemy’s head and use it to 
build a wall.”32 Actually it was Ding himself who drew a comparison between the indigenous 
peoples of Taiwan and North America:  
These things that he [Giulio Aleni] recorded pertain to the native barbarians of the newly 
opened northern frontier of North America, but their savagery is no different from the 
savages of Taiwan. Their ferocity was extreme, yet the Westerners have guided them 
                                                
32 Giulio Alenio was an Italian Jesuit missionary and scholar.  
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with their senseless, confused religion and have finally changed their customs. So it is a 
real injustice to say that the raw savages of Taiwan have absolutely no human morals 
despite their human appearance and that they cannot be civilized with our Kingly 
Governance (wangzheng)! (Teng 2004, 283–284)33  
  
Din’s observation reveals that the imaginary of civilizational and colonial frontier readily 
travelled from North America to China in mid-nineteenth century.  
Uncovering global connections of the early modern era, recent studies of modern China 
have questioned the conventional understanding that the principle of territorial sovereignty was 
first developed in Westphalia and then transferred to from the West to the East in the age of 
European colonialism. The new studies of early modern China put into question a range of 
concepts and categories that have been understood almost exclusively in the European contexts: 
imperialism, colonialism, ethnicity, and modernity.34  
 In the second millennium, states in general became territorially more expansive. As 
Lieberman has pointed out, the number of independent kingdoms decreased from two dozen in 
1340 to three in 1820 (Lieberman 2003, 2). He points out the pattern of “territorial consolidation” 
across Eurasia: between mainland Southeast Asia, Japan, France, and Russia. In this process, 
sedentary agriculture was promoted, a taxation system was developed, civilizational discourse 
was elaborated, and trade networks were expanded. In this process, the expansive states learned 
from each other about the practices and doctrines of colonialism. Modern colonialism effectively 
                                                
33 For the last sentence of this quoted passage, I use another translation made available by Teng herself, 
presented in Teng 2007. 
34 Beyond the Qing scholarship, a particularly resourceful is the study of Manchukuo by Prasenjit Duara: 
Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern. See especially Chapter 5 “Imperial 
Nationalism and the Frontier” in Duara 2003. For a rare studies that addresses frontier and 
postcolonialism, see also (Naum 2010). 
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became a module, which could be learned and applied by states around the world.35 As Ding 
Shayoyi’s travelogue illustrates, the traveling imaginary of frontier played a pivotal role in the 
making of this module.  
Conclusion: from history of ideas to geography of imaginaries 
 We all know that goods, services, and people have been moving around the world, but 
about how ideas, values, and imaginations have been traveling we know much less. I propose 
that we study such spatial movements of values, meanings, and imaginations. There are already 
studies of this kind, although they are scattered across many disciplines and fields. Scholars have 
shown, for example, how Buddhism migrated from India to China in the first millennia (Sen 
2003); how the idea of science travelled the Middle East to Europe in the tenth century (Saliba 
2007); how the idea of “declaration of independence” spread from the United States to various 
other colonies (Armitage 2009); how Hello Kitty travelled from Japan across the Pacific (Yano 
2013), and how a certain idea of romance has been transmitted from Korea to Myanmar through 
popular TV drama shows (Aung Si 2012).36 Studying these long-distance travels of certain 
imaginaries can challenge the conventional spatial units and boundaries that are often taken for 
granted. The units in question include not only nations and states such as Siam/Thailand, but also 
larger regional constructions such as Southeast Asia (Kratoska, Raben, and Schulte Nordholt 
2005). “Europe,” “America,” and “the West” are especially rich targets. Studies of how spatial 
units have been constructed and naturalized—a study of “metageography” (Lewis 1997)—is 
much needed today The geographical assumptions that sustain the habitual use of these terms 
need to be examined. Investigations of “frontier” can be of central importance in such studies. 
                                                
35 On this, see an insightful discussion on a modular model of imperialism” see Stoler 1997. 






Chapter 3: Approaches to Kachin Christianity 
 
 The Kachin people’s engagement with Christian evangelism has been known for some 
time, although very few academics have taken this up and pursued this topic. In this chapter, I 
will critically review the literature of Kachin studies in terms of their approach—or lack 
thereof—to Christianity. In the first section of this chapter, I will present an account of my 
encounter with vibrant evangelical activities in and around Myitkyina. Then I will review the 
literature on Myanmar—especially on the Kachin, highlighting in particular three writers who 
have extensively discussed them: the English anthropologist Edmund Leach, the Japanese 
ethnographer Toshihiro Yoshida, and the English historian Mandy Sadan. While they approach 
the Kachin from different angles, they all more or less discounted the importance of Christianity 
because they considered that it was not indigenous to the Kachin society.  
Encountering Kachin evangelical counterpublics 
 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, I was initially not interested in studying 
Christianity. Before my fieldwork, I was interested in how the Kachin formed grassroots 
associations, through which they identified, discussed and debated various topics and identified 
their common interest. Because the Kachin is a stateless minority people whose insurgency army 
has been actively fighting for much of the past half-century, they face extra difficulties. As a 
result of a long civil war against the Myanmar government, the Kachin region has been 
effectively divided to two competing political territories. The insurgency groups control patches 
of rugged hill regions, whereas the Myanmar government rules practically all the cities and the 
major roads. Most Kachin people support the rebel government (albeit to varying degrees), but 
life in the insurgency-controlled territories has been very difficult. The areas are vulnerable to 
offensives from the Myanmar army, and the public infrastructure such as schools and clinics are 
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severely limited. As a result, many Kachin people in fact live in the Myanmar territory. But life 
under the Myanmar government is not easy either. As a minority group, the Kachin people feel 
like they are treated as second-class citizens in Myanmar. Since the 1960s there have not been 
Kachin language newspapers, novels, or other publications to circulate, not to mention radio or 
television programs, since minority-language media have been effectively banned. (There used 
to be Kachin newspapers back in the 1950s.) Their language (called Jinghpaw) is not taught at 
any public schools, even in the Kachin State. 
In organizing my questions about the Kachin everyday politics as one coherent inquiry, I 
found the concept of subaltern counterpublics to be useful. The concept was proposed by Nancy 
Fraser, who, in the influential 1992 paper, critiqued Jugen Habermas’ conceptualization of the 
bourgeois public sphere. She argued that it is better to think of plural “publics”—rather than “a 
single, comprehensive, overarching public.” She also drew attention to “subordinated social 
groups—women, workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians [who] have repeatedly found 
it advantageous to constitute alternative publics.” These alternative publics are “parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and 
needs.” These she called “subaltern counterpublics.” Frazer herself identified a range of 
grassroots activities from the example of late-twentieth century feminist movement in the United 
States (as she considers it “perhaps the most striking example”): “journals, bookstores, 
publishing companies, film and video distribution networks, lecture series, research centers, 




I visited Myitkyina after the November 2010 election. In the first half of 2011, while the 
war was fought between the KIA and the Tatmadaw, I was able to spend nearly two months in 
Myitkyina. The situation in the Kachin region, however, was reaching the lowest point since the 
ceasefire agreement was reached in 1994. The Kachin Independence Army did refused the 
demand from the Myanmar government that they become a Border Guard Force. In retaliation, 
the Myanmar government did not approve any political parties led by the Kachin. In fact the 
three parties that were disapproved by the Election Commission were all Kachin-led initiatives. 
Every Kachin I knew was deeply angry about the situation. 
 The situation was tense, but this time I was at least prepared for my fieldwork better. A 
year after my preliminary trip, during which I made a mistake of visiting the university, I had a 
more specific idea as to what I was looking for. This time, my ideas was to find fun events. I 
wanted to locate spaces where Kachin people—men and women, young and old, rich and poor—
show up in a large number to have fun. I wanted to find the spaces of informal social gathering, 
in which people were voluntarily interacting with one another. I wanted to observe events of 
voluntary gathering because I thought that it would give me insights into the Kachin pub     
 I asked Dan Hkung Awng and other friends: “Will you take me to places where a lot of 
Kachin people come for fun?” This request delighted my Kachin friends and hosts, who were 
happy to take me to a series of events. They took me to weddings, sports games, dance 
performances, beauty contests, music concerts, comedy shows, and so on. At these events there 
were hundreds of—sometimes thousands of—Kachin people. As I had expected, during these 
events, the Kachin people carried out animated conversations, discussions, and debates over a 
wide range of issues—often very political. For exceptionally large and long events, they even 
made daily newsletters at the venue—in the Kachin-Jinghpaw language. I found counterpublics 
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in the Kachin frontier. What I hadn’t anticipated was that all of these events took place in 
Christian church compounds. Evidently the churches provided the “parallel discursive arenas.”  
During my stay in early 2011, I was able to attend two Manau dance festivals at local 
Baptist churches in Myitkyina. Manau dances used to be rather rare events; they were not 
regulated events. A certain type of Manau festival was held for a specific occasion. During the 
ceasefire period (1997-2010), however, a very large manau dance became part the Kachin State 
Day celebration, which is held in the large park in downtown Myitkyina (called the Kachin 
National Manau Park). Because it is a very easy and participatory dance, which takes place not 
on the stage but on the ground. The Kachin State Day manau dance used to get thousands of 
people involved.  
Every Burman person I spoke with about the Kachin knew the manau dance. The Kachin 
are known as a dance-loving people, partly because “ka-chin” could mean “want to dance” in 
Burmese. It is not clear when this dance became such an iconic symbol of the Kachin. The 
Kachin Christians used to condemn the dance as a pagan ritual.37 By the time I found myself 
dancing at the Shwe Zet Baptist Church in a northern part of Myitkyina, the dance was not only 
traditional but it was manifestly Christian. The manau dance always consists of two long lines of 
dancers, each of which is led by a priest figure. At the church, each of the two men who were 
leading the troops carried a large cross. When the dance finally ended after a few hours, the 
leaders led the lines of dances into the chapel to join a special worship prayer.  
The centrality of the church compound in the present-day Kachin society was 
demonstrated repeatedly. One day, I was talking with a Kachin friend about the civil war at a 
noodle shop in town. In the middle of the conversation, my friend suddenly changed the topic to  
                                                
37 I will come back to this Christianization of the Manau dance in Chapter 6. Sadan presents an 




Figure 2. A Manau dance held at a Baptist church near Myitkyina (March 2011)  
 
football and then settled the bill. He stood up and suggested that we take a walk. When we left 
the noodle shop, he told me that had had noticed intelligence officers had entered the noodle 
shop. He took me to his church, and when we sat down, he exclaimed: “Now we can talk!”   
Today the Kachin counterpublics are formed primarily as spaces of religious 
congregations. This discovery of Christian publics caught me by surprise. The literatures I had 
read in preparation for the fieldwork did not prepare me for this finding. The scholarship on the 
public sphere was dominated by secular liberal models. It paid scant attention to religion 
(although this trend changed within a few years).38 Religion was not an issue in Habermas’ 
                                                
38 The public forum at the Social Science Research Council “The Immanent Frame: Secularism, 
religion, and the public sphere” was launched towards the end of 2007. But I wasn’t immediately aware 
of this very useful forum. The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere including chapters by Judith Butler, 
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formulation of public sphere; nor did Frazer draw attention to it in her critique. I didn’t at all 
anticipate religion to play such a central role in the making of public sphere. Moreover, the 
literature on the Kachin identified animism as their authentic belief system. Most non-Kachin 
observers that I consulted considered the Kachins to be “nominal” Christians. The contemporary 
Kachin language publications—especially newsletters—are filled with articles about their latest 
frontier missions. In these stories, the Kachin land is not a languishing periphery but an epicenter 
of a global movement, from which missions are dispatched to countless frontiers. 
The Kachin are constantly conducting missions, which require detailed plans, careful 
collective decisions, and long-term follow-up actions. While I remained (and still remain) 
perplexed by much of what Kachin people were telling me about Jesus Christ and the Bible, it 
took me no time to notice their vibrant church activities. There were meetings, conferences, 
training camps, festivals, and mission campaigns all the time. In order to organize and attend 
these events, the church leaders were always traveling. They were the most frequent travellers of 
the Kachin society. They showed me countless photos and videos of their trips, especially from 
their evangelical campaigns. In downtown Myitkyina, I even found at a store in Myitkyina VCD 
of a pastor’s latest frontier mission.  
I had been already aware that Christianity had become the dominant religion among the 
Kachin, but I was overwhelmed by the enthusiastic evangelical campaigns in the Kachin region. 
This was not what I expected. There were few studies of Christian evangelism of Myanmar’s 
highlanders. There have been numerous studies about the Kachin since Edmund Leach’s classic 
study published in 1954, but to date there isn’t a single study on Kachin Christianity—except by 
evangelical Christians. In fact there are hardly any studies of Christians in Myanmar. As Juliane 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Cornel West was published in 2011 (Butler, Mendieta, and 




Schober has written in his recent review article on the studies of religion in Myanmar: 
“Altogether absent are recent studies of other [that is, non-Buddhist] religious traditions among 
ethnic minorities in Burma. We know too little about the practices of Christianity” (Schober 
2008, 265–266)39 While two studies on Islam in Myanmar are mentioned in her review, not a 
single study of Christianity is identified in Schober’s review. An equally extensive review paper 
on anthropological studies of Myanmar, written by U Chit Hlaing (F. K. Lehman), does not refer 
to any study of Christianity either (Chit Hlaing 2008). This paucity is remarkable even within 
Southeast Asian studies. Oscar Salemink’s review of the anthropological literature on 
Christianity in Southeast Asia, covering almost all countries in the region (even Burnei), does not 
cite any study from Myanmar (Salemink 2009). While many studies on this topic are emerging 
from countries across Southeast Asia, Myanmar remains almost entirely unstudied. 
The only study about the Christianization of an upland group in Myanmar conducted by 
an anthropologist was Cornelia Kammerer’s 1990 study on Akha highlanders of Myanmar and 
Thailand. In conclusion, she stated as follows: “conversions of conviction are rare. Most Akha 
converts to Christianity are simply seeking a replacement zah [Akha concept akin to “traditional 
religion”] that is cheaper and easier than their own” (Kammerer 1990. 288). The religious 
conversion did not involve the hearts and minds, according to Kammerer. People convert to 
Christianity because it is an easier and cheaper alternative, which performs more or less the same 
                                                
39 The term “practice” in Schober’s assessment is noteworthy, for there have certainly been studies that 
have focused on the history of Christian conversion among Burma’s minority groups. Mikael Gravers’ 
studies on Karen such as “Conversion and Identity: Religion and the Formation of Karen Ethnic Identity 
in Burma” and, most notably, the studies by the Chin scholar Lian H. Sakhong including his monograph, 
In search of Chin identity: A Study in Religion, Politics and Ethnic Identity in Burma are examples of this 
kind (Gravers 2007; Sakhong 2003). These studies on ethnic identity, however, tend to be concerned with 




functions as the old religion. The influence of Christianity is considered to be superficial in the 
final analysis. The conversion is explained in terms of immediate, tangible, pragmatic benefits.  
Prior to my own fieldwork I had read and found this interpretation to be very convincing. 
My plan was to dig deeper to find out what lies underneath the cosmetic changes brought by the 
foreign missionaries. My research proposal submitted in 2009 didn’t use the word “religion” or 
“Christianity” even once. I didn’t think it was relevant. 
But the Christianity I encountered among the Kachin was of a different kind from 
Kammerer’s. I found Kachin people to be exceptionally devout Christians. They take time to 
pray before every meal. Every single one of the countless Kachin events that I have attended—
from an English conversation club’s regular meeting, a woman’s organization’s anniversary 
party, a political group’s congress, a sports competition, a dance festival, rock concert, beauty 
contest, and so on—opened and closed with a long prayer. The Kachin Christianity is anything 
but superficial. It wasn’t cheap or easy. On the contrary, being Christian was above all extremely 
disciplining and demanding. There are church-related events—special prayer services, planning 
meetings, music lessons, Bible studies, and so on—on a daily basis. All these activities were 
taking place at various churches of the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) where I spent much 
time during fieldwork.  
The KBC is not only the largest of the Kachin Christian organizations; it is the largest of 
all Kachin organizations. Today they have 330,000 active members. We do not know how many 
Kachin people live in Myanmar, but according to common estimates about a third to a half of the 
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entire Kachin population belongs to this Christian organization. And this is only one among 
many Christian organizations in the Kachin region.40  
The KBC’s activity portfolio goes far beyond the usual scope of any religious 
organization or an NGO that I was familiar with. The KBC at times acts rather like a civilian 
government. The Kachin Baptist leaders identify villages and count household members. They 
even issue birth certificates and marriage certificates in very rural areas, where the bureaucracy 
of the Myanmar government doesn’t reach. They make textbooks and organize classes for 
language teaching. They produce and distribute newsletters regularly. They put together 
museums and exhibits about the Kachin culture and history. They visit foreign countries as 
representatives. And they organize the most spectacular entertainment events in the region such 
as sports competitions. Because of all these events, the Kachin Christian life was exceptionally 
public and dynamic. Of all the activities the most demanding was the arduous evangelical 
campaigns. A mission to a remote village may last years. The Kachin Christians dedicate an 
enormous amount of time, money, and labor to evangelism.  
Such evangelical agency of the tribal people, however, has been an elusive topic in 
academic studies. Even the studies that highlight the highlanders’ agency usually leave Christian 
evangelism alone. In fact the agency stressed by the existing studies appear to be incompatible 
with their conversion to Christianity. Scott in particular made a strong case for the upland ethos 
of heterodoxy and autonomy in The Art of Not Being Governed; he characterized highlanders as 
political agents who historically escaped the states, civilizations, and religious establishments to 
maintain independence. While the lowland society eagerly adopted world religions (in Southeast 
                                                
40 There are many denominations active in the Kachin region including the Catholic, the 
Anglican, the Assemblies of God, the Seventh-day Adventist churches. There is also another large Baptist 




Figure 3. “Zinghkri” (Network): a contemporary Jinghpaw-language publication. “Hpung Shiga" 
("Church News") is a periodical publication by the Kachin Baptist Convention. The featured articled, 
highlighted in this front cover, is "This Place belongs to Jesus Christ." The only Burmese words in this 




Asia, Buddhism or Islam, most typically) and endorsed cultural cosmopolitanism (especially 
through writing), the upland tribal peoples refuted such lowland influences in favor of religious 
and cultural autonomy. Civilization couldn’t climb the hills, as Scott nicely put it (Scott 2009, 
21). Neither Buddhism or Islam climbed the hills of Southeast Asia. It is true that the Kachin 
people did not endorse Buddhism, Islam, and Chinese religions while they were exposed to them 
prior to the arrival of Christian missionaries. But then how do we explain the fact that they have 
endorsed Christianity? What explains this exception? How has Christianity alone made it to the 
Kachin hills?   
The Kachin region of northern Myanmar has been largely inaccessible to academic 
fieldwork for a half century; indeed no one conducted academic fieldwork in the second half of 
the twentieth century. But the lack of fieldwork access is only one reason for this gaping hole in 
the scholarship. Leach, who spent six years with the Kachin, did not write about Kachin 
Christianity. He was profoundly interested in Christianity; he even put together a book on 
biblical myth. But when he wrote about the tribal society, he placed Christianity outside the 
scope of study. Why? Why have researchers of the Kachin have persistently avoided the issue of 
Christianity? In the following I will tackled this question by reviewing the works of three 
researchers: Edmund Leach, Toshihiro Yoshida, and Mandy Sadan.  
 
Edmund Leach and the British anthropology 
Leach’s classic study, published in 1954, has been not only the best-known 
anthropological study of a Southeast Asian’s highland; it has possibly been the most widely read 
book of anthropology in the English language in the past fifty years. More than a half century 
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after the publication, this work’s influence is not waning.41 Yet in this study, Leach did not 
provide any substantial discussion of Christianity. When Leach was conducting fieldwork, 
Christianity had not yet spread widely across the Kachin region, but in the areas where he was 
stationed, Christian missions were already well established and they had caused noticeable 
impacts on Kachin communities.  
In 1939, the British anthropologist from the London School of Economics arrived in 
Bhamo, northern Burma. His choice of Kachin for his doctoral research had to do with Noel 
Stevenson, a colonial officer stationed in northern Myanmar, who was writing a “diploma thesis” 
at the same university. After Leach came back from a disappointing trip to Iraq, Stevenson 
persuaded Leach and helped him with the administrative arrangement so that Leach would be 
able to conduct research in northern Burma.42 Arriving at his field site in northern Burma near 
the China border, Leach immediately noticed active evangelical Christian missions, both 
Protestant and Catholic, as he wrote in a letter back to London:  
Until a few years ago the administartion [sic] didn’t bother about the Kachins, but powerful 
bands of American Babtist [sic] and R.C. missionaries were hard at work until today in this 
area about half the population are Christians of some sort or other. … its [sic] the hell of a 
muddle. Obviously the root trouble is the existence of the rival missions, one is bad enough, 
but two!! Still what a chance for sociological comparison (Edmund Ronald Leach 2000).  
 
                                                
41 An edited volume that reappraises its legacy and enduring relevance has been published only 
recently: Social Dynamics in the Highlands of Southeast Asia: Reconsidering Political Systems of 
Highland Burma by E.R. Leach (Robinne and Sadan 2007). In the Preface to The Art of Not Being 
Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, James Scott acknowledges the enduring 
unique value of Leach’s study: “No one who plods the route I have taken gets anywhere without a 
sustained intellectual encounter with Edmund Leach’s Political Systems of Highland Burma. There are 
few books that are so ‘good to think with’” (Scott 2009, xiii). 
42 Stevenson was not the only influence. At the university Leach had also met L. R. Ogden, 
another anthropology student on leave from the Burma administrative service in the Frontier Areas (R. 
Anderson 2007, 7–8). This relationship between the colonial officers and academic anthropologists 
illustrate the fact that “the main task of anthropology was to give supplementary teaching to colonial 
service cadets” (Ileto 1979) 
  
 77 
It is perhaps indicative that Leach, a student of anthropology, chose the word “sociological 
comparison” as opposed to “anthropological comparison.” Perhaps it reflects that he didn’t 
consider Christian missions as an anthropological topic.     
 Before Leach finished the fieldwork, the Second World War broke out, and he ended up 
“organizing guerrilla warfare among Jinghpaw speakers along the frontier, acting as 
quartermaster for the Kachin Levies at Putao” (Anderson 2007, 14). Only when the war was over 
was he able to go back to London to complete the thesis. Leach’s doctoral dissertation, Cultural 
change, with special reference to the hill tribes of Burma and Assam, submitted in 1947, includes 
a long section titled “Christian missions,” in which a range of impacts of Christianity is 
discussed. He observes, for example: “the intelligentia of the hill peoples are now almost entirely 
Christian” (Leach 1947, 624). But the British anthropologist attributed the religious conversion 
to the financial power of the American Baptist Missions (A.B.M.): “There is little doubt in my 
own mind that, if for any reason, the financial support from outside sources were withdrawn, the 
A.B.M. Kachin church would very rapidly assume an entirely unrecognisable form or forms” 
(Leach 1947, 624). Since he found Christianity to be a short-lived phenomenon, enabled only by 
wealthy American missionaries, Leach put aside the whole topic for the more theoretically-
driven 1954 monograph. 
As far as I know, the only time Leach discussed Kachin Christianity was when, in 1975, 
he wrote a review of A Century of Growth: the Kachin Baptist Church of Burma, written by an 
American missionary with extensive experience in Kachin. Herman Tegenfeldt was the last 
Baptist foreign missionary based in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State; he stayed in 
Myanmar for two decades, from 1945 to 1966. The monograph is based on his dissertation at the 
School of World Mission and Institute of Church Growth at Fuller Theological Seminary in 
  
 78 
California. A Century of Growth remains the single largest monograph about Kachin Christianity 
written in the English language.43 
The only merit Leach found in “this “narrowly evangelical” study was the “extensive 
bibliography [with] references to missionary magazines and unpublished missionary archives 
which have not been listed in earlier Kachin bibliographies.” He faulted the book for “virtually 
ignor[ing] all recent developments of ethnological, sociological or political-historical 
significance,” concluding that “it does not appear that they contain anything of great 
anthropological significance.” He ends the brief book review, which appeared in the Man of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, by expressing dismay about the backwardness of the American 
Christian evangelism: “I find it astonishing, but also very sad, that the blinkered devotion which 
inspired the missionary contributors to the Evangelical Magazine around 1800 should reappear 
in entirely unmodified form in the work of an American author writing in 1974, but so it is” 
(Leach 1975, 168).  
It is not surprising that Leach didn’t think highly of Tegenfeldt’s evangelical study. But 
what is also noteworthy that the anthropologist shows no interest whatsoever in Christian 
evangelism itself. None of Leach’s critics who extensively discussed The Political Systems of 
Highland Burma—most notably, F. K. Lehman, Thomas Kirsch, David Nugent, and Jonathan 
Friedman—discussed Christianity either (Friedman 1987; Friedman 1998; Kirsch 1973; Lehman 
1970; Nugent 1982; Nugent 1983). 
 
Toshihiro Yoshida and the Japanese ethnography 
                                                
43 It is worth noting that Tegenfeldt’s study is available for sale at the Myanmar Baptist 
Convention and Kachin Baptist Convention bookstores in Myanmar even today. There is a considerable 
volume of literature on church history in the Jinghpaw-Kachin language today. The Kachin Baptist 
Convention in particular has been producing large monographs in recent years. 
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 Although Toshihiro Yoshida, a Japanese nonfiction writer, is not known outside Japan, 
he is the author of highly acclaimed books on the Kachin. Yoshida is the only foreign researcher 
I know who is fluent in the Jinghpaw language. Because none of his work has been translated 
into English, I will first give a brief introduction to this remarkable ethnographer.    
 Yoshida visited Southeast Asia’s upland in 1977 as a nineteen-year-old college student. 
Travelling in remote corners of northern Thailand, he was so enchanted by the upland peoples he 
encountered that he returned to the area repeatedly. Eventually he found himself talking with 
insurgents from Myanmar in the infamously porous borderland. In January 1985, he started to 
walk with troops of the Kachin Independence Army. He ended up spending three years and 
seven months with Kachin soldiers, criss-crossing the mountains of northern Myanmar. He 
quickly learned the Kachin (Jinghpaw) language; in fact he became so fluent that after a year or 
so the people he met assumed him to be a native Kachin.  
 From the beginning, Yoshida was determined to write about his experience in the Kachin 
hills. During the long journey across northern Myanmar, he took copious notes. When he 
eventually arrived back on the Thai border in October 1988, having survived life-threatening 
malaria, he was carrying thirty one notebooks and 2,800 photos. It took another seven years until 
he managed to complete his first book in Japan. When the 600-page monograph was finally 
published, it won the Ooya Souichi Award, the most prestigious award for non-fiction writing in 
Japan. Between 1995 and 2000, he published three books on the Kachin, in which he presented 
detailed descriptions of livelihood and cultural practices of Kachin and other peoples, covering 
an unusually wide range of topics: farming, hunting, handicraft, embroidery, architecture, 
cooking, music, myth and legend, festival and ritual, oral history, linguistic diversity, kinship 
structure, naming rules, and so on. His books collectively present probably the most detailed 
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ethnography of rural Kachin society in Myanmar ever published since The Kachins: Their 
Customs and Traditions (Hanson 1981) by Ola Hanson, a Baptist missionary, and The Kachins: 
Religion and Customs (Gilhodes 1996) by C. Gilhodes, a Catholic missionary. 
 Although, in Japan, Yoshida is rightly acknowledged as the single most authoritative 
researcher on the Kachin, his writings have never been translated into any other language.44 One 
of the reasons for the lack of international readership I think is that Yoshida eschews theory. 
Yoshida never engages with Leach’s study. He is an entirely self-taught ethnographer, having 
never attended graduate school. In fact there is basically no engagement with any academic 
anthropological literature in his writings. ⁠1 
 In Japanese academia, especially in Area Studies, there is a room for non-academic and 
non-theoretical writers like Yoshida, because the Japanese scholarship is generally not driven by 
theory. Anthony Reid, the great historian of Southeast Asia, has commented on the particular 
qualities:  
The Japanese model emphasized total immersion in the field, with a minimum of 
theoretical disciplinary alignment by western standards. … Because it is resistant to the 
theoretical trendiness which often drives American social science, this tradition often 
appears to westerners refreshingly rich in data if sometimes theoretically modest. (Reid 
2004: 6)  
 
Japanese scholars are typically known for the data collection and linguistic skills, acquired 
during intense and lengthy immersion-style fieldwork. Yoshida’s ethnography certainly presents 
these qualities at an awe-inspiring level.  
 In all of his four books on the Kachin, however, Yoshida never discusses Kachin 
Christianity. He only acknowledges its current influence in passing. In his 2011 overview of the 
                                                
44 As an established non-fiction writer, Yoshida writes primarily articles and books for non-
academic audiences. Occasionally, however, he writes about Kachin for academic publications. For 
instance, in 2011, he wrote a 63-page chapter on Kachin in the large scholarly volume, General 
Introduction to Myanmar (Myanmaa Gaisetsu) (Yoshida 2011). 
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Kachin, he dedicates the entire “Religion and brief” section to animism, while acknowledging in 
the beginning that about 90% of the Kachin are said to have become Christians (Yoshida 2011, 
507–508). According to Yoshida, the veneration of forest spirits is central to the Kachin religious 
culture. Trees and forests are the defining motif of his ethnography. (Each of his books bears a 
tree-related word in the title.) He presents lyrical descriptions of the spirits and their powers. He 
characterizes swidden farming as a symbol of the relationship between the Kachin people and 
forest spirits (see in particular Yoshida 2011, 508-524). 
Yoshida’s avoidance of the Kachin Christianity is not based on secular modernism, but it 
too appears to reflect a particular world-view of his own culture. That is, his insistence on 
animism as the Kachin traditional religion seems to betray a distinctly Japanese ethnological 
perspective. In his historical analysis of Japanese ethnology in the early twentieth century, 
Prasenjit Duara has identified a persistent quest for “authentically primitive” as an ethnographic 
object. He examined how ‘‘the primitive’ in the periphery frequently represents human nature” 
in the Japanese ethnological literature (Duara 2003, 175) and how such romanticization is 
achieved by selectively highlighting “the practices among [the primitive] that resemble those of 
the Japanese” (Duara 2003, 186). While the focus of Duara’s analysis was the Japanese 
representation of tribal frontier in Manchukuo in the interwar period, his insights are applicable 
to the post-war period as well. The Japanese search for primordial authenticity in Asian forests 
has clearly outlived the Japanese imperialism of the early twentieth century.      
 This continuity of the pan-Asianist ethnological view from the pre-war era to the present 
has received little scholarly attention—even in Japan. The recent scholarship has understandably 
stressed the contrast between the outward Asianist persctive of the imperial era and the inward 
perspective of the post-era. As Eiji Oguma has compellingly shown in A Genealogy of Japanese 
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Self-Images and especially The Boundaries of the Japanese, the geographical and ethnic 
boundaries of the people understood as “the Japanese” changed dramatically before and after the 
war, (Oguma 1998; Oguma 2002). While “the Japanese people” was imagined to be spatially 
expansive and ethnically heterogeneous during the imperial era, the same people came to be 
understood as a homogeneous ethnic group which has resided together and maintained a distinct 
culture for a long time in the same islands. The pre-war Asianist view, which stressed ethnic 
contiguities between Japanese and other Asians, has been replaced by the post-war discourse of 
Japanese as a unique and uniform ethnic group—especially in the popular nationalist rhetoric.  
 At the same time, a pan-Asianist imagination based on primordial ties with authentic 
tribal culture survived in different formats and continues to be popular. An intellectual source of 
inspiration for this new pan-Asianist imagination has been the “laurel forest culture sphere” 
(syouyoujyurin bunkaken) thesis, advocated since the late 1960s by well-established university 
scholars such as Sasuke Nakao (1916-1993) and Koumei Sasaki (1929-2013). It proposes a 
contiguous region from the eastern part of the Sino-Himalayas to the western part of Japan as a 
distinct cultural zone based on ecological, agricultural, culinary commonalities. 
 Mythical accounts of cultural geography like the “laurel forest culture sphere” theory 
have attracted writers and artists, who seek an alternative, Pan-Asian cultural geography. It led to 
a popular Japanese myth that the Yunnan-Assam range of the eastern Himalaya region was the 
root of the ancient Japanese culture. This myth—called “hypothesis” in Japan—based on highly 
selective “common cultural elements,“ inspired countless nonfiction books and documentary 
products, including A Journey to the Naga Highland: In Search of the Origin of the Japanese 
(Hikyou Naga Kouchi Tankenki: Nihonjin no Genryu wo Motomete) and In Search of the Origin 
of the Ancient Japanese called “Wa”: Expeditions to Highlands of Yunnan and Assam (“Wa jin” 
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no Genryu wo Motomete: Unnan-Assamu Sangaku Minzoku Tousakou). From 1992 to 1994, the 
private broadcasting company TV-Tokyo made a series of documentary program titled Origins 
of the Japanese (Nihonjin no genryu), which produced a series of documentaries, featuring 
Nagaland, Bhutan, Tibet, and other places in the eastern Himalayan region.  
 It would be wrong to reduce Yoshida’s ethnography to a product of these myths of 
Japanese cultural origins. At the same time, a full analysis of his writing on the Kachin would 
have to take into account the inspiration he drew from them. On occasions he approvingly refers 
to the “laurel forest culture sphere” in his writing, especially when he talks about food (for 
example in the chapter “Fermentation and the Milk of Mother God” (“Hakkou to hahanaru kami 
no chichi” in Yoshida 1997). He also admits that his initial interest in upland Southeast Asia was 
based on his search for an alternative geography of Asia, one not based on modern nation-states 
but on more primordial cultural flows (Yoshida 1998). The Kachin Christianity clearly does not 
fit the cosmo-geography of Pan-Asian animism. 
 
3.3. Mandy Sadan 
 Mandy Sadan, the preeminent scholar of the Kachin history, of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies at the University of London, is one scholar who has written explicitly about 
Kachin Christianity.45 She does so with deep dismay. Sadan criticizes the reductive, 
essentializing, and dogmatic Kachin evangelical discourse. She urges secularization of the 
Kachin historiography. Let us first review her criticism briefly.      
                                                
45 Sadan published Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds 
of Burma, a 512-page monograph, at the end of 2013. This book includes a chapter titled: “Religious 
interactions across the borderworld, 1961-1994.” This latest study is unfortunately outside the scope of 
my study simply because the book was published only weeks before the deadline of this dissertation. 
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 In “Constructing and Contesting the Category ‘Kachin’ in the Colonial and Post-colonial 
Burmese State,” Sadan points out that the “Christian sermons, therefore, especially those in the 
largest Kachin Christian constituency, the Baptist Church, have had a significant impact on the 
construction of a coherent nationalist Kachin identity” (Sadan 2007, 52). My own data from the 
field and archival work indeed confirms this observation. My analysis, however, parts from 
Sadan’s where she attributes this Christian nationalism to the Western colonialism:  
This rhetoric dominated representations of Kachin history in most discourses, and 
through its lack of subtlety, does little to do dispute the claims of the Burmese center that 
the Kachin have been misled by colonial officials and foreign missions in their 
interpretation of their historical relationship to the Burmese state (Sadan 2011: 145. See 
also Sadan 2007: 53) 
 
Because she does not cite any example of the Christian rhetoric of Kachin history, it is not 
entirely clear to me what kind of rhetoric she has in mind. It is perhaps useful to use the word 
“fundamentalism” to refer to the distinct quality of the rhetoric. If so, Sadan’s reaction to the 
rhetoric of religious fundamentalism—and it is the most common reaction among academic 
scholars—is to dismiss it categorically and explain the phenomenon in terms of deficiency. 
 Religious fundamentalism is not worth academic analysis, because it is irrational. It is 
entertained by those who lack proper education. Sadan laments that “it has been very hard to 
challenge, refute, renegotiate or decolonize the constructions of traditional Kachin morality and 
society” because of “the Kachin institutional churches” (Sadan 2007, 53). She is convinced that 
the Christianity has colonized the Kachin mind, and the decolonization hasn’t happened because 
“the Kachin people lack an adequately researched secular history” (Sadan 2007, 65-66) and that 
“Kachin elites . . . lack the secular academic training in historical and anthropological disciplines 
that would enable them to translate . . . into more globally understood conventions” (Sadan 2011, 
147). It is from the vantage point of liberal secularism that the Kachin Christianity is assessed as 
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inferior. In order to undo this Christian colonization, she urges that we first recognize the 
resistance to Christianity: “There are today, and were significantly so during the colonial period, 
communities of Kachin people who resisted the spread of the missions and conversion to 
Christianity” (Sadan 2007, 52).   
For all the groundbreaking work Sadan has done as a historian of the Kachin, she has, in 
my opinion, too hastily dismissed Kachin Christianity. To argue that the Kachin people were 
misled by colonial officials and foreign missions and that they are still barely aware of the 
colonial deceit today is so antithetical to the defining tenet of Sadan’s scholarship, which 
carefully uncovers Kachin perspectives. But more broadly, Sadan’s hasty judgement appears to 
reflect certain strongly-held assumptions about European colonialism, Christian evangelism, and 
modern secularism. These assumptions are not unique to her; they are widely held assumptions 
among many scholars. They are often taken for granted by university-based academics, because 
the modern secular scholarship has been developed in active opposition to religious teachings. 
Distancing oneself from Christianity, pointing out its dogma, and asserting the superiority of 
secular knowledge has been an integral part of the academic self-identity.  
Webb Keane points out that “a great deal of contemporary academic and political work in 
the Euro-American north tends to presuppose the moral narrative of modernity” (Keane 2013, 
163). He observes that “secularity often presents in compulsory terms, even as an ethical 
demand”: “they ought to be secular” (Keane 2013, 159). Keane also mentions how the secular 
modern get disturbed, and even offended, by “morally and politically troubling anachronisms, 
premoderns or anti-moderns” (Keane 2013, 162).46 Secular modernists are disappointed that an 
                                                
46 The best analysis of this moral disturbance is presented in Talal Asad’s penetrating analysis of 
the British reaction to the Rushdie Affair (Asad 1990). 
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indigenous people like the Kachin fall for something so premodern as Christianity. They demand 
that they become secular instead. 
In 2014, Sadan published her magnum opus, Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories 
Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma. In this 512-page monograph, Sadan engages 
with the issue of Kachin Christianity at length for the first time, devoting a whole chapter titled 
“Virtue.” Her primary concern is to dismantle the popular teleological narrative enjoyed by 
Kachin Christians. According to this narrative, the Kachin embraced Christianity during the 
colonial era and the religious conversion unavoidably led to a war against the oppressive state. 
Sadan analyzes archival data to show that the Kachin conversion actually took place not before 
but during the insurgency. This is certainly an important and necessary corrective. Sadan’s 
refutation of the evangelical account, however, leaves what seems to me a larger question 
untouched: why does the evangelical narrative appeal so strongly to the Kachin, despite the 
factual inaccuracies that could be pointed out rather easily? Is it conceivable that the evangelical 
narrative spreads because it is able to gloss historical facts as a simple, reductionist, 
essentializing story? Sadan herself admits that “Christianity is a useful resource for unifying 
discourses of historical experience among a diverse set of communities,” but I wish she had 
unpacked this particular kind of discursive resourcefulness more specifically (463).    
In Being and Becoming Kachin, Sadan convincingly repudiates the erroneous view 
(espoused by scholars like Robert Taylor) that the upland peoples like Kachin were “essentially 
deluded supporters of [the British] oppressive order” and “politically unsophisticated” (260). 
When it comes to the Kachin’s religious behavior, however, she appears to uphold a similarly 
unfounded view, implying that the Kachin are ultimately deluded supporters of an oppressive 
order and that they are not sufficiently sophisticated to “decolonize” their historiography. For all 
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the groundbreaking work Sadan has done, she appears to too hastily dismiss the Kachin 
subjectivity when it comes to their encounter with Christianity. To suggest, even implicitly, that 
“the Kachin have been misled by colonial officials and foreign missions” (Sadan 2007, 53) and 
that they remain unaware of this deceit today is quite antithetical to her scholarship, which has 
been skillfully uncovering the Kachin-centric perspectives.  
The Christianization of the Kachin has not been discussed extensively Leach, Yoshida, or 
Sadan. Nother has it received much attention from younger scholars who are conducting 
fieldwork in the Kachin region such as Karin Dean, Nicholas Farrelly, and Kevin Woods (Dean 
2005; 2007; 2012; Farrelly 2012; Woods 2011a; 2011b).47 The omission in studies of 
contemporary Kachin society is noteworthy, because Churches have become the most powerful 
organizations in Kachin society besides the military. For example, it was the Kachin Baptist 
Convention (KBC) who mediated the negotiations between Kachin Independence Army and the 
Myanmar government to reach the historic ceasefire of 1994. None of the numerous political 
analyses of the ceasefire and its effects has presented a detailed analysis of this organization, 
however (M. P. Callahan 2007; Zaw Oo and Win Min 2007). 
Some non-academic writers make refreshingly straightforward observations about Kachin 
Christians. The Japanese adventure-travel writer Hideyuki Takano spent four months in 2002 
with Kachin soldiers, traveling from Southwest China to Northeast India across Kachin State.48 
His book has a section titled “Why are the Kachin such devout Christians?” in which he writes 
                                                
47 There have also been studies of Jinghpo people conducted in southwestern Yunnan (Ho 1997; 
Z. Wang 1997; Zhang and Hlaing 2013). Because the Jinghpo people in Yunnan are hardly Christianized, 
naturally these studies do not discuss the Christianization taking place in Myanmar. The only exception is 
the study by Oliver Byar Bowh Si, which discusses briefly “liberation theology” in the Kachin context 
(Byar Bowh Si 2011). I hope he will expand this study in the future. 
48 Takano had spent a year in a Wa village in Myanmar and written a book based on his 
experience, which has been translated into English. See Takano 2002. 
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that having traveled around the world he is not aware of any people so devoutly Christian as the 
Kachin (Takano 2003, 256). A Burmese person with considerable experiences in the Kachin 
region also presents a straightforward assessment. In 2008, when there was a discussion on the 
New Mandala blog (run by Andrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly at the Australian National 
University) as to whether it would be possible for foreigners to travel on the old WWII-era Ledo 
road from India to China through Kachin State, a Burmese ex-soldier who had stayed in the 
Kachin State chimed in with the following piece of advise:  
For all the dreamers thinking of doing the famous Ledo road from India right through 
Burma and to China, what you need is a good bulldozer at the head of your convoy. 
Many parts of unsealed dirt road are now blocked by landslides and mud flow. Military 
escort would also be useless as the Burmese army presence would only attract KIA 
[Kachin Independence Army] and all sorts of Kachin rebels. Just carry a large cross and 
they would let you cross their territory (Hla Oo 2008). 
 
I myself heard from Kachin pastors that sometimes only a car with a large cross on the front 
window can pass checkpoints in the Kachin region.     
 Towards the end of his life, Leach himself pointed out that he avoided discussing 
contemporary affairs in the Kachin region and that it was a mistake. In “Tribal Ethnography: Past, 
Present, Future,” he wrote: “I still accepted the conventional view that my task was to discuss the 
indigenous social system of which I myself was not a part. Thus the missionaries and colonial 
administrators and the British military recruiting officers were not really part of my story. I see 
now that this was a mistake” [Leach 1987: 43. italics added]. The “mistake” was committed by 
most tribal ethnographers. As a result, “Christianity was the last major area of religious activity 
to be explored in ethnographic writing” (Cannell 2006, 8). Joel Robbins recalls that Christianity 
“was once a complete non-starter in disciplinary conversations.” It was difficult to raise the topic 
without “fear of eliciting blank looks or raised eyebrows” (Robbins 2006: 285). The avoidance 
of Christianity in anthropology was of course not limited to Southeast Asia; it was a regular 
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assumption for the whole discipline of anthropology. Jean Comaroff, who wrote her doctoral 
thesis nearly 30 years later at the same institution as Leach had, recounts that Christianity was 
not an anthropological topic even in the 1970s: “There was concern among my advisors at the 
London School of Economics because Christianity was regarded as a topic for comparative 
religion or sociology, not for anthropology. There was no anthropology of Christianity at that 
time, so it was really quite a struggle at that point to find relevant interlocutors.” (Comaroff in 
Kim 2010) 
Rather than framing Christianity with the binary of domination and resistance, it might be 
more useful to investigate the Christianization as a historical and ongoing process with many 
unexpected twists and turns. Such an approach would make us more cautious towards the view 
that the Christianization is a one-way street of colonial domination. In her studies of South 
Africa, Jean Comaroff has stressed how “Christianity was inseparable from the whole logic of 
the way colonialism had been made and was then being unmade” (quoted in D. K. Kim 2010; 
italics added). An example of this unmaking can be found in the formation of the African 
National Congress in South Africa; the founders came out of the African Independent Churches, 
“whose leader had taken the Bible—which had entered the community as a colonizing, civilizing 
text—and read another message out of it.” For our purpose here, it is worth recalling that the 
founders of the Kachin Independence Army were Baptists. Jean Comaroff also urges us to 
observe how Christianity itself changes as it travels, asking: “Is Africa becoming Christianized 
or was Christianity becoming Africanized?” (quoted in D. K. Kim 2010). A similar question can 
be raised for the Kachin context: while the Kachin are Christianized, isn’t Christianity also 
Kachin-ized at the same time?  
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If we take the Christianization as a historical process in which the evangelical rhetoric 
has been slowly yet steadily adopted and modified among the Kachin, then many new historical 
questions emerge. What aspects of the evangelical rhetoric did the Kachin first come to adopt? 
Has the evangelical rhetoric been uniformly shared among various ethno-linguistic groups and 
across various denominations within the “Kachin”? How do the non-Christian Kachin in China 
and India view the ethno-nationalist narrative? How does the Kachin military use the evangelical 
ethno-nationalist narratives without alienating its non-Christian members? How do Kachin 
evangelical Christians solve contradictory narratives? 
 In his 1947 dissertation, Leach observed that the Christian popularity was based solely on 
the foreign missionaries’ money and stated it would dissipate without the money. Less than 
twenty years after he made this assessment, the financial support to Christians in Myanmar from 
outside sources were cut off, as the new government of Ne Win expelled all foreign missions 
from country in the mid 1960s. The American missionaries—and their money—departed. Then, 
contrary to Leach’s prediction, the churches grew more than ever. The expulsion of foreign 
missionaries is today seen by many Christians in Myanmar—Kachin and others—as a fortuitous 
event, as a divine intervention, because it resulted in a stronger and more independent indigenous 
leadership. According to the 1995 dissertation by Yaw Ba Tangbau Lasaw, “A brief history and 
growth of the Kachin Baptist Church”:  
The departure of foreign missionaries gave Kachin Christians a new opportunity to 
demonstrate their faith as truly their own, independent of foreigners. They could show, in 
ways previously not possible, that the Christian faith was now one of the religions 
indigenous to Myanmar, just as the Buddhist faith had become after being brought from 
India centuries ago, and that Christians were worthy of being considered as responsible 
and respected citizens of the land (Yaw Ba Tangbau Lasaw 1995, 110). 
From Kachin Christians, I heard this comparison repeatedly; they say that Christianity came to 
the Kachin (and other tribal) people in a manner not dissimilar to how Buddhism came to the 
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Burmese people, meaning it is normal that a religion travels and become indigenous at a new 
place.49  
In the course of my inquiry I conversed with a number of academic and NGO researchers 
working in Myanmar. When I mentioned that I ended up studying Christianity I often received 
very negative responses. Many considered Christianity to be an ideology of the Euro-American 
imperialism. They attribute the spread of Protestantism in Myanmar to the brutality of the British 
empire and the wealth of the American missionaries. Most non-Christians I spoke with in 
Myanmar were very critical of Christianity as they saw it as an alien force destroying the 
indigenous traditional culture. Being unfamiliar with Christianity, I often found the Kachin 
evangelism extremely perplexing. It struck me initially that all their religious activities were a 
huge waste of time and energy because it seemed to me that there were more urgent, practical, 
and useful things that they should be doing instead. 
When I cautiously presented to the Kachin people the view that Christianity was a 
Western dogma, they laughed at it, and told me emphatically that Christianity was not a Western 
religion. They would tell me that Christianity had been traveling and that its center has been 
moving in its long history. The center moved from the Middle East to Europe, and then to 
America. Now it is moving to Asia! They consider themselves to be a driver of a global revival 
movement. Many Kachin people told me that it is their destiny, as a people located between 
China and India, to propagate the gospel to billions of non-believers that surround them. This 
was God’s strategic plan. I was not at all expecting that the Kachin people would tell me about 
frontier, of any sort, with such enthusiasm and hope. I was amazed how they have discursively 
                                                
49 For insightful ethnographic comparisons of Buddhist and Christian missions in Southeast Asia, 
see Keyes 1993; Keyes 1996. 
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Chapter 4: Frontier narrative: emplotting geographical transformation 
 
Introduction 
Studies of frontier have been in a peculiar state of stagnation for some time. Academics 
have become weary of “endless debate about the utility or uselessness of the frontier paradigm” 
(Giersch 2006, 226). Historians of the United States, who have discussed the word “frontier” 
more vigorously than anyone else, appear to be exhausted by the century-long debate. “There are 
few issues as moribund as [US] western history’s old debate about … frontier” (Deloria 2006, 
21). By today, other terms like “borderlands” and “contact zone” seem to have replaced “frontier” 
as an analytical concept. At the same time, “frontier” clearly remains a very popular metaphor 
among scholars, especially historians and anthropologists. What explains this apparent 
contradiction—that “frontier” is largely abandoned as a topic but ubiquitously adopted as a 
metaphor? 
If we look for studies that identify frontier itself as the primary subject of inquiry, there 
are actually very few. Untaming the Frontier in Anthropology, Archaeology, and History edited 
by Bradley Parker and Lars Rodseth is the only explicitly cross-disciplinary effort I know that 
tackles frontier head on (Parker and Rodseth 2005). There are even fewer theoretical studies.  
The “Introduction: Theoretical Considerations in the Study of Frontiers” by Rodseth and Parker 
in the above-mentioned anthology and Claude Raffestin’s work, especially “Elements for a 
Theory of the Frontier,” are the only genuinely theoretical efforts I have been able to find.50  
                                                
50 Daniel Power’s brief introduction to the volume edited by him and Naomi Standen “Frontiers: Terms, 
Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe” is another rare effort to explicitly 
discuss frontier in conceptual terms (Power and Standen 1998). His approach, which treats European and 
North American concepts separately, is useful. Because the volume is largely focused on premodern 
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In this chapter, I analyze the frontier metaphor by focusing its function in narrative. As 
Livingstone and Harrison pointed out, it is useful to see a metaphor as a condensed myth. 
Following this insight, I examine several imaginative historical narratives. In investigating these 
dramas of frontier transformation, I loosely adopt the categories of “comedy” and “tragedy.” 51 
In his magisterial Anatomy of Criticism, Frye characterized dramatic comedy as a story of a 
“movement from one kind of society to another.” At the end of the comic drama, a new society is 
created, which crystallize around the hero and heroin, most typically though a festive ritual such 
as a wedding. This new society is “the one that the audience has recognized all along to be the 
proper and desirable state of affairs” (Fry 1957, 152). It is noteworthy that Frye himself 
acknowledges that a “frontier” is a typical setting for a dramatic comedy. Pointing out that a 
typical setting of comedy is pastoral and that it “preserves the theme of escape from society to 
the extent of idealizing a simplified life in the country or on the frontier (the pastoral of popular 
modern literature is the Western story.” He further observes that the imagery of close association 
with nature, represented in the sheep and pleasant pastures (or the cattle and ranches), “is often 
used, as it is in the Bible, for the theme of salvation” (Fry 2006, 41). Fry associates “frontier” 
with comedy only; he did not see it as a setting for tragedy. His work was originally published in 
1957, when there were still few tragedies of frontier.  
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section will review how the existing 
academic literature has neglected the popular usage of frontier as a metaphor. The second section 
will investigate comic narratives of frontier, especially Frederick Turner’s “frontier thesis.” The 
                                                                                                                                                       
Europe, he does not explore the rhetorical use that later developed in North America. On a medieval 
European concept of frontier, see also Schlesser 1984 and Power 2004). 
51 In Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Narrating the European Conquest of Native America 1890-
1990, Kerwin Lee Klein (Klein 1997) also talks about “comedy” and “tragedy” in analyzing various 
narratives of frontier. Klein, however, does not discuss how the American sense of frontier has travelled 
beyond the United States. 
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third section turns to tragedy. James Scott’s historical narrative of upland Southeast Asia will be 
discussed. In the last section, I come back to the question why this geographical metaphor is so 
widespread and popular today.   
Definition struggles 
Numerous scholars have already commented on the unusually ambiguous and elastic 
senses of frontier. Frustrated by the lack of a common usage, many scholars have proposed 
definitions of their own, hoping to establish a common usage. Let us consult a major academic 
dictionary, The Dictionary of Human Geography, for a glimpse of such efforts here. I will review 
the two latest editions, published in 2000 and 2009.    
In the 2000 edition of the Dictionary, “frontier” is defined as “a zone of varying width 
that refers either to the political division between two countries or to the settled and uninhabited 
parts of a country” (Johnston et al. 2000, 282 italics added). Indeed, many scholars have 
identified zonality—as opposed to lineality—as a defining feature of a frontier. But the 
dictionary hastens to add: “Prior to the twentieth century, frontiers were a common feature of the 
political landscape. But most have disappeared under the global tide of human settlement and 
economic development, to be replaced by [linear] boundaries” (Johnston et al. 2000).52 The 
latest (2009) edition of the same dictionary defines “frontier” as a limit and identifies two kinds 
of limit. The first one is political: “the limits of a state. The frontier of a border is its border with 
another state. In modern times, this frontier is thought of as a line” (Gregory et al. 2009, 264). 
Again, “frontier” is defined as a premodern border. The “second sense of limit is “a line between 
settled and unsettled lands, cultivated and uncultivated.” Defined as a “line” that demarcates an 
agrarian and demographic boundary, it does not identify the zonal nature as an essential feature. 
                                                
52 Mark Blacksell is the author of the entry for the 2000 edition, and Gerry Kearns is for the 2009 edition.   
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While the 2000 edition emphasizes that it is a zone, the 2009 edition stresses it is a line. Both 
editions agree on one thing, however; they both assert that (a) in the premodern era political 
boundaries were not linear but zonal and that (b) we can call such premodern boundaries 
“frontiers.” That is, there are no more frontiers today, and “frontier” does not have a referent 
object in the contemporary world.  
This definition of “frontier” as premodern and zonal boundary is indeed consistent with 
the way many historians use the term. For example, Ainslie Embree makes a definition between 
“frontier” and “boundary” in her study “Frontiers into Boundaries: The Evolution of the Modern 
State”: “A frontier is an area … a boundary is a line” (Embree 1989, 68). The distinction 
between “frontier” and “boundary” was also observed by Sir Henry McMahon, who wrote in 
1935: “a frontier sometimes refers to a wide tract of border country, or to hinterlands or buffer 
states, undefined by any external boundary line” (McMahon 1935, 4). As McMahon’s 
“sometimes” indicates, what “frontier” meant was often ambiguous, however.53  
For the sake of analytical clarity, a different word has been introduced and it has gained 
prominence recently: “borderland.” With “borderland,” we can discuss the zonal nature of 
boundary in the modern world. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel presented a solid 
methodological foundation for comparative studies of borderlands.54 And the “borderland” 
literature is growing rapidly, demonstrating its advantages as an analytical term to understand the 
contemporary world. One might think that we do not need to talk about frontier anymore, now 
                                                
53 To my knowledge, there is no historical study of “frontier” as a British imperial terminology. The 
closest I am aware is Agha and Kolsky 2009.     
54 Baud and van Schendel explain frontier as follows: “Frontier commonly refers to the territorial 
expansion of nations or civilizations into ‘empty’ areas” (Baud and van Schendel 1997, 213) 
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that “borderland studies” are well-established. Bradley Parker has even suggested that we use 
“borderland” as an encompassing category and treat “frontier” as its subcategory. 
 In Parker’s typology, “frontier” is characterized by porosity and fluidity; whereas “border” 
is typically more restrictive and static (Parker 2006, 81). Parker’s attempt is laudable, but the 
quest to establish a rigid analytical category of “frontier” leaves one crucial question unanswered. 
As historian Patricia Limerick has pointed out in her essay “Adventures of the Frontier in the 
Twentieth Century,” the public usage of the word “has no relation at all to the definitional 
struggling of contemporary historians” (Limerick 1994, 77). She has observed that “despite 
earnest scholarly efforts to define the frontier, ‘elasticity’ and confused meaning [has been] its 
one constant characteristic” (Limerick 1994, 79). Why is there such a wide discrepancy between 
the academic definition and the everyday usage—to the extent that one recognizes that they have 
“no relation at all”? I suggest that we take this question seriously and ask how we can better 
understand the notorious elasticity of “frontier.”   
 
Figure 4: A typological diagram by Parker (Parker 2006, 81) 
  
I suggest that we begin a different kind of inquiry into frontier by first stepping back and 
observing the popular sense of “frontier.” We will do well to follow Wittgenstein’s advice. 
Parker] TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF BORDERLAND PROCESSES 81 
Figure 1. A continuum showing the interrelationships between borderlands (territories or regions around or between 
political or cultural entities), borders (linear dividing lines fixed in a particular space) and frontiers (loosely defined areas 
or transition zones that lie between political or administrative entities or between one such entity and a hinterland), and 
boundaries (unspecific divides or separators that indicate limits of various kinds) (Parker 2003). 
focus. First, borders and fron iers are made up of 
various types of boundaries (i.e., geographic, polit- 
ical, demographic, cultural, and economic). They 
are in fact boundary sets. And second, in their most 
extreme manifestations, borders and frontiers are 
opposite types of divides - the first hard, static, and 
linear and the second soft, fluid, and zonal. How- 
ever, as social scientists we all know that data rarely 
if ever fit neatly into typological categories. In fact, 
a review of the literature on this topic shows that 
there is considerable variation between various 
types of boundaries and between specific frontier 
situations. To deal with this variation, I have pre- 
viously proposed that boundary diversity can be 
categorized by juxtaposing borders and frontiers 
on a continuum with the static, linear border on one 
end and the dynamic, fluid frontier on the other. The 
continuum starts with the most extreme variation 
of the static border on the far left. This type of 
boundary is a spatially restricted border or line of 
separation that can be described as static or closed. 
This is juxtaposed with the most extreme version 
of the fluid frontier on the far right. This type of 
boundary is a zone that is spatially expansive and 
can be described as dynamic or open (Parker 
2002:374). Combining these distinctions with the 
concept of borderlands described above produces 
the paradigm shown in Figure 1. 
In the above discussion, I highlighted the impor- 
tance of the multidimensional aspect of frontiers 
described by Elton. Elton sums it up this way, "even 
the idea of a simple frontier zone needs to be 
expanded to that of multiple zones since not all 
types of activity can be bounded in the same way" 
(Elton 1996b: 113). Borders and frontiers may thus 
be considered boundary sets; that is, they are made 
up of multiple, overlapping boundaries. A complete 
analysis of any particular boundary must therefore 
include various categories of data. In order to allow 
for this variation I have previously proposed five 
categories of data that can be applied to the Con- 
tinuum of Boundary Dynamics: geographic, polit- 
ical, demographic, cultural, and economic (Parker 
2002). I envision the character of each of these cat- 
egories of data being measured as separate yet inter- 
dependent lines on the continuum. I refer to this 
model as the "Continuum of Boundary Dynamics" 
(Figure 2 and Parker 2002:374). This model allows 
for a more nuanced analysis of the various bound- 
aries that might occur in borderlands. In this sys- 
tem one might, for example, characterize a 
particular boundary as geographically and politi- 
cally restrictive but economically porous, demo- 
graphically fluid but politically static, etc. In my 
analysis of Assyria's Anatolian frontier during the 
Mesopotamian Iron Age (ca. 900-600 B.C.), for 
example, I argued that Assyria's political and mil- 
itary control over the region, which penetrated 
nearly all aspects of frontier society, made this a 
politically restrictive zone. However, some of the 
same forces that caused this region to be politically 
restrictive contributed to its demographic and cul- 
tural porosity. The geography was also, I argued, 
quite restrictive, but at the same time geography 
played a key role in the porous economic charac- 
ter of the area (Parker 2001, 2002). 
Although the Continuum of Boundary Dynam- 
ics is, I believe, a good step toward characterizing 
borderland situations, it is not without problems. 
One problem with this model is that the variables 
measured on the continuum (geographic, political, 
demographic, cultural, and economic) are very gen- 
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Instead of searching for definition, observe the everyday use—“the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language” (Wittgenstein 2001, 25e). Although “borderland” appears to be replacing 
“frontier” as an analytical term in scholarly literature, we all know that the two words are used in 
very different, non-interchangeable ways in our everyday speech. The difference is especially 
obvious when “frontier” is used as an adjective—as in the familiar phrases like “frontier mission” 
and “frontier spirit.”  
It is not surprising that Hollywood has made countless products whose names bear 
“frontier”—from “The Lawless Frontier” (1934) with John Wayne to “Star Trek: Hidden 
Frontier” (2000-2007). The metaphor has been used far beyond the American movie production, 
as we all know. Scientists love the phrases like “new frontier” and “next frontier.” Countless 
scholarly products, both in natural and social sciences, use the word “frontier” in presenting their 
latest achievements or future plans. “Biology of dairy cows during the transition period: the final 
frontier?” “Toward a new frontier in myocardial reprefusion therapy emerging platelet 
preeminence,” and “The next frontier of molecular medicine: delivery of therapeutics” are just 
three examples that I happened to find with a quick search on the internet. There are countless 
academic journals with “frontier” in the title, from “Frontiers of History in China” to “Frontiers: 
A Journal of Women’s Studies.”    
 The ubiquity of “frontier” compels us to consider it as what Henrietta Moore has called 
“concept-metaphor.” As Moore has pointed out, concept metaphors by their nature have a 
shifting tie to physical objects or places (Moore 2004, 73).55 If we trace back the emergence of 
frontier as a concept-metaphor, then we realize that this concept-metaphor emerged in the United 
States. It is this genealogy of the concept-metaphor that we now turn to. By proposing an 
                                                
55 I thank Hjorleifur Jonsson for drawing my attention to concept-metaphor.  
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approach focused on metaphor and narrative, I am advocating a perspective and strategy that 
opposes what Parker and Rodseth suggests in their Untaming the Frontier. Parker and Rodseth 
argue that we need to free and untame “frontier” from Fredrick Turner’s problematic narrative. 
the study of frontiers is still closely associated with one specific historical context—the 
American West in the nineteenth century—and with one specific school of 
historiography—the American tradition that flows from the work of Frederick Jackson 
Turner. As a result, the very concept of the frontier is widely considered to be hackneyed 
and ethnocentric. … The frontier … has been “tamed”—turned to the purposes of a 
familiar ideology and thus relieved of its power to excite the scholarly imagination 
(Rodseth and Parker 2005, 3).  
  
Accoridng to Parker and Rodseth, we can revive frontier as an analytically useful and exciting 
term again by dissociating “frontier” from the Turnerian narrative. Their “untaming,” however, 
amounts to neglecting the metaphorical and mythical dimensions of “frontier.” Instead of 
dismissing the mythical and metaphorical aspects, Livingstone and Harrison urge us to focus our 
analytical attention upon them.56 Following Livingstone and Harrison, II suggest that we take 
frontier seriously as a geographical imaginary that is expressed most vividly in the form of 
mythical narrative—in both comedy and tragedy.  
Comedy of frontier 
Frederick Turner: frontier as a place of rebirth and renewal 
In 1893, Turner gave a lecture titled “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History.” He portrayed the wild frontier of the American West as a place of transformation and 
                                                
56 Somewhat similarly, Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkins, in their study of “the Afghan frontier,” 
denounce frontier “images [which are] steeped in ignorance, romanticism and conceptual lethargy” 
(Marsden and Hopkins 2011, 1). To demystify harmful lies is a necessary task for academic researchers, 
but in this study I wish to point out that it is also worthwhile to analyze how such romantic myths about 
frontier emerge and circulate. I thank James Sidaway for the reference to this study.    
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rebirth.57 Turner’s frontier narrative agrarian features settlers in the American West who 
struggled to farm. But it is not simply a story of humans conquering the nature. Turner says that 
“at the frontier the environment is too strong.” Indeed, the settlers are unable to overcome the 
nature: the “wilderness masters the colonist.” Turner does not narrate a triumph of civilization: 
instead, in his thesis, the wilderness “strips off the garments of civilization.” It isn’t a story of 
defeat either, however. For “little by little,” the colonialist and the wilderness transform each 
other. Out of this interaction comes “a new product.” This “outcome is not the old Europe… The 
fact is, that here is a new product that is American” (Turner 1994, 33).   
The Turnerian thesis is in fact profoundly anti-European—it is intended to be post-
European, to be more precise. It is a story in which the Europeans abandon the Old World and 
embrace the New World by becoming Americans. The European settles are born again as 
Americans through their frontier experience. In this regard, Turner’s frontier thesis is an account 
of ethnogenesis.58 
What makes Turner’s frontier thesis so enduringly influential is not that his study had 
better methodology or better data. The power seems to stem from the ways he crafted a vivid and 
memorable narrative for the genesis of the American national culture. Turner succeeded in 
presenting a simple and appealing formula: “European settlers + open wilderness = American 
democracy.” With this, he provided the new nation with a master narrative.  
                                                
57 The literature on Turner is, not surprisingly, enormous and continues to grow. According to Klein, the 
“single best account” of this American historian and his legacy is Billington 1973 (Klein 1997, 302). For 
an annotated bibliography of writings on Turner, see Mattson and Marion 1985. On the mythological 
nature of the “frontier thesis,” see, among others, Hofstadter 1949; Slotkin 1992; Slotkin 1985; Popper, et 
al 2000. 
58 On the linkage between ethnogenesis and frontier in general, Chappell 1993 provides an entry point. 
He writes: “Frontiers, zones of transformative interaction between systems, offer revealing insights into 
the process of ethnogenesis, by which a cultural community distinguishes itself from perceived ‘others’” 
(Chappell 1993, 267). 
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 As countless scholars have tirelessly pointed out, Turner’s narrative exclusively features 
white male settlers. It is a story of European men colonizing a non-European land. In this 
narrative the natives are not so much mis-represented as they are un-represented. Most of the 
time the natives are absent from the story. Turner’s “frontier” is not a place of dangerous 
barbarians and bandits; it is not like John Wayne’s “lawless frontier.” It is a vast empty space of 
harsh nature with few people. As Richard White has pointed out, the icon of the Turnerian 
frontier is a log cabin—a humble structure on the vast prairie (White 1994, 13).  
The absence of menacing savages in a depiction of Turner’s representation of the 
American West was quite unusual for his time. The native Americans featured prominently in 
most other stories of frontier life. White makes an insightful contrast between two 
representations of frontier: one by Turner and another by Buffalo Bill (William Frederick Cody). 
In fact when Turner was delivering his famous lecture in 1893 at the Columbian Exposition (four 
hundredth anniversary of Columbus’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere) in Chicago, the 
famous showman was also at the same event, performing Buffalo Bill’s Wild West and Congress 
of Rough Riders of the World twice a day, at a venue that could hold eighteen thousand people. 
His show was hailed at the time by a well-known journalist as “a correct representation of life on 
the plains … brought to the East for the inspection and education of the public” (White 1994, 7).  
White makes a contrast between Turner’s depictions of “wilderness” and Buffalo Bill’s 
staged enactment of wild savages: “On Turner’s frontier Indians were … not essential to the 
meaning of his narrative. But Indians were everywhere in Buffalo Bill’s Wild West.” The 
Indians were everywhere to attack the whites. On the stage was an inverted world of “Indian 
killers and white victims.” Buffalo Bill’s representation of the frontier featured colonial settlers 
as innocent victims, who had no choice but to defend and retaliate: “We, these stories say, do not 
  
 102 
plan our conquests … We just retaliate against barbaric massacres” (White et al. 1994). Turner’s 
representation (of struggling farmers) and Buffalo Bill’s (of helpless victims and reluctant 
conquerors) in fact complimented each other.  
The Turnerian narrative frontier asserted that the new society had made a unique and 
unprecedented contribution to the world. This contribution was none other than democracy. In 
“Contributions of the West to American Democracy” (1903), Turner glorified the achievement 
of the United States as follows: “Whatever shall be the outcome of the rush of this huge 
industrial modern United States to its place among the nations of the earth, the formation of its 
Western democracy will always remain one of the wonderful chapters in the history of the 
human race. (Turner 1996, 267).” Turner narrated the history of the United States as a peaceful 
and idealistic nation. “America’s contribution to the history of the human spirit [is] extending its 
type of frontier into new regions; and in creating peaceful societies with new ideals in the 
successive vast and differing geographic provinces which together make up the United States.” 
(Turner 1921, vi). This narrative thus characterized colonial settlers as dignified and honorable 
builders of a peaceful nation. His narrative continues to appeal to popular imagination among the 
Americans even today because it glorifies the experience of the immigrant settlers (none other 
than democracy) while effectively erasing the memory of colonial aggression.  
In “American Usage of the Word ‘Frontier’ from Colonial Times to Frederick Jackson 
Turner,” John Juricek points out that many other contemporary writers were already using 
“frontier” as a metaphor at the end of the nineteenth century, citing an expression “frontiers of 
our history” as an example. Turner, however, achieved a broader referential scope for the 
metaphor by using “frontier” to talk about a “form of society,” a “state of mind,’ or a “process” 
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(Juricek 1966, 29). Through such metaphorical associations, Turner succeeded in introducing a 
powerful new imaginary.  
Being a narrative historian, Turner never theorized. He did not even bother to define the 
word “frontier,” brushing aside the task by saying that it “is an elastic one, and for our purposes 
does not need sharp definition” (Turner 1994, 33). Tuner was not interested in comparative 
studies either. He only wrote about one country, and did not bother to see if this frontier formula 
could be applied to another geographical and historical settings.  
Enduring legacy of Turner’s frontier and the traveling of “America’s frontier” 
The Turnerian “frontier” narrative was quickly adopted by schools across the country; 
through textbooks, novels, paintings, and movies, the frontier narrative captured the popular 
imagination (Slatta 2001). A major reason for the continuous popularity of Turner’s frontier 
narrative is that it presents an exceptionally optimistic picture of the United States—especially 
the American democracy—as an advancing force for good.  
Many decades after Turner delivered the talk in Chicago, a politician aspiring to become 
the president of the United States gave a speech, which many found to be exceptionally inspiring. 
In the summer of 1960, as the young senator from New England was accepting the nomination of 
the Democratic Party, he spoke about the history of the country, and talked about “the pioneers 
[who] were determined to make the new world strong and free.” He urged the Americans “to be 
pioneers” again:   
Some would say that those struggles are all over, that all the horizons have been explored, 
that all the battles have been won, that there is no longer an American frontier. But I trust 
that no one in this assemblage would agree with that sentiment; for the problems are not 
all solved and the battles are not all won; and we stand today on the edge of a New 
Frontier -- the frontier of the 1960's, the frontier of unknown opportunities and perils, the 
frontier of unfilled hopes and unfilled threats. … It would be easier to shrink back from 
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that frontier, to look to the safe mediocrity of the past, to be lulled by good intentions and 
high rhetoric…but I believe the times demand new invention, innovation, imagination, 
decision. I am asking each of you to be pioneers on that New Frontier (Kennedy 1960). 
 
It is difficult to find a text that more fully exploits the rhetorical power of frontier than this 
speech, given by John F. Kennedy in Los Angels. It is usually called Kennedy’s “new frontier 
speech.”59 This speech highlights the durability and renewability of the frontier narrative. 
“Frontiers energize old fantasies,” as Anna Tsing has noted (Tsing 2005, 29). 
A frontier is constantly renewed for each generation, and this renewability is not limited 
to the land of the United States. A half century after Kennedy’s speech, a senior professor at 
Georgetown University published an article titled “America’s next frontier.” David Steinberg, 
Distinguished Professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, was in fact talking about 
Myanmar. Indeed, “frontier” has been a popular word to describe the predicament of the 
Southeast Asian country for the past few years.  
Today “frontier” can be used to refer to any place on the planet. Searching database for 
news headlines bearing the word “frontier,” I discovered that financial and business publications 
are especially fond of the frontier metaphor. “Firms see Myanmar as Next Frontier,” reports The 
Wall Street Journal Nov 30, 2011). “Myanmar, The Last Frontier?” asks the Forbes (Kent 2012). 
It is not only US-based publications that use the spatial metaphor of frontier for Myanmar. The 
Daily Telegraph calls Myanmar “Asia’s next economic frontier” (“Asia’s next Economic 
Frontier” 2012). “Myanmar opens up new telecom frontier” reads a headline in the UK-based 
Financial Time (Thomas and Robinson 2013). “Companies rush to Myanmar ‘new frontier’ for 
opportunities,” according to The Australian (Callick 2013). The Daily Yomiuri, the largest 
                                                
59 The Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University still gives “New Frontier Awards” every 
year “to young Americans who are changing their communities—and the country.” 
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English-language newspaper in Japan, too describes the Southeast Asian country as Asia’s “last 
frontier” (Yamashita 2012). According to my research, of all the broadsheet newspapers, it is 
The Strait Times of Singapore that seems to use “frontier” most frequently in their coverage of 
Myanmar. The Singaporean government has even published a 26-page brochure for Singapore-
based companies “Myanmar: Opportunities in Asia’s Last Frontier Economy.” It declares that 
the country is “the last sizable economy and market in Asia that remains untapped” (Kim et al 
2012, 1). But Myanmar will not remain a frontier forever, because global capitalism is constantly 
expanding, and its frontiers too are constantly moving. Indeed, it is the nature of a frontier to 
move on (Tsing 2005, 36). If it is fixed in one place, it is not a frontier.  
The affinity between global capitalism and frontier imageries is also reflected by the 
numerous companies and merchandises that bear the word “frontier.” In the United States, there 
is an airline company called “Frontier Airlines” as well as a telecommunication firm named 
“Frontier Communications” (Klein 1993). But these commodities are not limited to American 
companies and products. The Japanese company Nissan sells pickup trucks named “Frontier.” 
In the fields of science and technology too, “frontier” has become a favorite metaphor as 
a term referring to the place of progress and advancement. In the United States, the association 
between frontier and scientific advancement was already made explicitly during the first half of 
the twentieth century. President Franklin Roosevelt declared in 1944 “New frontiers of the mind 
are before us.” In the following year, the United States government issued a report to make a 
case for government funding to science and technology research, titled “Science—The Endless 
Frontier.”60 As Limerick has pointed out, it is particularly the space programs that exhibit a 
penchant for this metaphor. The 1986 report “Pioneering the Space Frontier” reads: “The 
                                                
60 This report resulted in the creation of a new federal agency, the National Science Foundation. 
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promise of virgin lands and the opportunity to live in freedom brought our ancestors to the shores 
of North America. … Now space technology has freed humankind to move outward from Earth 
as a species destined to expand to other worlds” (quoted in Limerick 1994, 90).       
This fondness of the frontier metaphor has been shared with a very different group of 
people: evangelical Christians (Boles 1993). The website “www.frontiers.org” belongs to an 
evangelical campaign that specifically targets Muslims around the world. While financial news 
repeatedly describe Myanmar as the “next frontier,” the “Frontier Burma Mission” project (with 
the website www.frontierburmamission.org) belongs to a Christian evangelical group, led by a 
Burmese couple living in Okalahoma. We will come back to this evangelical sense of frontier 
later in this study.  
Limerick, an American historian who has vigorously criticized the Turnerian 
historiography, is surprised that the frontier metaphor has spread so widely despite the historical 
root in a colonial perspective. Having long considered “frontier” to be racist, she was especially 
taken back to find that African Americans were using frontier vocabulary in describing activities 
like the civil rights movement (Limerick 1994, 92). While Limerick and other Americans have 
criticized “frontier” as inherently ethnocentric, the word has taken its own path to find many 
users across ethnic and racial boundaries: “The idea of the frontier and the pioneer have clearly 
become a kind of multicultural common property, a joint-stock company of the imagination 
(Limerick 1994, 93–94).”61 Politicians, enterpreneurs, investors, scientists, Christian 
missionaries—they all habitually use the word “frontier” in the most optimistic, comic sense of 
                                                
61 Dan Moos points out that African American artists such as Oscar Micheaux, one of the first black film 
makers in the United States, incoporporated the Turnerian frontier language even during the first half of 
the twentieth century (Moos 2002). 
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the word, because frontier has become a master metaphor for promise, progress, and ingenuity” 
(see Wrobel 1993, 145).  
Tragedy: Frontiers as a Lost World 
While Turner’s narrative celebrated the birth of the post-European culture in the United 
States, many scholars have challenged his comic characterization of transformation. In fact it is 
very difficult to find an approving reading of Turner today. The critical voices have become so  
dominant that, as Klein has observed, “the ritual flagellation of Frederick Jackson Turner has 
become a popular scholarly pastime” (Klein 1996, 183). Scholars have argued against the 
Turnerian comedy of frontier by presenting counter-narratives—that is, tragedies.   
As mentioned above, Patricia Limerick strongly criticized the frontier concept as she saw 
it “ethnocentric and nationalistic.” She argued that “the concept of frontier performs the task of 
describing, explaining, and encapsulating the story of the colonization of North America … 
miserably” (Limerick 1987, 72). She went so far as to assert that “an unthinking reliance on the 
idea of the frontier almost ruined Western American history” (Limerick 1987, 75). Some 
considered “frontier” to be permanently tainted and avoided the word in their own writing. 
Richard White wrote his 684-page study, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A New 
History of the American West (1993) without ever using “frontier”; he demonstrated that the 
history of the US West could do without “frontier.” 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, historians of early America came to avoid 
grand narratives in general, and instead conducted in-depth studies with a relatively limited 
temporal and spatial scope. In general, these studies reconstructed a world in which the 
domination by Europeans settlers over the natives was not yet firmly established, implying that 
the eventual domination and the racist regime was not a foregone conclusion. James H. Merrell’s 
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Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania Frontier (1999), examines the 
people who moved between the European and native cultures—whom Merrell calls “go-
betweens”—between 1680 and 1750. Another example is Jane Merritt’s At the Crossroads: 
Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (2003). These new studies of 
frontier represent the trend in which the monolithic continent-wide frontier is “replaced by 
multiple and discrete frontiers.” As Larry Kutchen has put it, “Turner’s frontier has been broken 
up into distinct contested spaces, frontiers of cultural convergence” (Kutchen 2005, 163–164).  
Richard White and “the middle ground”  
These new studies of the US-American frontier which challenge the old grand and 
teleological frontier narrative are now called the “New Western History.” Of this literature, The 
Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (1991) 
by White, has been hailed as the milestone. It presents detailed descriptions of the spaces of 
“accommodation” between European settlers and native Americans. This study, in the author’s 
words, “places Indian peoples at the center of the scene and seeks to understand the reasons for 
their actions” (White 2011, xxvi). White characterizes the middle ground as “the place in 
between: in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages” 
(White 2011, xxvi).  
White’s “middle ground” refers to a particular area, the region around the Great Lakes, 
which the French called pays d’en haut. This was a periphery of an empire: “I am … describing 
imperialism … But this is an imperialism that weakens at its periphery” (White 2011, xxvii). 
White seeks to capture the particular dynamics of an imperial periphery. When the empire 
expanded and the periphery was incorporated into the imperial sphere, the middle ground at pays 
d’en haut collapsed. As White put it, “when Indians ceased to have the power to force whites 
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onto the middle ground … the desire of whites to dictate the terms of accommodation could be 
given its head. As a consequence, the middle grounded eroded” (White 2011, xxxi). What was 
for Turner the process of democratic nation-building is for White the erosion of a mutual 
accommodation. For Turner, the nineteenth century was the golden moment of the US-American 
cultural formation. For White, it was the end of a delicate arrangement.  
Pierre Clastre’s “Last Frontier”  
Particularly sharp criticism of the Turnerian comedy has come from anthropologists, who 
sought to view the history from the other side of the frontier—that is, from the perspective of the 
colonized.62 Pierre Clastres, a French anthropologist, conducted research in South America and 
he never discussed Turner by name, but he unleashed an exceptionally fierce criticism of the 
comic narrative of European settlement in the Americas. In articles including “The Last Frontier” 
and “On Ethnocide,” he characterized the European colonization as a five-century-long 
onslaught of violence and described the Yanomani people, whom he studied, as “the last of the 
besieged” (Clastres 2010, 80).63 He wrote: “Since 1492, a machine of destruction of Indians was 
put into gear. This machine continues to function where the last ‘savage’ tribes subsist along the 
great Amazonian forest.”  
Clastres presented an entirely inverted narrative of the history of frontier freedom. While 
Tuner found frontier settlers as peaceful builders of a post-European democratic society, Clastres 
saw them as ruthless despots. It was among the native tribes that the anthropologist found the 
culture of freedom and egalitarianism. He argued that the Yanomani took refuge in forested 
                                                
62 I should mention that this perspective was explicitly taken by Australian historian Henry Reynolds in 
his 1981 book The Other Side of Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia 
(H. Reynolds 2006).   




uplands to run away from the colonial violence and to preserve their autonomy. This strategy 
was made possible by the ecological and geographical settings, which the Yanomani used as 
barriers:   
This cul-de-sac in the Amazon, part of both Venezuela and Brazil, has up until now 
resisted penetration through a variety of natural obstacles: the unbroken forest, 
unnavigable rivers … , the remoteness of everything, illness, and malaria. All of this is 
hardly attractive to colonizers, but very favorable to the Yanomami (Clastres 2010, 53). 
 
This insight into ecological obstacles would be later elaborated further by James Scott in The Art 
of Not Being Governed. Like Scott, Clastres stressed that the conditions favorable to the free 
people in the Amazon had been mostly depleted by the five-century-long process of 
colonization: “the whole enterprise that began in the fifteenth century is now coming to an end; 
an entire continent will soon be rid of its first inhabitants” (Clastres 1998, 345).    
James Scott on frontier enclosure  
Both Clastres and White sought to describe a world in which the state’s rule was not yet 
firmly established. Inspired by these two scholars, James Scott has gone further in turning the 
Turnerian narrative of civilization upside down.64 The main geographical focus of Scott’s Art of 
Not Being Governed is the montane region of mainland Southeast Asia, but actually Scott seeks 
to present a world history, using Southeast Asia to dramatically illustrate its main plot.  
Following Clastres, Scott argues that it was not the settlers but the tribal people who built 
and maintained egalitarian and free societies. The colonial settlers did not create a free society; 
they destroyed it. In his tragic narrative, frontier refers to the open space that is not yet 
                                                
64 Scott acknowledges “enormous intellectual debt” to Pierre Clastres, whose sentence appears in the 
beginning of the book as the epigraph (Scott 2009, 13). Scott also acknowledges White’s “brilliant” work 
(Scott 2009, 38), and White reciprocates the compliment in his new preface to the twentieth anniversary 
edition of the Middle Ground (White 2011, xiv). 
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incorporated into the state. Scott suggests an extraordinarily long period for his narrative. The 
colonial settlers he talks about aren’t at all restricted to modern cases. He characterizes the 
expansion of colonial settlements as a two-thousand year process. This two-millennia long 
period is the second period in Scott’s three-staged tragedy of the human being.   
The first stage was the period of a stateless world. During this period, there were no 
states:    
the social landscape consisted of elementary, self-governing, kinship units that might, 
occasionally, cooperate in hunting, feasting, skirmishing, trading, and peacemaking. It 
did not contain anything one could call a state. In other words, living in the absence of 
state structures has been the standard human condition (Scott 2009, 3). 
 
According to Scott, this stateless period was by far the longest period in the human history. In his 
reckoning, this period claims ninety-nine percent of the entire human history in Southeast Asia. 
Because states—in the form of concentrated sedentary populations—only emerged about two 
thousand years ago in this part of the world, whereas homo sapiens sapiens themselves have 
been around for two hundred thousand years.     
The period of stateless world lasted for an extraordinary long time, until “state spaces” 
emerged. Then a new era began, in which state-spaces competed with non-state spaces. The Art 
of Not Being Governed suggests that during this historical period, many people went back and 
forth between the two worlds—stateless villages and empires. (As we will see in the next chapter, 
we can see here Orwen Lattimore’s influence on Scott.) When a state was prosperous, it attracted 
a lot of people. But when the state was oppressive and coercive—which Scott suggests it very 
often was—people fled or retreated to a non-state space. Scott characterizes the non-state spaces 
of this era as “zones of refuge” and “shatter zones” (Scott 2009, ix). He also uses the word 
“frontier” too: “Frontier operated as a rough and ready homeostatic device; the more a state 
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pressed its subjects, the fewer subjects it had. The frontier underwrote popular freedom” (Scott 
2009, 4).65 “Over the course of two millennia”—frontiers provided spaces for those “fleeing the 
oppressions of state-making projects—slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and 
warfare” (Scott 2009, ix). By characterizing the period as a frontier era, Scott stresses that the 
hegemonic status of the state spaces has been achieved only very recently. He makes an 
unusually bold hypothesis by claiming that before the recent triumph of the state, open frontiers 
were the normal environment for humans. Most humans lived in frontiers, because the state 
spaces were very limited: “Not so very long ago … such self-governing peoples were the great 
majority of humankind” (Scott 2009, ix). His characterization of this long frontier era heavily 
relies on his interpretation of the Chinese history, which we will examine in detail in the 
following two chapters.  
The final stage of Scott’s three-stage human history is the era of enclosure. It is the 
present era, in which open stateless frontiers have been systematically eliminated. Scott calls this 
elimination “enclosure.” He borrows the term from the English history, in which the term refers 
to the process of fencing and entitling common lands as private properties. In The Making of the 
English Working Class, E. P. Thompson described the sixty years between 1760 and 1820 as a 
period in which common spaces were systematically transformed to become private properties: 
“the years of wholesale enclosure in which, in village after village, common rights are lost” 
(Thompson 1963, 217). The landless working class in cities was a product of the wholesale 
                                                
65 Scott repeatedly refers to this function of the open frontier: “The existence of an open frontier operated 
like an automatic brake on what the state could extract.” (Scott 2009, 37); “demography and an open 
frontier limited the effectiveness of pure coercion” (Scott 2009, 67); “Topography, military technology, 
low population, and an open frontier conspired to limit the successful application of coercion to a 
relatively small core area” (Scott 2009, 271). 
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enclosure in rural areas across England. In Southeast Asia, a product of what was essentially the 
same process was the hill peoples, who retreated to remoter mountains (Scott 2009, 5).66  
Scott’s assessment of the present, post-frontier era is dire. The nation-states are now 
“colonizing the periphery itself and transforming it into a fully governed, fiscally fertile zone. Its 
immanent logic … is the complete elimination of nonstate spaces” (Scott 2009, 11). Such 
thorough transformations have been made possible by what Scott calls “distance-demolishing 
technologies (all-weather roads, bridges,railroads, airplanes, modern weapons, telegraph, 
telephone, and now modern information technologies including global positioning systems)” 
(Scott 2009, 11). The demolishing of habitat for free humans is now almost complete today. Hill 
peoples are characterized as the last band of free humans. They are very much an endangered 
species whose habitats have been destroyed. “Frontier” refers to the remaining habitat of the free 
humans. “An open, common-property frontier” (Scott 2009, 279) has all but disappeared. This is 
the great tragedy of the frontier.   
 A most powerful image that illustrates the loss of habitat has been presented by Mark 
Elvin, a historian of China. Although it is a map that shows how elephants retreated from China 
over the past three thousand years, it seems to capture the spatial expansion of the state-spaces 
(Elvin 2004, 9). Elephants were once roaming across nearly all of China, but by today there are 
hardly any natural habitats left. The only possible habitats for elephants today are a few patches 
of upland forests in the Sino-Myanmar borderland; indeed they are in the Kachin region.  
                                                
66 A number of recent studies stress the power of the law as instrumental in the making of the 
understanding that a frontier is a uncivilized and savage area in need of state intervention. As Nicholas 
Blomely has pointed out in “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, 
and the Grid: “The construction of that which is deemed law thus rests on the definition of a violent world 
of nonlaw. The inscription of a frontier—which may be figurative, temporal and spatial—is integral to 
this process” (Blomley 2003, 124). On this issue of law and frontier, see Banner 2009 for the American 








According to Scott, things have gone tremendously wrong since the rise of the state a few 
thousand years ago. The quality of human life has qualitatively declined in a drastic manner. 
Scott’s anarchist tragedy reveals intense yearning for the bygone era in which humans were 
fundamentally better and stronger.  
Hjorleifur Jonsson attributes Scott’s anarchist imaginary to a distinctly American source 
of inspiration—namely, the historical narrative of the American frontier (quoted in Hammond 
2011). Scott’s narration of the enclosure of “non-state space” indeed resonates well with the 
well-known historical narrative of the American West. Larry Kutchen analyzes the retrospective 
narration of the American frontier in terms of melancholy. Drawing insights from Anne Anlin 
Cheng’s Melancholy of Race, Kutchen investigates how the historical narrative retrospectively 
reopens and then recloses the frontier. He uncovers how this historical narration resuscitates 
native Americans “as serviceable ghosts” and then reburies them. The ghosts do remind us of the 
horrible betrayal committed at the birth of a nation—how certain peoples were excluded at the 
founding of the democratic nation in a manner that contradicts the very principle on which that 
nation was supposedly founded. This is a painful, nightmarish reminder. How do we go on from 
this nightmare? We manage and go on by narrating stories, which resuscitate those have been 
dead, restore their honor and dignity, and rebury them. Our incessant consumptions of these 
narrations are a sign of melancholia, which consists of the cycle of encountering and overcoming 
the guilt. Kutchen warns us that the melancholic historiography of frontier “incur[s] the risk not 
only of predetermining what we recover from the past but also of indulging in an entirely 
retrospective radicalism” (Kutchen 2005, 164). 
If this diagnosis, provided by Kutchen and Cheng, sounds at all plausible, then it raises a 
series of questions to those of us who read and reread Scott’s historical narrative of hill peoples. 
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With Anarchist History, the context is not the American history; it is the history of the entire 
human civilization. Perhaps more than any other text published recently, the Anarchist History 
reveals how melancholically we narrate the human history with an anthropological trope, how 
we retrospectively dramatize the course of modernity, how such narrative relies heavily on the 
tribal wisdom as a symbol of the irrevocable loss, and what wisdom we want tribal peoples and 
frontier histories to tell us. Scott insists that the age of tribal anarchism is over today. The 
Anarchist History imagines and honors political radicalism but he also buries it as a thing of the 
past. Scott shows us a way to honor hill tribes and mourn their death.  
Conclusion: metaphor of spatial transformation 
In this chapter, I began this inquiry by pointing out that “frontier” as a metaphor is very 
alive both in academic and non-academic writings. As a metaphor “frontier” is used to refer to a 
place that is going through transformation brought by a powerfully expansive force. When we 
use the word frontier, we talk about a space that has not yet been converted by a well-
acknowledge force of expansion. This force could be anything as long as it is commonly 
understood to be spreading or advancing: neoliberalism, urbanization, colonialism, democracy, 
Christianity, terrorist networks, telecommunication coverage, nuclear technology. A frontier is a 
space that is facing an expanding force but that is not yet transformed by it. When we talk about 
a frontier we refer to such a pre-transformation space, but we imply that it will be converted 
sooner or later.  
In order to understand this spatial dynamism that the frontier metaphor represents, it is 
necessary to go back to the Turnerian narrative of the US-American history. With a comic 
interpretation of a frontier transformation, Turner has created a popular myth—or at least he has 
packaged one exceptionally well. Today, we are all very familiar with the comic senses of 
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“frontier” as in familiar idioms like “frontier mission” and “frontier spirit.” It is against this 
comic background that post-Turner scholars of frontier—such as White, Clastres, and Scott—
have presented counter-narratives of tragic frontier.  
Once strongly associated with the American West, the “frontier” metaphor has been 
travelling beyond the United States of America. Calling Myanmar a frontier is to express the 
prediction with confidence that the place is going to be transformed. In this sense, the act of 
calling a place “frontier” is to project a spatial and historical imagination. As Tsing has 
remarked: “Frontiers aren’t just discovered at the edge; they are projects in making geographical 
and temporal experience” (Tsing 2005, 29). The imaginary of frontier inspires aspiring 
politicians, automobile companies, government agencies, movie producers, tourist agencies, 
Christian missionaries, and academic researchers—as narratives of transformation, both comic 
and tragic, circulate around the world.    
The frontier imaginary has gained currency because there is a widespread understanding 
that we live an age of unprecedented transformation—comic or tragic. A story of a frontier can 
be an uplifting narrative of achievement and accomplishment. Or it can be a story of loss and 




Chapter 5. Yunnan as China’s frontier 
 
Introduction  
 Turner’s influential scholarship led many historians to use “frontier” as a more general 
analytical model of historical process, and to conduct a comparative study of frontiers. Walter 
Prescott Webbb’s 1952 study, The Great Frontier, with an introduction by Arnold Toynbee, is a 
representative study of this kind (Webb 2003). Numerous scholars have made comparative 
studies, but all too often the comparative cases have been limited to the colonies of modern 
Europeans, the Americas, Southern Africa, and Australia being the most usual cases (Allen 1959; 
Gerhard 1959; Katzman 1975; Kolchin 1982; Lamar and Thompson 1981; Lawson 1980; 
McNeill 1983; Mikesell 1960).  
 Frontier has been conceptualized in terms of interaction between two societies. In their 
explicitly comparative study, Lamar and Thompson presented such a conceptualization, arguing 
that a frontier “opens” when two different societies meet, and it “closes” when one society 
dominates the other and establishes a single political authority. (Lamar and Thompson 1981, 
7).67 Their approach is certainly useful for comparing the cases of modern European colonies, in 
which immigrants from Europe make long-distance trips, often across an ocean, arrive at a very 
foreign land and encounter a very unfamiliar culture. This model, however, does not apply easily 
to other contexts in which the encounter takes place more gradually between two (or more) 
groups of people, who are long-term, if long-distance, neighbors. For example, the interactions 
between sedentary and nomadic or tribal peoples in China have a very long continuous history; it 
                                                
67 This theme of interaction has been a very important theme in the studies of frontier, especially in 
Pratt’s insightful proposal of “contact zone” (Pratt 2007). Oakes, one of few geographers who write about 
China’s frontier, uses “frontier” primarily in Pratt’s sense (Oakes 2012). 
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is difficult to identify a specific point of time as the opening of a frontier in such cases. The US-
American “frontier” model, based on a unidirectional movement of colonial settlers over a large 
space in a relatively short period of time, cannot be straightforwardly transferred to the Chinese 
historical geography. Indeed, earlier scholars who studied the spatial dynamics of China’s 
periphery—such as Owen Lattimore and Edmund Leach—presented alternative models of 
“frontier,” challenging the Turnerian model. Both Lattimore and Leach stressed, rightly, that, in 
China’s periphery, frontiers as in-between spaces persisted for a long time. And in recent years, a 
number of scholars have characterized China’s periphery as a “middle ground.”     
 In this chapter, I argue that “frontier” as a concept-metaphor can provide us with a loose 
frame for studying comparable processes of territorial expansion. More specifically, I argue that 
it is plausible to describe Yunnan of southwest China as a modern colonial frontier—a site of 
modern colonial transformation—because the process is sufficiently similar with other better-
known cases. I will also point out that it will remain difficult for “colonial frontier” to be 
translated and accepted in Chinese-language studies of China for a number of reasons.    
 This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I will review the earlier 
contributions made by Lattimore and Leach on China’s “frontier” and then briefly discuss how 
contemporary scholars of Yunnan (writing in English) are characterizing Yunnan as a “middle 
ground.” I will argue that these earlier “frontier” models and the recent “middle ground” 
approach do not sufficiently address the expansive dynamics of China’s territorial history. In the 
second section, I will present a revisionist history of Yunnan as a colonial frontier, illustrating 
the process of expansion. The history of Yunnan presented in this section will also contribute to 
the understanding of the Kachin history, because the Chinese side of the Kachin history has 
rarely been studied. In the third section, I will show that the perspective of “colonial frontier” 
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will likely remain an elusive perspective in the Chinese understanding of its national geography, 
because neither colonialism nor frontier fit the Chinese self-understanding of its geography. In 
the concluding section, I suggest that the untranslatability and ambiguity makes “frontier” a 
strategically useful word in discussing China’s historical geography, given the sensitive nature of 
the subject.   
 
1. Studying China’s Periphery  
For nearly a century—since the days of Owen Lattimore—historians and anthropologists of Asia 
have been writing about frontier. While scholars of the US-American history hardly ever discuss 
a non-American frontier, scholars of Asian history have presented numerous studies of frontier 
on their own.  
Owen Lattimore  
Frontier was the central theme in the scholarship of Owen Lattimore (1900-1989), who 
pioneered the historical geography of China and Inner Asia with studies including The Inner 
Asian Frontiers of China (1940) and Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928-1958.68 
While Turner was preoccupied with the experience of a young country called United States of 
America, Lattimore sought to capture the two-millennia long dynamics of a vast region in central 
Eurasia, mostly occupied by nomadic peoples.69 Rather than focusing on a state or a nation, he 
                                                
68 In a recent paper on Owen Lattimore, William Rowe points out that “to the extent that he had any 
disciplinary identification, it was likely as a geographer.” This geographer, however, is almost entirely 
neglected by geographers today. Lattimore’s name is not even once mentioned the latest edition of the 
Dictionary of the Human Geography (Gregory et al 2009). I am aware of only one recent paper written by 
a geographer, “Owen Lattimore: A Memoire” by David Harvey. Harvey’s paper, however, is preoccupied 
with McCarthism, and Lattimore features in it only as a victim of the vicious witch hunts. 
69 For an insightful comparison between Turner and Lattimore, see (Gaubatz 1996, 19–21). 
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wrote about an in-between area, which did not belong to any particular state for much of its 
history.70    
For reviewing Lattimore’s unique scholarship on frontier, his “Origins of the Great Wall 
of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice,” which appeared in Geographical Review 
in 1937, serves us as a suitable entry point. He points out that in China the concept of linear 
boundary is easily traceable to an ancient period.71 The Great Wall, which was first built during 
the Qin Dynasty in the third century BCE, symbolized linear boundary.72 There was, however, 
always an unbridgeable gap between theory and practice, because it was impossible to 
comprehensively implement a long-distance boundary in a linear manner on the ground. 
Lattimore points out that the state itself was always keenly aware of this gap. While the Great 
Wall symbolized the boundary of the state territory, its function as a territorial borderline was 
limited in reality.73   
a line of cleavage existed, somewhere, between the territories and peoples that could 
advantageously be included in the Chinese empire and those that could not. This was the 
line that the Great Wall was intended to define. In practice it was impossible to maintain 
the concept of a line that could not be crossed; what was attempted, therefore, was an 
easing off of the process of expansion that would keep up the appearance of a continuing 
outward pressure. . . . The linear Frontier never existed except as a concept (Lattimore 
1937, 546). 
 
                                                
70 Since “Inner Asia” is not a familiar term, it might be worth reminding us of the size of this region. If 
we, for the sake of simplicity, consider this region as consisting of today’s Mongolia (1,564,110 km2) and 
the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (1,664,900 km2), then its land area (3,229,010 km2) is larger than India. 
71 Peter Sahlins too points out that the concept and practice of a linear boundary is ancient in European 
history, easily going back to the Greeks and Romans (Sahlins 1989, 5).  
72 A proper treatment of the Great Wall of China, which includes the post-Lattimore scholarship, is 
unfortunately outside the scope of this dissertation. For a demythifying, revisionist study, see (Waldron 
1990). 
73 Much of the existing wall was built during the Ming Dynasty.  
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The function of the Great Wall of China was more symbolical than practical. It signified an ideal. 
In reality there was a wide buffer zone, which hosted “social groups that, though not fully 
homogeneous with the main body of China inside the Great Wall, would be amenable to Chinese 
control” (Lattimore 1962, 546). They were “partly sinicized nomads and semibarbarized Chinese, 
in the zone adjacent to China, to steppe peoples in Mongolia, forest peoples in North Manchuria 
and Urianghai, and peoples of the plateau in Tibet” (Lattimore 1962, 546). The loyalty of these 
groups to the Chinese state was not entirely dependable; these “ambivalent social bodies … 
could either serve Chinese control of the Frontier or become auxiliary to attacks on China.” The 
history of China indeed presents a pattern of attacks on Chinese by these frontier groups. 
Lattimore called these people, sometimes enemies and sometimes subjects of the state, a 
“frontier reservoir” (Lattimore 1962, 546). These in-between peoples have often played decisive 
roles in history of eastern Eurasia for millennia, but their historical roles have been routinely 
neglected. They were “agents of ferment in frontier relations, causing new adjustments of the 
balance and preventing it from ever becoming static and permanent.”  
 Whereas Turner’s frontier only moved in one direction—always westward from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific, Lattimore’s frontier moved back and forth between East Asia and Inner 
Asia. By conceiving of this interface as a cyclical process, he consistently challenged the 
teleological, “unidirectional” historiography. But these “auxiliary peoples of the Inner Frontier 
are probably the least studied of the major agents in Chinese history” (Lattimore 1962, 547).74  
According to Lattimore, the principle patterns of the sedentary-nomadic frontier in 
eastern Eurasia were determined already by the end of the Han dynasty (206BCE – 220CE).  
                                                
74 This topic has been fruitfully pursued by Thomas Barfield. See Barfield 1989 and Barfield 2001. 
Barfield too illustrated the importance of the “barbarians” not only in the context of the Inner Asia 
frontier but that of global history. 
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for about two thousand years, from the time of the Earlier Han to the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the combined history of Inner Asia and China can be described in 
terms of two cycles, distinct from each other as patterns but always interacting on each 
other as historical process—the cycle of tribal dispersion and unification in the steppe 
and the cycle of dynastic integration and collapse in China (Lattimore 1947, 512). 
   
Lattimore considered the interface between sedentary and nomadic societies as the classical 
model of frontier not only in Chinese history but in world history. He critiqued the evolutional 
view of agrarian development, which projected a course of advancement from (a) hunting and 
gathering as the most primitive to (b) pastoral nomadism, (c) shifting agriculture, and ultimately 
to (d) sedentary agriculture.75 Instead of understanding them as sequential stages in the course of 
unidirectional development, Lattimore understood them as different practices that suit different 
ecological settings. As a place, Lattimore’s frontier refers to the ambiguous and shifting space 
between two different agro-ecological zones. Edmund Leach’s characterization too shared 
similar features. 
Edmund Leach 
 Leach was also strongly interested in frontier from ecological and agrarian perspectives. 
In his 1960 essay, “The Frontiers of ‘Burma,’” in which Leach presents a bold historical 
hypothesis and as an anthropologist attempts to dialogue with historians: “It is not the 
anthropologist’s task to write history, but if history is to be elaborated with the aid of inspired 
guesses then the special knowledge of the anthropologist becomes relevant so as to point up the 
probabilities” (Leach 1960, 49). As Tambiah has pointed out, while the 1960 essay has received 
much less attention than his classic Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin 
Social Structure (1954), the two studies are closely related to each other.  
                                                
75 This critique has been further elaborated by Scott in The Art of Not Being Governed. 
  
 124 
Based on “inspired guesses,” Leach presented a longue duree history of a vast region in 
Asia. His geographical scope is, audaciously, “the whole of the wide imprecisely defined frontier 
region lying between India and China” with “modern political Burma at its core.” 
Acknowledging Lattimore as a precursor, Leach treats frontier as a “zone though which cultures 
interpenetrate in a dynamic manner.” Like Lattimore, Leach also presented a bold hypothesis. 
According to Leach, “the whole of ‘Burma’ is a frontier region continuously subjected to 
influences from both India and China.” The Indian influence has permeated across the lowlands, 
and the Chinese the uplands. Therefore, this “Burma” actually consists of innumerable small 
frontiers, which are contact zones between what he calls “valley people” and “hill people.” These 
frontiers are “zones of mutual interest” among “the petty political units” (Leach 1960, 50).76 In 
other words, across mainland Southeast Asia innumerable small political units existed among 
ambiguous “zones of mutual interest.” Leach points out that the modern European concept of 
frontier (in the sense of boundary) is not applicable to Southeast Asia: “The modern European 
concepts frontier, state, and nation are interdependent but they are not necessarily applicable to 
all state-like political organizations everywhere” (Leach 1960, 49).  
In Leach’s historiography, the two eco-social categories of “hill people” and “valley 
people” represent “two kinds of political structure, two kinds of ecology, two distinct patterns of 
kinship organization, two sets of economic interests” (Leach 1960, 67). Leach argues that for the 
region in question there has been a process of “interaction” between these two “throughout 
historical times” (Leach 1960, 51). According to Leach, these two categories make fundamental 
                                                
76 Readers of Leach’s Political Systems of Highland Burma here detect how these two categories of “hill 
people” and “valley people” correspond to the categories of Kachin and Shan. In the 1960s essay, 
however, Leach’s spatial coverage is far broader than that of the Political Systems; the “valley” here 
primarily refers to the Irrawaddy Basin. 
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historiographical categories because the influences of the Valley society on Hill societies were 
fundamentally limited. Thus he characterizes the nature of Valley People’s kingdom as follows:  
The King would first establish authority over his own home valley… He would then 
spread his authority to a neighbouring valley… Finally the King would claim sovereignty 
over all the hill country separating the two valley sectors of his total domain. Thus most 
Hill People were, at least in theory, the subjects of a Valley Prince.  
But the control which the Valley Princes were able to exercise over the Hill subjects was 
seldom more than marginal… What I must emphasise is that the nominal overlordship of 
a Valley Prince over a tract of Hill country did not entail the meeting of the Valley 
People with the Hill People in any cultural sense. Whatever the overall political structure 
the two categories remained distinct in language, religion and ecological adaptation 
(Leach 1960, 59–60).  
    
Leach acknowledges that Hill Peoples and Valley People “interpenetrate territorially and 
politically as well as culturally” and that the “two categories of population are symbiotic on one 
another.” Indeed, “‘civilisation, as represented by the culture of the Valley People, has fanned 
out along the river valleys and infiltrated upwards into isolated pockets right in the heart of the 
hill country” (Leach 1960, 60). Such influences of civilization, however, amounted little more 
than the mimic usage of dress or honorific titles. In the end, there remained a profound divide 
between the two categories, which are “two different kinds of political structure, two kinds of 
ecology, two distinct patterns of kinship organization, two sets of economic interests” (Leach 
1960, 67).  
 The relative autonomy in mountain frontiers was not necessarily a major concern in itself 
to the pre-modern polity, for it was not interested in establishing and maintaining an extensive 
territory. It was not interested in conquering and colonizing frontiers. The polity was almost 
exclusively preoccupied with the center. Rather than extending its reaches far, it wanted to bring 
all the resources into the core. Leach’s insight to the hill-valley divide is consistent with the 
characterizations of geographical dynamics of Southeast Asian polities such as O. W. Wolters’s 
  
 126 
“mandala” and Stanley Tambiah’s “galactic 
polity.” Mandala, according to a common 
Indo-Tibetan cosmological tradition, is 
composed of a core and a complex of 
satellites. Wolters used this term to 
characterize the geographical patterns of 
pre-modern politics in Southeast Asia.77 In 
the political geography of mandala, the 
center is clearly defined but the outer 
boundaries remain vague and ambiguous. The power that emanates from the center does not 
abruptly end at a particular location, as the modern legal authority does at a jurisdictional 
boundary. Nor are mandalas geographically exclusive entities: they are spheres of influence 
overlapping, as the diagram below illustrates.  
Because there were no clear borderlines, it is common to use co-centric circles to indicate 
the spatial reaches of political power. There are numerous specific examples to illustrate these 
spheres of overlapped territories. For example, The Tai Lue kingdom of Sipsonnpanna (in 
today’s Southwestern Yunnan) sent tributes both to the Chinese and Burmese. Political 
sovereignty was typically “shared” and “multiple,” as Thongchai Winichakul has stressed.78 
Building upon the mandala model, Tambiah introduced a vivid imagery for Southeast Asia’s 
pre-modern political landscape with the term “galactic polity.” With this imagery, he attempted 
to shed light on “the design of traditional Southeast Asian kingdoms, a design that coded in a 
                                                
77 On mandala and other conceptualizations of the pre-modern Southeast Asian state, see C. J. Reynolds 
2006; Tambiah 1977; Wolters 1999.  
78 On this, see especially Winichakul 1994, 84–94. 
Figure 7. A visualization of the “mandala” model of 
pre-modern Southeast Asian policy 
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composite way cosmological, topographical, and politico-economic features” (Tambiah 1977, 
69).  
The supreme importance of the core—as opposed to bounded territory—has been pointed 
out by a number of scholars as a defining feature of pre-modern political geography. The 
Kunming-born scholar Benedict Anderson stressed this point in his study “The Idea of Power in 
Javanese Culture”: “the state is defined, not by its perimeter, but by its center. The territorial 
extension of the state is always in flux; it varies according to the amount of Power concentrated 
at the center. Certain frontiers were generally recognized in practice, formidable geographical 
obstacles like mountains and seas, which, however, tended to be regarded as the abodes of 
powerful unseen forces.” A clear manifestation was, as Anderson points out the “wholesale 
deportations of populations by victorious rulers. Bringing these conquered populations near to 
the center augmented royal Power that much more” (B. R. O. Anderson 1972, 30). Anderson too 
identifies “the fundamental difference between the old idea of a Southeast Asian kingdom and 
the modern state, which derives from totally contrasting views about the meaning of frontiers” 
(B. R. O. Anderson 1972, 28).  
Leach, who spent years in the Kachin hills, formulated “hill people” as an eco-social 
category. Lattimore had already recognized the vital role of the natural environment and agrarian 
regime, by examining one macro frontier region, a vast in-between area in the middle of the 
Eurasian continent. In contrast, Leach drew our attention to frontiers of various scales. He first 
discusses the macro frontier of “Burma,” a large slice of mainland Southeast Asia around the 
Irrawaddy River. Then he identified multiple, “petty” micro frontier zones within this region. As 
Scott among others has pointed out, the trick was to get off a high-altitude balloon, stop looking 
down vertically, and instead observe the patterns of households and villages locations from a a 
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horizontal viewpoint.79 Going up and down hills in northern Burma, Leach found countless, 
small cultural frontiers.  
Recent studies of Yunnan as a “Middle Ground” 
 Lattimore and Leach both presented unique conceptualizations of frontier, which could 
have been considered as alternatives to the Turnerian version. Because the “frontier thesis” of the 
US-American history has become so influential in the United States, however, scholars began to 
avoid the term “frontier” altogether and started to use alternative words. This tendency has 
spread beyond the discipline of US-American history and even influenced the historical 
scholarship of Asia.    
 In the past decade, several scholars have characterized Yunnan as a middle ground. Two 
historians who have written books on Yunnan’s history, Patterson Giersch and Bin Yang, have 
characterized the region as a middle ground. Between Winds and Clouds: the Making of Yunnan 
(second century BCE to twentieth century CE) by Bin Yang presents a section titled “The Middle 
Ground: Yunnan as a Process,” which explicitly adapts White’s model to Yunnan. He 
characterizes “the southern Yunnan frontier” as an in-between zone in which “neither China nor 
Burma nor local entities could over come each other” (Yang 2009, 29). He proposes a “long-
term perspective” and stresses “the long-term middle ground experience in Yunnan created a 
new local identity: that is, the Yunnanese” (Yang 2009, 174).  
C. Patterson Giersch has even more explicitly adopted the “middle ground” framework 
for his study of southwestern Yunnan; he characterizes this region as a middle ground between 
three “Asian empires”: Qing China, Burma and Siam. He criticizes Turner’s conception of 
                                                
79 See Scott 2009 (18).  
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frontier as ethnocentric and proposes what he believes to be a better model, approvingly citing 
White’s scholarship: 
A better way to define frontier . . . is as a territory or zone in which multiple peoples 
meet; at least one group is intrusive, the others indigenous. . . . These interactions were 
rarely one-sided affairs in which the intrusive society immediately conquered or 
displaced the indigenous. Instead, the frontier often became—however temporarily—a 
“middle ground” in which newcomers and natives each adapted to the other even as they 
sought to use or manipulate each other. Such contact produced new or modified 
institutions and customs that drew from the traditions of multiple cultures. …(Giersch 
2006, 3)  
 
Giersch further argues that “such approaches … should not be restricted to North America or to 
European zones of rivalry” (Giersch 2006, 4).  
Anthropologists such as Mette Halskov propose that southwestern Yunnan is still very 
much a middle ground today.80 Hansen, who examines the varieties of Han immigrants in 
China’s border regions, also uses the term to mean a place of acculturation, which “allows for the 
inclusion of agency on the part of both indigenes and Chinese immigrants, and would provide us 
with new histories of cultural encounters in the frontiers” (Hansen 2007, 9).  
This application of the “middle ground” by these scholars of Yunnan is based on the 
understanding that the term refers to a place of acculturation, a place in which local hybrid 
identity is created. Gierschs states that “‘middle grounds’ [are] places of fluid cultural and 
economic exchange where acculturation and the creation of hybrid political institutions were 
                                                
80 Hansen approvingly cites Giersch as follows: “Pat Giersch has argued that studies of Qing imperialism 
have focused on the imperial state as the main actor, generally overlooking the agency of migrants and 
indigents (Giersch 2001). He argues instead for an approach that conceives the frontier as ‘middle ground,’ 
the destructively creative formulation of ‘something new’ in lands where ‘alien cultural and political 
institutions meet’ (Giersch 2001, pp.88-9)” (Hansen 2007, 9). Again this treats “middle ground” as a 
space of acculturation.  
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contingent on local conditions (Giersch 2006, 4). White, however, stresses in the very beginning 
of his book, a “middle ground” is not a space of acculturation:  
the accommodation I speak of is not acculturation under a new name. As commonly used, 
acculturation describes a process in which one groups becomes more like another by 
borrowing discrete cultural traits. … On the middle ground [in contrast] diverse peoples 
adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, and often 
expedient, misunderstanding (White 2011, xxvi).  
 
It is this attention to “misunderstanding” that is absent in the hasty adoption of the “middle 
ground” model to Yunnan.81 Giersch suggests that we can find a “middle ground” at a colonial 
frontier because the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized creates cultural 
interaction, “however temporarily.” Henry Reynolds, however, states unambiguously that “there 
was no ‘middle ground’ in Australia” in The Other Side of the Frontier (H. Reynolds 2006, 7). 
White himself proposed “middle ground” to refer to a narrower range of cases than 
“acculturation” or “contact zone.”     
 It is ironic that the recent scholars have adopted “middle ground” over “frontier” to 
emphasize the process of acculturation, because the scholars of an earlier generation, such as 
Lattimore and Leach, used “frontier” to mean more or less the same meaning. Both Lattimore 
and Leach proposed, contra Turner, that we consider “frontier” as a place of two-way interaction 
between settlers and indigenes. Lattimore described how the Mongols and the Chinese 
accommodated each other and characterized the “resultant amalgamated society” as “a 
                                                
81 What appears to be a more fruitful application of the “middle ground” model to China’s periphery is 
found in Familiar Strangers : A History of Muslims in Northwest China by Jonathan Lipman, which 
covers 1,300 years of history of Gansu in northwest China. He characterizes the region as “the meeting 
ground of four cultural zones. In the past millennium the dominant cultural and political cores of Chinese, 
Tibetan, Mongolian-Manchu, and Central Asian civilizations all have lain far from northwest China, 
making it a frontier of four cultures.” He call is “the middle ground of Gansu” and argues that this contact 
zone “enabled a long process of sometimes expedient, sometimes deadly, mutual misunderstanding” 
(Lipman 1997, xxxiii–xxxiv).      
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composite society” (Lattimore 1962, 416-417). Leach too described a frontier as a site of 
“process of interaction” (Leach 1960a, 64).  
 The overall emphasis on acculturation, shared by all the scholars mentioned above, 
effectively downplays the aspect of domination. In stressing the persistence of “frontier reservoir” 
for much of China’s history, Lattimore, for example, de-emphasize the expansiveness of Qing 
China. In fact, Millward considered that Lattimore’s neglect led to “the almost absolute neglect 
of China’s eighteen-century westward and northward expansion” until recently (Millward 1998, 
5–6).82 The recent studies of Yunnan present a similar concern. In Asian Borderlands, Giersch 
stresses that the project of conquest by the Qing rulers was at times compromised and that the 
empire wasn’t able to establish its rule instantly: “the Qing were often forced to negotiate with 
indigenous rulers, particularly Tai aristocracies, over frontier defense and resource allocation, 
and each contributed elements of its own culture to hybrid governing institutions” to stress 
(Giersch 2006, 4). He emphasizes the hybrid institutions in order to critique the “triumphal 
narrative” “that Chinese political and cultural expansion was a peaceful and progressive 
‘unification.”” (Giersch 2006, 14). He hopes to highlight “contingency to the study of the 
Chinese past.” Contrary to these stated intentions, however, the characterization of southwestern 
Yunnan as a “middle ground” obscures the colonial nature of the territorial expansion. In fact, 
Giersch’s detailed descriptions of brutal measures taken by the Qing authority Yunnan illustrates 
the frontier enclosure as an overwhelming force, reinforcing the understanding that mutual 
accommodations were indeed exceptions that prove the rule.   
                                                
82 Millward made this observation in 1998. Since then the scholarship on Qing frontiers has been grown 
tremendously. For a review of this growth, (Waley-Cohen 2004a) is particularly helpful.  
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 Today Chinese researchers also easily notice how thoroughly Yunnan has been Han-
nized, as Stevan Harrell has reported:  
My research collaborators, mostly graduate students from Sichuan University in Chengdu, 
were a bit disappointed with our preliminary visit in 1988 to the Yi village of Yishala on 
the Yunnan border south of Panzhihua City. It was, they say, tai Han hua, “too Hanified.” 
People there wore ordinary Chinese peasant clothes, lived in four-sided houses with 
central courtyards, and spoke fluent Chinese (Harrell 2001, 5).  
   
How has this “Hannification” achieved? In the next section, I present a revisionist history of 
Yunnan –especially southwestern Yunnan—as a modern colonial frontier. By doing so, I 
challenge the view , advanced by several scholars of Yunnan in the past decade, that Yunnan is a 
“middle ground.”   
  
2. History of Yunnan as a Colonial Frontier 
By today it has been common to characterize southwest China—Yunnan, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, and Guangxi—as a frontier. Framing this region as a colonial frontier is not novel 
either, but doing so explicitly remains rather uncommon. “Colonial” is of course a loaded term, 
and we need to use it carefully. To date, I am not aware of a historical study that presents 
Yunnan as a colonial frontier. In this chapter, I wish to present such a history as a somewhat 
crude baseline. I am not primarily a scholar of China, and this historical work is entirely based 
on the secondary literature. The point of the study is not to provide hitherto unavailable data, but 
to connect dots, which have been already known but not put together, and presents them in an 
overarching frame.     
By presenting a history of Yunnan as a colonial frontier, I wish to achieve two purposes. 
First, I hope to highlight the comparative dimension of the modern territorial expansions, arguing 
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that there are noteworthy similarities between Yunnan and other cases of the same era. The 
colonization of Yunnan, like that of the Americas, took place in the second half of the second 
millennium. During this period, sedentary agriculture expanded dramatically and millions of 
immigrant settlers moved in as farmers, merchants, and traders. This large-scale migrations that 
occured in the Americas and in southwestern China were similar, and the they were in fact 
connected by the commercial networks. For example, the introduction of new crops from the New 
World bolstered the migration of new settlers, who turned forest lands to transferable commodities. 
The commercial connections enabled the territorial expansions in both regions.  
Buddhist kingdoms: Nanzhao and Dali 
The toponym “Yunnan” was established only in the thirteenth century, only in the 
beginning of the Yuan Dynasty. In that sense there was no “Yunnan” for most of human history 
(Giersch 2006, 29). Prior to the Yuan era, the Han-Chinese rule was sporadic at best in Yunnan. 
Han-Chinese settlers moved into Sichuan as early as in the Qin dynasty (221-206BCE). Sihcuan 
was thoroughly dominated by Han sedentary agriculturalists by the thirteenth century. But 
Yunnan long remained outside the Sino sphere (Flad and Chen 2013). While the region was 
partially placed under the rule of the ancient Han dynasty in the second century BCE. But by the 
third century BCE, the Han dynasty’s influence waned, leaving the region to multiple political 
and cultural forces. 
For centuries, the region we call “Yunnan” today was ruled by non-Chinese powers. The 
Kingdom of Nanzhao and its successor the Kingdam of Dali were the last and largest of such 
non-Chinese kingdoms. Since the historical evidence is very limited, there are many unknowns 
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about these kingdoms.83 We do know, however, that by the ninth century Nanzhao was a 
formidable political power. It emerged as a sizable kingdom when six nearby principalities 
formed a single state and then went on to mobilize various tribal groups.84 Nanzhao would fight 
alongside the powerful Tibetans at times. It would switch the alliance depending on the balance 
of power between the Tibetans and the Han Chinese. The Tibetans and Nanzhao even joined 
together to attack Chinese cities. It would be wrong to consider it a marginal power, who found a 
small territorial niche in a forgotten backwater. It was indeed an expansive empire, whose 
military power reached from its center in Dali to Hanoi to the east and the Bay of Bengal to the 
south. 
Nanzhao eventually crumbled through internal strife in the beginning of the tenth century. 
The succeeding Kingdom, still based in Dali, adopted Buddhism in the eleventh century, and the 
kings styled themselves as descendants of Ashoka, the great Indian emperor and benefactor of 
Buddhism.85 The Kingdom of Dali was eventually conquered in 1247 by Kublai Khan, who 
placed the entire region of Yunnan under the rule of the Yuan dynasty. In the late fourteenth 
century the Ming rulers forcefully dispersed the remnant Buddhist royal family members of Dali. 
These Dali-based kingdoms are among the least studied polities in Asian history, partly because 
no present-day state claims its legacy today.   
Yunnan’s Muslim elites 
                                                
83 In English there has only been one monograph on this kingdom, . For a substantive update, see Chapter 
3 in (Yang 2009). For a critical analysis of how the history of this kingdom has been narrated, see (Liang 
2011). 
84 The historical summary here is based primarily on Yang 2009 and Myint-U 2012. 
85 We do not much about the Buddhism practiced in the Kingdom of Dali, except that it was quite 
esoteric. At the same time we know that it was known as the Buddhist kingdom by other Buddhist 
kingdoms in Southast Asia (Howard 1997). The Dali kings adopted the “Gandhara” for their country. It is 
the same word as Kandahar in present-day Afghanistan and it remains the name for Yunnan in the literary 
Burmese language today (Myint-U 2012, 167). 
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In 1274, “Yunnan” was established by the Mongol-led Yuan rulers, who for the first time 
in history used the toponym for the newly created administrative unit and incorporated it into the 
political hierarchy, whose center was Beijing (Herman 2007, 47–50).86 Kunming became the 
provincial capital, and the provincial governor was appointed. The first-ever governor of Yunnan 
Province was Sayid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar, who was originally from the Central Asian city of 
Bukhara (in present-day Uzbekistan)(Armijo 2001, 296). As Jacqueline Armijo has stressed in 
her dissertation “Sayyid Ajall Shams Al-Din: A Muslim from Central Asia, Serving the Mongols 
in China, and Bringing ‘civilization’ to Yunnan,” the governor introduced a series of “civilizing” 
measures for the first time. He implemented a hierarchically nested administration consisting of 
four levels: the Lu (region), Fu (prefecture), Zhou (division), and Xian (district). He placed 
civilians in charge of these administrative units. He constructed irrigation systems for rice 
(building the first major dam in the region). He also introduced new plants (hemp and mulberry 
trees among others). While a Muslim, as a Chinese governor he constructed Yunnan’s first 
Confucius temple-cum-school (Tan 2009, 92).  
During the Yuan period, Yunnan went under a mixture of influences. Muslim elites 
played a particularly prominent role, even after the Yuan rule ended in the 1380s, until the mid 
nineteenth century.87 Among them was Zheng He, a renowned explorer who made seven 
                                                
86 See also Chapter 3 of Yang 2009. Kublai Khan moved his headquarters to Beijing in 1266. He 
formally claimed the Mandate of Haeven and proclaimed the new Chinese dynastic ruler in 1271. 
87 On the Muslim history in Yunnan, see J. Wang 1996 and Atwill 2005. I have relied on the latter in 
particular. For a particularly insightful review of this remarkable work, see Caffrey 2006. It is worth 
noting that the Ming rule was not a monolithic and ethnocentric Han straitjacket. For example, the Ming 
general who led the attacks upon the Mongol force, which consisted of many Muslims, was also a 
Chinese Muslim. When the Ming army defeated the Yuan troops in Yunnan in 1381, many Muslim in 
Yunnan actually became eunuchs serving the Ming dynasty. Zheng He was one of them. For a broader 
historical study of Muslims in late imperial China, Benite 2005 is invaluable. 
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expeditions throughout the Southeast 
Asian archipelago and the Indian ocean, 
eventually reaching the east coast of 
Africa (Armijo 2001, 297).88  
Arrival of immigrant settlers 
Although Yunnan was established 
officially as China’s administrative unit 
during the Yuan dynasty, it was probably 
the demographic shift during the Ming and 
Qing periods that probably played the 
most vital role in the incorporation of 
Yunnan into the Han-Sino sphere in an irreversible manner. China’s population increased rapidly 
during the late Ming period and explosively during the Qing period. According to James Lee, 
between 1685 and 1885, China’s population increased from 100 million to 430 million.  
A range of New World crops such as 
maize that had come to Asia from the Americas 
played a crucial role in driving and sustaining the immigrant population (Giersch 2006, 141; 
Waley-Cohen 2004b, 1). Once it was discovered that it was possible grow maize, sweet potatoes, 
peanuts, tobacco, and opium on land previously considered not arable, Han settlers rapidly 
expanded the cultivation of these commercial crops further, into the hills (Armijo 2001, 324; 
Giersch 2006, 141–142). Equally important—or more important in Lee’s analysis—was the 
growth of the mining industries in China’s southwest. According to Lee, between 1700 and 1850, 
                                                
88 Zheng He is alternatively spelled as “Cheng Ho” among others. 
Figure 5. History of China's population size 
(Smil 1993, 16) 
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the population of China’s southwest ballooned from approximately five million people to twenty 
million” (J. Lee 1982, 712).  
Waves of immigration began especially when the Ming rule was installed in Yunnan. 
Unlike the Yuan rule, during which Persians, Turks and Central Asians moved to Yunnan, the 
Ming rule brought a massive number of Han Chinese to Yunnan at an unprecedented scale. The 
first to move in were nearly 300,000 soldiers and their families (Myint-U 2012, 175). They were 
joined by exiled officials, merchants and businessmen, and above all immigrants seeking 
farmlands or jobs in places like mines. The government gave incentives such as tax remissions, 
travel funds, and land grants (Armijo 2001, 298). Already by the end of the Ming era, the Han 
had become the largest ethnic group in Yunnan, although not yet a majority (Yang 2010, 141). 
Lee estimates Yunnan’s population rose from four million to ten million between 1775 and 1850. 
Yang considers this population shift to be one of the largest and most sustained government-
sponsored migrations in Chinese history (Yang 2010, 147). 
Before 1750, Southwest China was the least urban part of China, the urban population 
barely reaching 5 percent. There were few towns with more than 5,000 residents. By early 
nineteenth century, both Kunming and Dali had over 100,000 residents, and the urban population 
climbed to about 10 percent (Giersch 2006, 145). The urbanization meant not only dense 
population centers but also new cultural and religious practices; not only military barracks but 
also imperial temples were built to transform the urban landscape.89 According to Lee’s estimate, 
Han migrants to Southwest China constructed over 400 temples during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Han migrants constructed ancestral halls that celebrated their ancestors, and 
                                                
89 The new fortified towns included Youle (1729), Talang (1732), Weiyuan (1745), and Mianning (1735). 
This happened not only in Yunnan but also in Guizhou and Xinjiang (Giersch 2006, 146). 
  
 138 
erected temples to the gods of their native places. They also built 300 native place associations 
during the same period; they would compile and publish large-scale genealogies. Often these 
associations acted as a form of local informal government (Giersch 2006, 148). 
From indirect rule to direct rule 
At the heart of the incorporation of peripheries to the hierarchical China-wide political 
administrative system was the transition from indirect rule to direct rule. Under the regime of 
indirect rule, local rulers were recognized as “native officials” (tusi 土司) in many peripheral 
regions where the locals enjoyed autonomy to a very high degree. Crucially, the local rulers were 
allowed to possess their own armies (Giersch 2006, 34). During the Ming era, accepting the tusi 
title allowed the local rulers to exercise unfettered authority over their domains in most cases. It 
entailed little change on the ground, and the Ming court too understood clearly that the tusi 
regions laid outside the control (Herman 2006, 137).90 This changed fundamentally, however, 
during the Qing era. 
In 1659, the Qing government introduced the rule of patrilineal succession: that is, they 
made it a rule that tusi titles would only be inherited by direct patrilineal descendants. Each 
applicant for the title would have to submit a proof of genealogy. While this policy was not 
immediately enforced across the vast territory of Qing China, this signaled a new era of 
increased supervision and compliance from Beijing (Giersch 41-42). Over time, the direct ruling 
of the state administration did prevail. In southwestern Yunnan, this policy was pursued 
particularly vigorously under the Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735), who considered the direct 
rule to be necessary. As Giersch put it, “removing native officials was rarely peaceful, however, 
                                                
90 There is now a fairly large, and rapidly increasing, amount of studies on native chiefs and the transition 
to direct rule, including Took 2005, Herman 2007a, Wang 2011, and Faure 2013. “Tusi” is sometimes 
spelled as “Tsusi” in English-language scholarship. 
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and this approach led to a brutal period of new frontier militarism in Guizhou, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan” (Giersch: 45). This expansion of the state apparatus, which, often brutally, removed 
native chiefs (tusi), was called gaitu guiliu （改土帰流), which literally means “returning the 
native tribes to regular administration” (Waley-Cohen 2004b, 4).     
Militarization: revolts and suppressions 
The Qing China’s territorial expansion during the reign of Yongzheng was driven by 
what Giersch calls “pro-colonization policies.” During the Yongzheng era, the Chinese settler 
population dramatically increased: “Chinese migration was encouraged even though land-hungry 
settlers often stole aboriginal lands.” Yongzheng “proposed aggressive plans for colonizing the 
Southwest, and he allowed his handpicked men to lead imperial armies in violent wars of 
conquest” (Giersch 44). A particularly notable figure of this conquest was a Manchu official 
named E’ertai.  
E’ertai arrived in the southwestern frontier in 1726, and he dramatically transformed the 
frontier region with ruthless military conquests. Finding that the locals were deceitful and 
resilient, E’ertai was convinced that a permanent rule could be achieved only through the use of 
strong military force (Giersch 2006, 52–55).91 The locals were becoming resentful against the 
encroaching rule, especially the new taxation on the hitherto untaxed salt industry. In 1827, 
hundreds of both Tai and hill people immediately fought back against the draconian ruling. 
Locals, of various ethno-linguistic backgrounds including Hani/Akha, Lahu, and Tai, banded 
together in a counter-offensive (Giersch 2006, 49). E’ertain’s soldiers ruthlessly suppressed the 
opposition, killing nearly 1,000 people. “Despite debilitating disease and difficult terrain, the 
Qing military slaughtered and burned the determined opposition into submission. Local 
                                                
91 To date, by far the most detailed study of the history of Sipsongpanna is Kato 2000.  
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resistance fighters were tenacious, but they simply could not overcome the sheer numbers of 
imperial soldiers” (Giersch 2006, 55). Herman too concludes that E’ertai and his contemporaries 
attempted to “systematically destroy any trace of traditional integrity the indigenous frontier 
societies might have possessed” (quoted in Giersch 2006, 50). It is Giersch himself who says that 
by the 1720 the Qing government had established a “frontier discourse” that would deploy the 
images of a “corrupt, exploitative native official and his followers” (Giersch 2006, 54). They 
would characterize the struggle as one of civilization versus barbarism. 
The Chinese colonization of Southwestern China consisted of demographic pressures, 
commercially-driven exploitations of natural resources, and military oppressions. Across the 
region, we find numerous revolts by local peoples from the end of the eighteenth century to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Atwill, there were more than twenty eight 
outbreaks of violence between Qing government forces and Yunnan’s multiethnic population 
between 1795 and 1805 (Atwill 2005, 54). We can understand the first half of the nineteenth 
century as the conclusive phase of the Qing-China colonization, after which the options left to 
the locals were either assimilation to the Han or fleeing to other countries (most usually, 
Myanmar). We shall review one particular revolt against the colonial juggernaut that took place 
in western Yunnan.  
Lisu revolt in Yunnan 
 A particularly remarkable was the uprising by Lisu and other locals against the Han 
immigrants, which broke out in 1821 in Yongbei Ting, in northwestern Yunnan, near the border 
with Sichuan.92 Because the leadership included many Lisu, this event is usually called a Lisu 
                                                
92 The description of the Lisu revolt here relies on Daniels 1994, which introduced the findings of a 
Japanese historian Fusaji Takeuchi.  
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revolt, but actually it involved many non-Lisu peoples including Tai-speaking lowlanders of the 
region. Into this remote corner of Yunnan, Han immigrants were moving in in droves; they were 
attracted by non-timber forest products, which the Han marchants knew were commercially very 
valuable. The Han immigrants acquired large tracts of land—even in forested areas. They did not 
seize the lands forcefully through violent means. They bought land directly from the local head 
(tsusi), or his subordinates, or from the tenants (Daniels 1994, 9). The transactions themselves 
were more or less legitimate, but they caused much hostility among the locals against the rich 
Han immigrants, because the latter quickly dominated the commerce and squeezed the natives. 
The Han immigrants were able to do so because they had more initial capital and they had access 
to the markets in the eastern region. The Han merchants had acquired the capital partly thanks to 
the British, who brought silver (originally from South America) to pay for tea and other import 
items from China.  
Entrepreneurial merchants from the China’s east coast (Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 
particular) began large-scale mushroom cultivation for the markets back home. The 1854 local 
gazetteer describes their method as follows:   
In recent years, immigrants from Jiangsu and Zhejiang have bought forests … they fell 
large trees … lying them on the ground, pare off their tops and branches, and chisel 
twenty to thirty holes in the trunks. … After four to five years, they sprout profusely, 
growing … thousands of mushrooms on all the trees, and the whole scene is called a red 
mountain. After ten years or so, the trees decay and the mountains are left bare. In a short 
space of time the peole’s insatiable greed for quick profit has caused the decay … in the 
worst affected places even firewood gathering and grass cutting have become impossible. 
It is the same throughout the country (Daniels 1994, 9).  
   
Prior to the arrival of these settlers, the locals had been foraging in forests for fungi on fallen 
trees. They sold mushrooms too, but they never practiced such an intensive method of production. 
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The introduction of the commercial mono-crop production directly resulted in degradation of 
forests and a loss of hunting, foraging, and grazing grounds for the natives.  
It is difficult to exactly ascertain when these commercial enterprises spread in the forests 
of Southwestern Yunnan. We know that by 1818 they had already resulted in violent clashes 
between the Lisu and the mushroom merchants from Zheijiang. In 1821, 1,500 Lisu armed 
themselves and demanded the lands back. This uprising gathered momentum immediately and 
grew to a force of 8,000. Later, when a 100-strong delegation marched into the neighboring 
Dayao country to seek settlements, they were joined immediately by 4,000 other natives—Tai 
(Baiyi) and Yi (Luoluo). This event ended in bloodshed; over 500 people were killed by the 
angry locals. Fusaji Takeuchi, who investigated this event, concludes his study by noting that 
“mass scale colonization by the Han from the eighteenth century not only creaetd tension with 
the cultivators on the plains, such as Tai peoples who practised agriculture on valley floors along 
the Jinsha River. It also dealt a blow to the livelihood of the Lisu, who relied on swidden 
agriculture and hunting, because commercial cultivation on hill land resulted in the accelerated 
degradation of the environment” (Daniels 1994, 10). 
The final straw for the non-Han population who resisted the Qing ruling was the so-called 
“Panthay Rebellion,” which effectively eliminated the possibility of an open uprising against the 
political incorporation of Yunnan into China.93 The rebellion, this time, was driven by Muslim 
leaders, but it was once again a multi-ethnic movement, including Han leaders. The rebellion 
started as spontaneous and widespread uprisings across Yunnan, following a massacre of 
Muslims in Kunming in 1856. The rebels established an independent government based in Dali, 
                                                
93 The historical event has been known in the English language literature as the Panthay Rebellion. But in 
Chinese, it has been called the Du Wenxiu Rebellion. 
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naming this government “pingnan” (平南	 meaning “pacified south”). They were able to 
maintain this Dali-based multi-ethnic government under Muslim rulers until 1873. But when the 
reinvigorated Qing imperial forces launched decisive and repeated attacks, it collapsed. 
Wholesale massacres of Muslims followed. According to Armijo, “Qing troops carried out a 
systematic and brutal massacre of the Muslim population (Hui) of Yunnan. The government-
sponsored ethnic cleansing is estimated to have resulted in the death of as many as 90% of the 
Muslim population” (Armijo 2001, 294). Many fled towards Myanmar; some took refuge in the 
Wa region, then beyond the reaches of the Chinese power (Forbes 1986).Throughout the 
nineteenth century, a series of uprisings occurred across Yunnan, as Atwill’s map (below) 
illustrates.  
 
Map 5. “Map of Major Han-Hu disturbances, 1845-1850” (map from Atwill 2005, 55)  
Reproduced with perm






 Giersch tells us that Yunnan’s “middle ground” period ended in the 1850s “with the 
explosion of the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873), a civil war so brutal that it devastated 
populations throughout Yunnan” (Giersch 2006, 10). He also reminds us that in the 1950s “a 
Chinese government [was] able to remove all local contenders from power, demarcate 
borderlines, and incorporate most (but not all of the [regions] as sovereign territory within a 
modern Chinese national state” (Giersch 2006, 11).  
If we examine the history of Yunnan during the period between the fourteenth century 
and today and draw a macro-level pattern of its historical geography, we clearly find a long arc 
of colonial process. Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms were once formidable Yunnan-centered powers, 
but they were thoroughly dismantled by the Yuan and Ming rulers. The Muslim elites introduced 
a number of new ideas and technologies to Yunnan during the Yuan era, but they were almost 
entirely massacred by the end of the nineteenth century. A variety of indigenous peoples such as 
the Tai and the Lisu revolted against the encroaching powers, but they were systematically 
suppressed by the state. The Buddhist empires, the Sino-Muslim communities, and the resistance 
by a coalition of valley and hill peoples in southwest Yunnan all clearly belong to the past, and 
they are rarely recognized in China’s historical geography.  
During the Ming and Qing periods, waves of Han immigrants moved and settled in 
Yunnan. China’s population increased in an explosive manner and immigrants from China’s 
central plains moved to hinterlands. The region was steadily incorporated into the Chinese 
administrative hierarchy. Yunnan became a political, agrarian, and commercial frontier of the 
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expansive Han Chinese world. John E. Herman presents a most succinct summary of this process 
as follows:  
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the southwest was inhabited by an assortment 
of strikingly diverse cultures and ruled by a multitude of political entities. The vast 
majority of the region’s polities were small, geographically confined units that came and 
went with violent regularity … However, by the middle of the eighteenth century nearly 
all these polities, both large and small, had completely disappeared, and many of the 
region’s cultures were moving rapidly toward extinction. China’s military, political, 
sociocultural, and economic institutions were now firmly in control of the southwest, 
leaving only the most remote highlands and inaccessible valleys beyond the direct control 
of the Chinese state (Herman 2007, 1).  
 
According to Armijo, the Han Chinese from the heartland viewed the frontier “as uninhabited, 
since the majority of the population there were not Han” (Armijo 2001, 299). This is not very 
different from how European settlers viewed their frontier in North America. 
In the twentieth century, ethnic minority groups of southwest Yunnan suffered 
tremendously during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; many fled across the 
border to neighboring countries (Tapp 1995, 216). The one-child policy led many Lisu to flee to 
Myanmar.94 By today the erosion of the “middle ground” in southwestern China—even in the 
remotest area of southwestern Yunnan—is so conclusive that whatever remains of the space of 
accommodation can be observed only in fragmentary fashions.  
 Today there are eight “autonomous prefectures” and 29 “autonomous counties” in 
Yunnan. This includes the “Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture.” The “autonomy,” 
however, does not even include financial planning, which must take place within state guidelines 
(Tapp 1995, 212–214). The government publishes a monthly newsletter in the Jinghpaw 
language, but its content is largely translations of Chinese-language articles and it rarely 
                                                
94 I thank Bobby Morse for this information in Chiang Mai 2012. 
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generates original articles from the perspectives of the “Jinghpo people.” Discussion of political 
affairs across the boundary in Myanmar is prohibited.    
While it may be possible to trace back colonial practices and ideologies in Chinese 
history to an ancient period, studies of “Chinese colonialism” have been mostly concerned with 
the Qing period. They also tend to emphasize the synchronic developments of modern 
colonialisms, by pointing to the circulation of ideas and practices around the world. The 
territorial expansion of China is characterized as an essentially modern event, which exhibits 
considerable similarities with other colonial powers. Arguably, they represent certain synchronic 
processes.95 Sedentary agriculture expanded dramatically and millions of immigrant settlers 
moved to hinterlands in unprecedented manners, thanks, at least partly, to the introduction of 
new crops from the New World. As the new settlers cultivated more lands, farms expanded and 
forests were denuded. Practically everywhere, lands became transferable commodities. This 
process of expansion was always accompanied by powerful techniques of modern colonialism 
such as cartography and ethnography (Akerman 2009; Pels and Salemink 2000; Pratt 2007). And 
at crucial junctures, the state resorted to violence and brutally suppressed local resistance.  
 Observing these parallels and stressing almost two decades ago, Millward reiterates the 
usefulness of understanding “frontier” as a process: “In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the frontiers of Han China were widening in a fashion every bit as dramatic as those of the 
United States or Russia, as Han Chinese—with their agricultural techniques, commercial energy, 
and political, social, and cultural systems—moved into lands newly conquered from other 
                                                
95 In Strange Parallels, Victor Lieberman examines these synchronic processes of state formation, 
examining a variety of countries (including mainland Southeast Asia, Russia and Europe, Japan, and 
China) between c.800 and 1830. Examining this study of incredible scope is unfortunately beyond my 
present study.        
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peoples, from nature, or from both” (Millward 1996, 113). It is because of this structural 
similarity the metaphor of “frontier,” despite its ambiguity, keeps recurring in the narratives of 
modern China’s territory.  
 
3. Does the “frontier” metaphor travel to China? 
As discussed above, “frontier” has been used by different scholars of China in different 
senses. This is not surprising because, as I repeat, “frontier” is a concept-metaphor whose 
meaning is often ambiguous. In the previous section of this chapter, however, I made a case for 
characterizing Yunnan of the past centuries as a “colonial frontier,” drawing similarities with the 
US-American and other cases of territorial expansion. In the last section of this chapter, we will 
consider how the “frontier” concept-metaphor might be understood or misunderstood by Chinese 
historians.   
China’s indigenous discourse of civilizational transformation   
Some scholars such as James Scott propose that we consider China’s territorial history as 
a much longer process of colonial expansion from an ancient era—exemplifying the general 
historical pattern in which states have gradually yet steadily gathered strengths in the past few 
thousand years. Discussing “the precocious early expansion of the Chinese state” (Scott 2009, 
24), he paints an extraordinarily long and continuous lineage of colonial expansion: “from at 
least the expansion of the Han Dynasty southward to the Yangzi (202 BCE – 220 CE), when the 
Chinese state first became a great agrarian empire, and continuing, in fits and starts, all the way 
to the Qing and its successors, the Republic and the People’s Republic” (Scott 2009, 129).  
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Proponents of this longue duree view of Chinese colonialism points to China’s uniquely 
powerful civilizational discourse as an evidence of its precocious colonialism. In the Chinese 
cosmology, the center of civilization has been traditionally referred to as “hua” (華), which 
literally means “fluorescent” or splendorous.” It has been contrasted against “yi” (夷) and other 
terms meaning “uncivilized” and/or “unfamiliar.”96 This hua-yi distinction has been a 
fundamental cosmo-geographical order in Chinese history. In this view, the world consisted of 
the hua at the center and the various yi peoples in the “four seas” around the center” (X. Liu 
2004, 10).    
The powerful discourse of civilization in Chinese history can be interpreted as a sort of 
colonial ideology, but here there are good reasons not to equate them directly. According to Peter 
Perdue, there have been two opposing ways to think about civilizational frontier in Chinese 
history. According to one way of thinking, civilization belongs to certain places—such as the 
Yellow River basin. Civilization is not a spatially expanding force; it is stationary and doesn’t 
travel. Therefore, barbarians will always remain barbarian, as long as they stay in barbaric 
regions. According to the other view, civilization has dynamic nature; it can transform barbarian 
peoples and places as its sphere expands outward to peripheries. The doctrine of “transformation” 
[hua/化] posits that a people could become civilized as they long as they learn the proper ways. 
That is, it is possible for a barbarian to cease to be yi and enter the realm of hua. The path to hua 
was, first and foremost, “study[ing] of the classical texts, observation of rituals to honor 
ancestors, practicing settled agriculture and rural textile production, proper segregation and 
subordination of women, etc” (Perdue 2008, 252). According to Perdue, officials and 
                                                
96 In English-language literature, yi has been conventionally translated as “barbarian.” This convention 
has obscured another dimension of yi; it also means “unfamiliar” or “foreign” in a more value-neutral 
sense. For a sophisticated analysis of the term “yi” and its translation into English, see L. H. Liu 2004. 
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policymakers usually endorsed this view, partly because they themselves achieved their positions 
by studying classical literature and passing the imperial examination (which lasted from 589 to 
1905). The imperial examination was (in theory) based on a certain egalitarian and universalist 
ethos, for it gave opportunity to anyone regardless of family, ethnic, homeland backgrounds.          
The first way of thinking, proposing a static geography, is represented by the Song (960–
1280 CE) and Ming (1368–1644 CE) dynasties. The Han dynasties (206 BCE–220 CE) and Tang 
dynasty (618–906 CE) display an interesting mix of the two views (Perdue 2008, 254). The 
second, expansionist view was endorsed by the non-Han rulers like the Mongols and the Manchu 
conquerors. As they were considered to be “yi” themselves, they argued that any person could be 
civilized and cultured, regardless of geographical or ethnic origins. Indeed they would make 
extra efforts in perfecting the Chinese culture to prove this doctrine.  
China presents a remarkable history in which the one culture—what has come to be 
called the “Han” culture—flourishes not only during the periods of Han-peoples’ ruling but also 
during the periods of non-Han peoples such as the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) and 
the Manchu-led Qing dynasty (1644-1911). As Lieberman has observed, “by eliminating non-
Chinese regimes all along the frontier, the Mongols did China a favor that it had been unable to 
do so for itself” and “almost four centuries after the Mongols tried to join all of China and vast 
stretches of Inner Asia in a single empire, the Qing resumed that project” (Lieberman 2009, 522). 
The non-Han conquerors, once they establish their rule over the Han people, would become the 
champions of the very culture that were appreciated by the conquered people rather than impose 
their own culture. The Mongols and Manchus moved in to Beijing as soon as they defeated the 
previous dynasty, rather than move the capital back to their homeland. The Chinese culture was 
often more vigorously promoted and spread by the government during the eras of non-Han 
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dynasties. It is this layer of complexity that makes it difficult to straightforwardly apply the 
modern European model of colonialism, because the latter represents a strong racial doctrine.    
3.2. Between “frontier” and bianjiang  
 It remains difficult for “frontier” to be accepted in China, precisely because the orthodox 
narrative in China denies the history of colonial expansion. In China, there is a well-established 
and thriving academic field of geography that focuses on bianjiang xue (边疆).97 There is even a 
research center for bianjiang studies (called “bianjiang xue”), sponsored by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences: the Research Center for Chinese Bianjiang History and Geography. 
This bianjiang research center houses about 30 professional researchers and publishes a quarterly 
journal.  
 “Bianjiang” has been usually translated as “frontier” in English (and “bianjiang xue” and 
“frontier studies”).98 Yet the research center itself translates “bianjiang” as “borderland.” Their 
preference of “borderland” is understandable, given the ambiguity of “frontier.” The center’s 
preference might also reflect the perspective of the government-sponsored institution: “Research 
on the history and geography of China’s bianjiang … bears great significance for protecting 
sovereignty over national territory, handling relations with neighboring countries and 
strengthening the unity of domestic nationalities” (Millward 1996, 119).99 The center’s website 
presents latest news articles, categorized under twelve “borderlands” including (Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Yunnan, and Taiwan) and twenty neighboring states that share an international border with 
                                                
97 To my knowledge, the only English-language discussion on the history of “bianjiang” is found in 
Leibold 2007, 11.   
98 Google Translate presents “frontier” for “边疆” (bianjiang) too.  
99 I have used Millward’s translation but restored bianjiang, which Millward translated as “frontier” 
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China today.100 The driving concerns of this research center are the present-day boundary 
disputes. It is not interested in examining the historicity of the present-day territory.   
At a deeper level, the standard understanding of China’s historical geography (in China) 
regards the present territory of the country as a land that the nation has inherited from the ancient 
era. According to this understanding of primordial territorial integrity, Xinjiang, for example, 
remained part of China from time immemorial, or at least since the Tang dynasty (618-907). The 
dramatic expansion into Xinjiang during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), which is described in 
detail by Peter Perdue in his China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, is 
understood as a restoration. These areas had been temporarily lost but they have been recovered. 
The word “conquest” (zhengfu 征服), which has been used commonly by Japanese and 
Taiwanese to describe Qing-China’s territorial expansion, is avoided in China. Instead, 
unification (tongyi 統一) is consistently used by Chinese scholars. Millward insightfully 
comments as follows:  
Similar propangandistic terminology flavors discussions of the Chinese relationship to 
Tibet as well, and of Han historical relations with non-Han peoples in general. In effect, 
this is equivalent to the nineteenth-century notion of “manifest destiny” in the United 
States, although in China’s case it might better be called “manifest heritage” (Millward 
1996, 120).101    
  
If the frontier expansion is the myth of the US-American historical geography, the stasis of 
ancient imperial territory inherited from the ancient era is that of the Chinese historical 
geography.  
                                                
100 It is worth mentioning that an important theme in the discourse of bianjiang is that the present-day 
territory of China is actually smaller than it should be. As William Callahan has illustrated in “The 
Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody” (W. Callahan A. 2009).  
101 The rhetoric of this imperial heritage—and the difficulty of transition from this imperial cosmology to 




The basic spatial dynamics of the Chinese cosmo-geography rests on the myth of China 
as the immovable center; this is the idea of the Middle Kingdom or the Central State (中国). In 
the long history of China, the Yellow River valley has always been considered as the center in its 
civilizational discourse. This cosmo-geography even withstood the shock that was brought by the 
introduction of Buddhism. According to Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of 
Sino-India Relations, 600-1400 by Tansen Sen, the Chinese Buddhists suffered from an 
agonizing “borderland complex” in the first millennia. This complex stemmed from the facts that 
the Buddhist pilgrimage sites were far from China and most crucially Buddha lived outside the 
Sino sphere. The Daoists and Confucian critics castigated Buddhism as a foreign doctrine, 
unsuitable for the Chinese people: “Confronted with the problem of a borderland complex, the 
Buddhist clergy in China made an earnest effort to transform China into a legitimate Buddhist 
center” (Sen 2003, 12). This centering of a periphery involved cartographic projects. By the 
seventeenth century, they produced maps like Sihai huayi zongtu (四海華夷総図, General Map 
of the Chinese and Barbarian [Land] within the Four Seas), which presents China as the center of 
the Buddhist cosmology, Jambudvīpa. In this map, India is relegated to an insignificant periphery 
(Sen 2003, 240).   
Because this center-periphery cosmology is so fundamental to the Chinese spatial 
cosmology, bianjiang is necessarily a “periphery” (zhobian 周边), and it is structurally inferior 
to the center. In the US-American myth “frontier” refers to the birthplace of the national culture. 
Bianjiang only denotes a remote place, far away from the immobile center. While “frontier” is 
recognized for its generative power, bianjian is not accorded any such power. Bianjian never 
produces China’s national culture. Because the US-American and Chinese mythico-geography 
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represent incommensurable spatial models of cultural generation, it is extremely difficult to 




Thirty years ago, Paul Cohen published Discovering History in China: American 
Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past, in which he critiqued the work of leading postwar 
American scholars, who interpreted Chinese through the lens of Euro-American concepts and 
concerns (Cohen 2010). Does the frequent usage of “frontier” in the English-language 
scholarship mean that a US-centric perspective is imposed on China yet again? Or does “frontier” 
open up a promising new framing towards fruitful comparison between the two imperial 
expansions? It is difficult to answer these questions because, if I may repeat, the meaning of 
“frontier” itself is often ambiguous.  
The meaning of “frontier” greatly depends on the context. “Frontier” could serve the 
scholarship broadly as a as a useful corrective to the Eurocentrism in the studies of 
colonialism—including the “postcolonial studies”—which tends to neglect non-European cases 
of colonialism. While this exclusion was in some ways understandable in the past (especially 
during the era of “decolonization), we are in a better position today to examine more synchronic 
and modular developments of imperial powers around the world. China and Japan present rich 
materials for comparisons of territorial expansion. In this study, by describing Yunnan as a 
colonial frontier, I suggest there are cases of territorial expansion in Asia worthy of comparison. 
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Scholars like Peter Perdue explicitly call for comparative studies of the processes of 
territorial expansion among various empires including China. It is unlikely, however, that such a 
comparative approach will be actively pursued by Chinese scholars—for various reasons. First of 
all, it is genuinely problematic to call the Qing “a Han-Chinese colonial power” because, as 
Perdue put it, “the Manchus were, in fact, frontier peoples on the edge of the Ming empire 
(Perdue 2003, 54).” It is arguable that the Han were colonized by the Manchu (as symbolized by 
the enforcement of the queue hairstyle. Perdue himself reports that “no historian in China today, 
to my knowledge, would ever describe Qing relations with Mongolia or Taiwan, or Tang 
relations with Vietnam, as ‘colonial’ (Perdue 2009, 88). “Colonial frontier” is likely to be 
avoided in the official language in China, given the sensitivity of Tibet and Xinjiang.  
Perhaps scholars using “frontier” to imply “colonial frontier” without explicitly saying so. 
A scholar of China who regularly visits the country has told me that not a few scholars who write 
about a sensitive topic practice self-censorship and avoid word “colonial,” because they fear that 
the Chinese government might find it offensive—to the degree that they might make it difficult 
for the offending scholars to conduct research in China. Indeed, the thirteen American scholars 
who contributed to the 2004 volume on Xinjiang have been denied permission to enter the 
country (Millward 2011). Ambiguous metaphors are all the more useful when one has to censor 
one’s own writing. Asked why he didn't leave the dangerous Buenos Aires at the time of the 
Peronistas to take up a position at a university in the United States, the smiling, blind Borges said, 




Chapter 6: Evangelical frontier: Protestantism and vernacular missions 
 
Introduction  
 In April 1961, three months after John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as the new president 
of the United States, the Baptist World, a periodical magazine published by the Baptist World 
Alliance, published an article titled “The Nagas: New Frontier for Burma Baptist.” It is an article 
about a Kachin mission to a Naga land. The article is presented with the following background 
explanation:  
The story of this Burma Baptist mission to the Nagas was told by a group of Bhamo High 
School students in a pageant present to the Burma Baptist Convention last October. 
Afterwards 11 Kachin young people now carrying on the work … were introduced and 
received an ovasion as they stood on the platform … Then in a display of gratitude to 
those who have brought them the Gospel of Christ, Naga chiefs presented gifts of Naga 
weapons and items of costume … to leaders of the Kachin Convention (Hackett 1961, 3). 
 
Then the article describes the “pioneer mission” carried out by Kachin Baptists in a Naga region 
nearly 300 kilometers from Myitkyina: “One of the most thrilling projects of the Burma Baptists 
in the past few years has been the opening of mission work among the wild, naked Nagas of 
Burma’s northwest frontier.” It praises the work by the Kachin Baptists as an exemplary mission 
to a frontier: “the local convention nearest the frontier senses the need and responds by sending 
its workers.”  
 In this and the next chapter, our inquiry will focus on evangelical frontiers. While a 
variety of people—politicians, scientists, film makers, advertisers, risk analysts, and so on—are 
fond of the spatial metaphor, no one seems to evoke “frontier” as a self-galvanizing catchword as 
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constantly as Christian missionaries.102 And there are grounds for them to argue that their 
frontierism has been exceptionally successful, for Christianity is today by far the most spatially 
spread of all the religions in the world. Christianity achieved this status relatively recently in its 
long history. On the eve of the modern era, it was clearly Islam, not Christianity, which was the 
most globalized religion; Muslim communities were spread from the Malay archipelago in the 
east to West Africa in the west. During the past five centuries, however, Christianity has come to 
spread around the globe with unprecedented dynamism, surpassing Islam in terms of spatial 
diffusion. During this period, as Gananath Obeyesekere remarked, “one universal religion, 
Christianity, began to take root in virtually every part of the world, and in this sense it became 
the first ‘world religion,’ and perhaps remains the only one” (Obeyesekere 2003, 64).  
The long-distance diffusion of Christianity out of western Eurasia in the early modern era 
began with the expansive Iberian empires, which introduced Catholicism to their vast colonies 
around the world—parts of Asia and most notably Latin America. While the Jesuits made 
pioneering long-distance missions, the spatial diffusion of Christianity to “virtually every part of 
the world” has been achieved in a late modern era—in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—
primarily through Protestant evangelism. While the spreading of Catholicism was driven by 
government-sanctioned agents in top-down manners, Protestantism was disseminated through a 
series of voluntarily organized missions, which acted independently of state authorities (Van der 
                                                
102 To my knowledge, the only study in geography that has pointed out the Christian evangelical usage of 
“frontier” explicitly is John Agnew’s “religion and geopolitics (Agnew 2006, 184). Agnew, however, 
reads this as an aspect of the American right-wing politics, represented by George W. Bush and Karl 
Rove. As Robert Hefner has reminded us, the evangelical projects designed and carried out by 
fundamental Christians often bring unintended and unexpected effects “at the level of the barrio” (Hefner 
1998, 96). This is precisely what the scholars who are studying the globalization of Pentecostalism are 
reporting. Even the right-wing Americans cannot contain the Spirit as they wish!         
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Veer 1996, Young 2007, Calhoun 2012). Protestant evangelism has been marked by radically 
decentralized—indeed quite anarchic—spatial patterns.  
With no over-arching coordination across various denominations, Protestant churches 
frequently experience breaking-up and splintering. In spite of—or perhaps because of—such 
unmanaged nature of the missions, the Protestant evangelism, as a whole, continues to be 
exceptionally vibrant to this day, as the dramatic rise of Pentecostalism in the Global South 
testifies (Martin 1990; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Robbins 2004a; Hefner 2013).  
With long-standing Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, and Catholic communities, Southeast Asia 
presents a vantage point from which we can see the distinct orientation of Protestant frontierism 
in a multi-religious landscape. Protestantism are a minority in every single country of Southeast 
Asia, but in each of them it has spread strongly among disenfranchised minority groups. This 
pattern has been observed in both mainland and maritime regions of Southeast Asia.103 
Protestant missionaries have been strikingly successful among upland peoples in particular, 
“whether working among hill tribes in Northeast Thailand, mountain peoples in the Philippines, 
or the highlanders of Western New Guinea” (Andaya 2012, 114). Protestantism can be now 
considered as a distinct feature of the mountain region of the mainland called “the Southeast 
Asian massif” (Michaud 2006; Michaud 2007) or “Zomia” (W. van Schendel 2002; Scott 2009), 
which encompasses the contiguous upland region from southwestern China to northeastern India. 
Whether we look at Muslim-majority countries of Indonesia and Malaysia, the Buddhist-majority 
countries like Thailand and Myanmar, the Communist countries of Vietnam and China, or the 
Hindu-majority country of India, there is an unmistakable pattern that Christianity, especially 
                                                
103 As Oscar Salemink has observed in a rare region-wide review article on Protestantism, 
“Christianity—particularly evangelical Protestantism—is an attractive religious option for many marginal 
ethnic groups” (Salemink 2009, 36). 
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Protestantism, has appealed strongly to marginalized ethno-linguistic groups, especially upland 
“tribal” peoples.104 
 Myanmar illustrates well the typical spatial pattern of religious diffusion between what 
Leach has called “hill people” and “valley people.” It is said that Christians make up only about 
four percent of the country’s population, incidentally about the same percentages as the 
Muslims.105 But unlike that of Islam, the diffusion of Christianity has been marked by a 
breathtaking ethno-linguistic diversity. The Myanmar Baptist Convention, the national umbrella 
body, today includes fourteen organizations (called “conventions”) of ethnic minority: Ahka, 
Asho Chin, Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Lahu, Lisu, Mon, Naga, Pwo Karen (Kayin), Shan, Rakhine, 
Tedim, Wa, and Zomi.106 The headquarters of these “conventions” are located across the 
country. In the neighboring country of Thailand too, Christianity has particularly appealed to 
highland peoples. Hayami reports, for example, how a Christian school located near Bangkok, 
whose official name is “Jesus Christ’s Association for Thai People,” is actually so full of 
highlanders that the students called it “Jesus Christ’s Association for Hill Peoples (chaw khaw)” 
(Hayami 2007, 264). 
                                                
104 The scholarly literature on Christianity in upland Southeast Asia is now so large that it is impossible 
to make a comprehensive list. Here I make a short list of English-language studies, organized by countries, 
to indicate the width of this phenomenon and diverse academic scholarship. On southwestern China, see 
Cheung 1995; N. Diamond 1996. On northeast India, see Joshi 2012. On Indonesia, see Aragon 2000; 
Hefner 1993; Hoskins 1993; Keane 2007; Spyer 1996; Steedly 1996. On Malaysia, Chua 2012. On 
Myanmar, Chua 2012. On Thailand, Hayami 1996; Charles F Keyes 1993; C. A Kammerer 1996; 
Cornelia A. Kammerer 1990. On Vietnam, Ngô 2010; Pearson 2009; Salemink 2009. Keyes 1996, 
Salemink 2003, and Tapp 1989 presents multi-country perspectives. 
105 The estimates are commonly used by international agencies and governments including the United 
States’ annual international religious freedom report. I have not encountered any justification or 
explanation for the estimates, however. 
106 Among these, only Shan and Rakhine are predominantly Theravada Buddhist groups. 
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While this affinity between upland tribal peoples and Protestantism has been clearly 
recognized across Southeast Asia, it has long confounded scholars as a vexing phenomenon. The 
spread of Christianity seems to contradict the well-known qualities of the upland religious 
culture. Scholars of upland Southeast Asia—from Edmund Leach to James Scott—have stressed 
that highlanders have for a long time retained their own local religious culture, fending off the 
cosmopolitan religions from the outside.107 If we consider a defining feature of the upland tribal 
society to be the lack a world religion such as Buddhism and Islam then how do we explain their 
passionate endorsement of Christianity? In this chapter I present an answer to this question by 
pointing to the unique reproductive dynamics of Protestant frontier missions.  
 While previous studies have stressed the roles played by Euro-American missionaries, 
this study will show that the frontier missions to remote mountains have been made possible by 
indigenous peoples themselves. The indigenous peoples imitated evangelical campaigns for 
themselves and became missionaries who in turn evangelized neighboring peoples. It is such 
reproductions that have enabled a chain of missions in multiple directions. In this chapter I trace 
the chain of missions to the Kachin backward to the Atlantic world and analyze how frontier 
missions have been reproduced to cover such a long distance. I highlight two mutually 
reinforcing doctrines of Protestant evangelism that enabled the reproduction: vernacularism and 
universal priesthood.    
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I will critique the still strong 
tendency to attribute the Protestant diffusion in Southeast Asia to the coercive power of 
European colonialism. The second section will present a genealogical study of Protestant frontier 
                                                
107 In “Frontiers of Burma,” Leach stated that “true ‘Hill People’ are never Buddhists” (Leach 1960, 52). 
In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott too noted that “hill people … do not follow the ‘great tradition’ 
salvation religions of lowland peoples Buddhism and Islam in particular)” (Scott 2009, 21). 
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missions—tracing back the development of vernacular evangelism from upland Myanmar to the 
trans-Atlantic world in the early nineteenth century. The historical analysis presented here will 
feature Karen evangelism in particular, as it illustrates the reproduction of mission at a tribal 
frontier very vividly.     
  
1. Protestant Evangelism Beyond European Colonialism  
For a long time, the spreading of Christianity has been so unproblematically attributed to 
the might of European empires that this historical event has rarely been examined from different 
angles. In his 1996 article, “Being Protestant Christians in Southeast Asian Worlds,” Charles 
Keyes, who presented one of the pioneering papers on Protestantism in Southeast Asia, stressed 
the enabling role played by the European colonial rule:  
the colonial governments … created environments in which the authority of the 
missionaries was significantly enhanced. … Colonial governments facilitated the work of 
missionaries among peoples who were considered to be “primitive” or “uncivilized” in 
order to bring those living in remote areas of colonial societies more fully into the 
colonial orders. … The colonial ambience proved especially conducive to Protestant 
missionary activity in those countries in which the colonial rulers came from Protestant 
societies—British Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the American Philippines” salem.108  
 
Indeed, in certain places Christianity grew dramatically under the Protestant colonial rulers. In 
Minahasa in northern Sulawesi, for example, Christianity spread strongly during the colonial era. 
Between 1821, when Dutch missionaries arrived, and 1900, more than 90 percent of the 
Minahasans converted to Christianity (Andaya 2012, 114).  
 In Myanmar too, we can find a remarkable growth of Christianity during the British 
colonial period. According to Paul Ambroise Biganded (1813-1894), there were less than 3,000 
                                                
108 See also (Keyes 1993). 
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Christians at the end of the eighteenth century in Myanmar (Bigandet 1996, 23). A century later, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, the Baptists alone counted more than 40,000 members 
attending their churches in the country (Merriam 1900, 117).   
Upon close scrutiny, however, it is questionable how much credit is due to the might and 
wealth of the European colonial powers. The colonial rulers generally did not support the 
Protestant missions. Portuguese, Spanish, and French certainly supported Catholic missions but 
not Protestant counterparts. The Dutch and British governments, while Protestant at home back 
in Europe, were generally opposed to Christian proselytization in the colonies. It fact it was more 
typical that they even forbade mission activities in the Muslim-dominant areas.109 For example, 
the Dutch colonial authority prohibited mission work in Muslim Java; they even confiscated the 
first Javanese translation of the New Testament, printed in India in 1831 (Hefner 1993, 99).110 
British Colonialism against Christian proselytization  
Because our particular focus is Myanmar, it is necessary to examine close the case of 
British India, of which Myanmar was a part. The colonial rulers from Britain were profoundly 
indifferent, if not hostile, to religious activities. Claudius Buchanan, a chaplain employed by the 
East India Company, lamented that for the 30,000 British soldiers and civil servants in India, 
there were only six military chaplains and three churches (Chancey 1998, 511). In his classic 
study Fashioning of Leviathan: the Beginnings of British Rule in Burma, John Furnivall wrote:  
                                                
109 This was not limited to Southeast Asia. In West Africa too: “It was a deliberate policy by France and 
Britain to exclude Christian missions from strongly Muslim areas” (Sundkler and Steed 2000, 651). See 
also Woodberry 2012, 260.  
110 Keane also notes that the “Dutch missionaries … had little support from the distant centers of 
government and were rarely in a position of much direct coercive power” elsewhere in the Dutch East 
Indies (Keane 2007, 8). 
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Leviathan has no soul. The things of Caesar are the things of this world. As you may see 
in any of the old reports on Material and Moral progress in India, Leviathan is unaware of 
any morality that cannot be measured in pounds sterling … [Leviathan] will grind out 
bread so long as he can go on grinding at a profit” (Furnivall 1991, 87).  
 
The Great British Empire had no soul. It was a profit-seeking machine. It is noteworthy that the 
St. Mary’s church in Fort St. George in Chennai (Madras), the “first Anglican church eat of the 
Suez” was built in 1678 without any official support from the Company. In a recent study of 
Christian missionaries in the 19th century Myanmar, Jorg Schendel summarized the relations 
between the British rulers and the Christian missionaries as follows: “missionary targets and 
British government interests had little in common. Accordingly there was no concerted action, 
rather considerable tension” (J. Schendel 1999, 63).  
Colonial order and evangelical disorder 
The antagonism between the British colonial officers and the (mostly American) 
Christian evangelism took many forms. Some European colonists were opposed to evangelism 
because they thought that Christianity was too good for the natives. The natives’ conversion to 
Christianity disturbed a particular Victorian racial sensibility, which associated the religion with 
the white race. This sentiment is best captured in Burmese Days by George Orwell, who was 
himself a colonial officer in British Burma. Burmese Days presents a microcosm of the British 
colonial world through a description of a small town named Kyauktada in upper Myanmar.111 
The town has the “population [of] about four thousand, including a couple of hundred Indians, a 
few score Chinese and seven Europeans. There were also two Eurasians named Mr Francis and 
Mr Samuel, the sons of an American Baptist missionary and a Roman Catholic missionary 
                                                
111 The fictional town of Kyauktada is based on the real town of Katha, where Orwell himself stayed in 
1926-27 as a member of the Indian Imperial Police. It is worth mentioning that the novel was first 
published in the United States, because it was feared that it might be libelous. 
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respectively.” Of the novel characters, it is the British officer called Ellis who represents the 
crude racist perspective:  
Oh, hell! I’d snivel psalms to oblige the padre, but I can't stick the way these damned 
native Christians come shoving into our church. A pack of Madrassi servants and Karen 
school-teachers. And then those two yellow-bellies, Francis and Samuel--they call 
themselves Christians too. Last time the padre was here they had the nerve to come up 
and sit on the front pews with the white men. Someone ought to speak to the padre about 
that. What bloody fools we were ever to let those missionaries loose in this country! 
Teaching bazaar sweepers they're as good as we are. “Please, sir, me Christian same like 
master." Damned cheek” (Orwell 1950, 26–27).    
For Ellis, Christianity stands for all things that were civilized, and it properly belongs to the 
white people. Therefore, for him, it is inconceivable that a primitive people professes the 
civilized religion of Christianity. In Burmese Days Orwell draws a sharp contrast between this 
racist view of European officers, embodied by Ellis, and the inter-racial practice of evangelists, 
symbolized by the Eurasian children raised by the missionaries.  
There was also another concern, which more directly mattered to the empire’s vital 
material interest. This was the pragmatic concern that the religious conversion within the 
colonies was bad for the empire’s business; it was the fear, well-founded, that the missions 
would cause unrest among the colonized natives and make the work of colonial ruling (and profit 
making) more difficult. When Christian evangelism unsettled British officers’ understanding of 
religious and racial order, it also disturbed many non-Christians who were worried that a foreign 
religion was going to be forcefully imposed upon them. Indeed by the end of the eighteenth 
century, the suspicion would erupt and become a serious political concern to the East India 
Company. The Company was so concerned that they did not even allow William Carey, the first 
foreign missionary from Britain, to stay in British India. When Carey, considered to be the father 
of modern Christian missions today, arrived in India in 1793, he had to stay in Serampore, a 
Danish colony in West Bengal. When Adoniram and Ann Judson arrived in British India in 1812 
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as the first foreign missionaries from the United States, they too were immediately ordered by 
the Company to leave the colony.  
When, in 1806 the Company experienced a disastrous mutiny in the colony, they 
concluded that the resentment against Christian evangelism was the root cause of the violent 
unrest in the colony. This mutiny took place when the Company introduced a new dress code to 
the sepoys in Vellore in the Madras presidency. The new regulation prohibited the Hindus from 
wearing religious marks on their forehead and required Muslims to shave their beard and trim 
their moustache. The purpose of the dress code was presumably instilling a secular sense of 
solidarity among the sepoys of various religious affiliations. But the sepoys themselves 
interpreted the new regulation as a Christianizion project, partly because they identified the new 
uniform (a round hat, in particular) as a Christian dress.112 When the offended sepoys received 
severe corporeal punishment and summarily dismissed from the army, a revolt broke out, killing 
more than half of the 370-member garrison. After this event the British rulers made more efforts 
to restrict mission activities and censor evangelical publication (Chancey 1998, 513).113  
The imperial principle of secularism 
 The tensions between the colonialists and the evangelists were profound. Christian 
evangelists were driven by what they understood as an urgent moral imperative to spread the 
truth and civilization to all humans. The British officers, however, saw the missionaries as a 
threat to the colonial order. They thought that the colony would be ruled best not with any 
                                                
112 One can read the French government’s ban on the hijab in public schools as a contemporary version of 
this effort to impose secularism.  
113 Indeed Carey and his colleagues had already published an evangelical pamphlet in Persian (the 
intellectual language of the Muslim in the subcontinent), titled An Address to Musslemans with an 
Appendix Containing Some Account of Mahomet, about which the East India Company received a 
complaint that it was offensive to Islam (Chancey 1998, 513).  
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particular religion but with the principle of secularism. Only when their interests overlapped, 
usually in the implementation of education and public health projects, did the colonial 
administration support missionaries’ activities.  
Even when the British colonial government assisted an education project carried out by 
the American missionaries, they made it clear that they were not supporting proselytizing 
activities. For example, the Company was financially supporting the American Baptists’ 
education project in lower Myanmar as early as in the 1830s, but it told the missionaries in 
explicit terms that the assistance was not for their religious work. A. D. Maingy the first British 
Commissioner of Tenasserim in lower Myanmar wrote to Sarah B. Judson (Adoniram Judson’s 
second wife), who was running the schools:  
My own government in no way prescribes the teaching of Christianity. The observations 
in my official letter are intended to support what I have before brought to the notice of 
the government, that all are received who present themselves for instruction at your 
schools, without any stipulation as to their becoming members of the Christian faith 
(quoted in Judson 1850, 163). 
 
Promoting Christianity, or for that matter any religion, was not the British colonial officer’s job. 
His job was to consign all the religions to the private sphere and treat them as personal beliefs. 
The idea was, as Keane has put it, “religion should get out of the business of politics and law and 
return to its proper domain, spirituality” (Keane 2007, 104). 
Protestant missionaries as language experts 
 Euro-American colonial powers and Euro-American Christian missionaries nonetheless 
formed a powerful alliance, especially in the times of war. The colonial government valued 
particular missionaries as skilled individuals; the missionaries were often hired as, in today’s 
language, “consultants.” When the government was able to find the expertise with its own 
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resources, collaboration didn’t take place. The missionaries served the military projects, most 
typically as linguistic experts. 
 In Myanmar, the Protestant missionaries distinguished themselves as languages experts 
from the very beginning of the British colonial era. The East India Company’s knowledge of the 
local languages spoken in Myanmar was very limited even when the First Anglo-Burmese War 
broke out in 1824. According to C. A. Bayly’s Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering 
and Social Communication in India 1780-1870, the British empire’s intelligence gathering was 
suffering from severe limitations on the Burmese front: “Overall, the most striking feature of 
these early attempts to gather knowledge was the lack of a serious attempt to come to terms with 
the Burmese language. … As late as August 1825 the Commander-in-Chief of the Burma force 
was writing to Calcutta complaining of a total failure to establish the rudiments of diplomatic 
relations and the extreme inaccuracy of all Burmese translations.” It was only when Judson was 
released from captivity in Ava that the British began to accumulate appropriate language skills 
(Bayly 1996, 118).114 So the question to be raised is: how did Protestant missionaries become 
experts of local vernaculars? We will come back to this question Chapter 6.  
Post-colonial Growth of Protestantism 
 Another reason that we should approach the global diffusion of Christianity in broader 
historical and geographical contexts than those of European colonialism is that the period of 
dramatic Protestant growth is typically found not during but after the period of European 
                                                
114 The case for utilizing Protestant missionaries for an imperial project is still vocally made today. 
Robert Kaplan argues that the U.S. government should make use of the American missionaries active in 
Thailand-Myanmar borderlands. See Kaplan 2008. 
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colonial rule.115 In the above-mentioned region-wide literature review too, Oscar Salemink has 
remarked: “What is … clear from the work … is that Protestant conversion was numerically very 
limited during the colonial era. However, after independence … the conversion efforts were 
much more successful, in the sense, that, numerically, many more people converted to 
Protestantism” (Salemink 2009, 43). This view is supported by numerous ethnographic studies. 
For example, in Becoming Sinners: Christianity and Moral Torment in a Papua New Guinea 
Society, Joel Robbins reports that at his field site (the far western highlands of Papua New 
Guinea) Christianity began to sweep through the region in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. The Urapmin people had first encountered Christianity in the late 1950s and no Western 
missionary had ever lived among them. So, to think that “the intense missionary efforts, backed 
by the compulsions and seductions of the colonial or Western orders the missionaries represent, 
are largely responsible … is a patent nonstarter” (Robbins 2004b, 2). A detailed historical 
account of Christian conversion in Java by Robert Hefner also identifies “a spectacular increase 
in conversions to Christianity” in the post-1965 period.  
Protestant evangelism has outlived the European colonial powers. It is thriving more than 
ever in upland Southeast Asia today. We shall examine the spatial history of Protestantism 
evangelism by tracing back the frontier missions from upland Myanmar to the North Atlantic 
world.    
 
2.  Birth of vernacular evangelism and frontier evangelism  
                                                
115 This is especially the case in South America, where Protestantism has spread since the 1960s, as 
David Martin has shown in Martin 1990. 
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It is well known that a central component of the “protest” lodged against Catholicism in 
the sixteenth century Europe was a demand for a right to read the scripture independently of the 
clerical authority. Protestants contended that the Bible be made accessible not just to the elites 
but to every person, arguing that the reading of the scripture alone could be the foundation of 
one’s faith as a Christian. Arguing that it should not be necessary to learn a special language 
(like Latin) to read the scripture, Protestants vigorously began translating the Bible to 
vernaculars. In 1522, Martin Luther published a vernacular (German) translation of the New 
Testament.116 The widespread circulation of the text resulted in standardizations of the 
vernaculars, which would later contribute to the emergence of ethno-national identities (Dickens 
and Friedrichs 1976, 1976).    
Calvinism in particularly went further in the pursuit of what scholars today call 
“dematerialization,” removing material and visual manifestations such as icons, fetishes, and 
rituals. Keane points out in “Calvin in the Tropics: Objects and Subjects at the Religious Frontier” 
that Calvinists demand that the sincerity of the believe be expressed not in the formulaic rituals 
but in vernacular speech (Keane, 1998). From the Calvinist point of view, reading the scripture 
in one’s vernacular is not just a matter of convenience; it is a matter of necessity. As Max Weber 
noted, “the interaction of the Calvinist with his God took place in a deep spiritual isolation” 
(Weber 2001, 61).  
 The Protestant missions (and the Catholic missions of the Counter Reformation such as 
the Jesuits who had incorporated much of the vernacularist practice in missions) radically 
                                                
116 According to the appendix presented in Sanneh (2009), the complete Bible translations were made 
available in French (1530), English (1535), and Spanish (1553). Against this trend of Reformation, the 
Roman Catholic Church declared the Latin Bible to be the only authentic and official Bible at the Council 
of Trent in 1546. At the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Catholic Church granted permissions 
to conduct most of the Mass in vernacular languages.  
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expanded the scope of Christian evangelism to encompass the entire humanity.117 The 
evangelical scope was widened dramatically when Protestants understood all humans as potential 
Christians. As Talal Asad has elucidated in his historical analysis of the concept of the “human,” 
Protestants did not consider pagans as fundamentally different creatures; rather, they considered 
them as members of the same species who were still incomplete (Asad 2009). 
 We can recognize the difference between the Catholic and Protestant missions more 
clearly if we compare their activities in the early nineteenth century in Myanmar. Paul Ambroise 
Bigandet (1813-1894), a Catholic Bishop who lived Myanmar in the nineteenth century, 
described the religious landscape of pre-colonial Myanmar as follows:  
The Natives believe that religion being essentially a part and portion of nationality, every 
individual has a right to follow without hindrance, or opposition that region of the nation 
he belongs to. Hence the Mussulmen, the Hindoos and the Christians being looked upon 
as foreigners, are left at liberty to practice in the way they like, the observances of their 
respective creeds. They are not expected to abandon them for the Budhist observances, 
because the nationality they belong to, ignored Budhism. … [A Christian is] tolerably 
secure, provided he limits the efforts of his zeal to the preaching of the Christian religion, 
to the members of his congregations (Bigandet 1996, 43).  
  
The court of Myanmar did not find the Catholic communities to be threatening, because their 
activities were contained within their own small and rather isolated communities (Charney 2006, 
150). 
 The Barnabite Fathers, the Catholic order in charge of Myanmar during the pre-colonial 
period “never troubled themselves about the spread of Christianity among the heathen. They 
would not even condescend to learn the language of the natives. They spoke Portuguese, 
                                                
117 The idea of human unity can certainly be traced back to certain passages in the Bible and Thomas 
Aquinas’s treatise, but it was the nineteenth century Protestant missions who, under an influence of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, pursued the implications of this doctrine for modern 
evangelism (Stanley 2001, 10). 
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preached in that language, and made it the distinctive characteristic of Christians” (Bigandet 
1996, 27). The Barnabite Fathers understood their work to serve the existing Catholic 
communities populations. They did not consider it their task to invent orthography for tribal 
languages and translate the Bible and catechisms into them.118 
  A brief reflection on Islam might be useful too. From its beginning, Islam was a highly 
mobile religion, with limited role for clergy and ritual, but it maintained the view that the form 
and content of the scripture were inseparable and that it was generally reluctant to translate the 
Quran into vernaculars. Because the Quran is understood to have been directly revealed from 
God to Muhammad the prophet. Writing in 1875, Edward Blyden observed: “Among 
Mohammedans, written or printed translations of the Koran are discouraged. The Chinese, 
Hindoos, Persians, Turks, Mandingoes, Foulahs, etc., who have embraced Islam, speak in their 
‘own tongues’ wherein they were born’ but read the Koran in Arabic (Blyden 1967, 6–7)). The 
Quran in Arabic was understood to unify the humans, among whom there were too many 
different languages. In Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State 
Development in Indonesia, Lorraine Aragon introduces an episode from her fieldwork in 
Sulawasi that children at local school there were told that “Islam was superior to Christianity 
because Muslims hold their services in ‘God’s language’ … while Christians use only human 
language” (Aragon 2000, 240). While print press was endorsed by Protestants, “for various 
reasons … print technology was relatively slow to be received among their Muslim neighbors 
(Feener 2011, 45).  
                                                
118 This point is particularly well illustrated by the fact that despite the long and influential presence of 
the Jesuits in China from the sixteenth century, it was Protestant missionaries who began the translation 
and printing of the Bible in the early nineteenth century. On the publication and circulation of the Chinese 
language Bible in the nineteenth century, see DeBernardi 2011. Sanneh, however, stresses the continuity 
between Catholicism and Protestantism in terms of the Bible translations (Sanneh 1989). 
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 While Islam is hardly separable from the Arabic language and culture, Protestantism has 
sought to separate the content of the scripture from its particular languages that merely convey 
the “message.” See discussion in (Sanneh 1989, 266). In Islam Translated: Literature, 
Conversion, and the Arabic Cosmopolis of South and Southeast Asia, Ronit Ricci reminds us that 
many important Islamic texts were indeed translated from Arabic to various language like 
Javanese, Malay, and Tamil between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries and that they created a 
sort of Islamic multi-lingual “cosmopolitan” world (Ricci 2011)). While this is an important 
reminder of the breadth of religiously inspired literature, the point remains that Protestant 
vernaculaism presents uniquely theological argument for the translation of the scripture itself. 
Steedly’s study from Indonesia presents a revealing quote from a Christian missionary, who 
found himself competing with Islam: “The stronger we make the people’s language, the smaller 
is the chance for Islam” (Steedly 1996, 457).   
2.1 Evangelism at a tribal frontier in North America 
 With the vernacularist turn, translation and printing became a defining work of Protestant 
evangelism. After the Bible was translated into a series of European vernaculars, Protestants 
found new frontiers of vernacular evangelism in North America, where they encountered 
numerous tribal peoples. Here the new challenge to the evangelists was to devise orthographies 
for the unfamiliar languages. Since the whole point of devising orthography was that it would 
allow translation and printing, a press was also an essential component of the mission at tribal 
frontiers.  
 Already in the early half of the seventeenth century, Protestant evangelists were working 
out orthographies indigenous languages spoken in New England. In 1655, an “Indian College,” 
equipped with a press, was established at Harvard College. In 1663, an English Puritan 
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clergyman and pastor named John Eliot (c. 1604-1690) translated the Bible into the Massachusett 
language (also often called the Wampanoag language). This Bible was printed at the Harvard 
Indian College. It was indeed the first Bible to be printed in North America. Cotton Mather 
(1663-1728), an influential Puritan minister rejoiced upon the printing of the translation: “Behold, 
ye Americans, the greatest honor that ever you were partakers of. The Bible was printed here at 
our Cambridge, and is the only Bible that ever was printed in all America” (Brumberg 1980, 31). 
Between 1655 and 1672, the Harvard Indian College produced books and pamphlets, along with 
primers, catechisms, grammars, and tracts in the Massachusett language.119 Eliot came to be 
known as the “Apostle to the Indians” (Cogley 1999; Salisbury 1974).  
 A century later, David Brainerd (1718-1747), who worked among Native Americans of 
New Jersey and Delaware, became another legendary missionary. He wrote: “All my desire was 
the conversion of the heathen.” His biography was written by Jonathan Edwards, considered as 
the greatest theological thinker of early America, in 1749.120 According to Brumberg’s study of 
the 19th-century American evangelical culture, figures like Eliot and Brainerd were “part of the 
Christian lore passed from parents to children” by the end of the eighteenth century (Brumberg 
1980, 25). And the frontier evangelism in the New World reverberated back across the Atlantic. 
For example, Edwards commanded a large audience in England and Scotland. William Carey, 
the first missionary from England to go abroad (India), acknowledged the special inspiration he 
                                                
119 The funding came from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel Among the Indian. See Cogley 
1999. The Wampanoag lost 40 percent of the population in the war against the English colonialists, King 
Philip’s War (1675-1676); most of the male survivors were sold into slavery in the West Indies; many 
women and children were enslaved in New England. See (Lepore 1998). 
120 Jonathan Edwards published Account of the Life of the Late Rev. David Brainerd in 1749. The 
author’s sister Jerusha Edwards herself nursed Brainerd as the young man was dying in his early thirties, 
and Jerusha too died soon after him. Jonathan Edwards himself was a missionary to the Housatonic 
Native Americans in his later years before he was elected president of the college of New Jersey (later 
Princeton University).  
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drew from the missionaries at work in tribal frontiers in North America like Eliot and Brainerd 
(Phillips 1969, 13). Brainerd in particular inspired a generation of missionaries. George 
Boardman (1801-1831), the pionneer missionary to the Karen land, carried a bible and 
Brainerd’s memoirs (Hutchison 1987, 63-64).   
Around the turn of the century, we see remarkable growth of frontier evangelism on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In 1792, Carey published An Enquiry into the Obligations of Christians to 
use Means for the Conversion of the Heathens, a manifesto for global frontier evangelism. This 
publication quickly led to the formation of the Baptist Missionary Society in the same year, 
which was originally called “the Particular Baptist Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
Amongst the Heathen.” Carey moved to Calcutta in the following year. Similar missionary 
organizations were rapidly formed in Britain.121 In the United States, the first missionary 
organization, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, was established in 
1810.122 In 1816, this organization opened a seminary called the Foreign Mission School “for 
the purpose of educating youths of Heathen nations, with a view to their being useful in their 
respective countries” (Foreman 1929, 242). This is, as far as I know, was the first institutional 
effort to train “heathens” as future missionaries.  
The project was especially inspired by a native Hawaiian named Henry Opukahaia (circa 
1792–1818), one of the first Hawaiians to convert to Christianity. Opukahaia himself worked to 
device orthography for the Hawaiian language, and even translated parts of the Bible. When, 
                                                
121 The London Missionary Society was established in 1775 by Anglicans and Nonconformists. In 1799 
the Church of England followed with the establishment of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and 
the East. 
122 It was supported by the Congregationalist and Presbyterian Churches. Adniram Judson and Ann 
Hasseltime were their first missionaries sent abroad, but they became Baptists once they arrived in India. 
The American Baptist Missionary Union was formed in 1814, after the Judsons had arrived in Burma. On 
the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the definitive study remains Phillips 1969. 
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shortly after his death, his memoir was published, it became the best-known title among the 
rapidly growing literature about “converted heathens.” Adniram Judson was personally 
acquainted with Opukahaia at the Andover seminary (Brumberg 1980, 33–36).  
 By the early nineteenth century the Protestants in the North Atlantic had developed an 
evangelical geography of multiple frontiers around the world. The above-mentioned Foreign 
Mission School in Connecticut included not only Native Americans from North America and the 
Hawaii but also a number of Asians—South Asians, Chinese and Malays.123 Some of the 
American missionaries who went to Myanmar in the early nineteenth century first worked 
among Native Americans before embarking on a mission in Asia. For example, the second single 
female missionary to Myanmar, Eleanor Macomber, first worked among the Ojibway in 
Michigan for five years before leaving for Myanmar in 1835 (Eddy 1859, 133–162).124 As 
William Womack has pointed out, “there was a clear association in the minds of the Baptist 
missionaries between Karens and Native Americans as indigenous peoples” (Womack 2005, 99). 
2.2.  Evangelical vernacular frontiers in Asia 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, Asia appealed to the Christian evangelists in the 
North Atlantic as a particularly arresting mission frontier. In 1809, Claudius Buchanan, the 
                                                
123 When the school opened “there were twelve students; seven Hawaiians, one Hindu, one Bengalese, an 
Indian and two Anglo-Americans. The school had increased its number of pupils the second year to 
twenty-four; four Cherokee, two Choctaw, one Abenaki, two Chinese, two Malays, a Bengalese, one 
Hindu, six Hawaiians, and two Marquesans as well as three American” (Foreman 1929, 242). But he 
school was disbanded in 1827 because of two interracial marriages (involving two Cherokee male 
students and two white female) (Foreman 1929, 258). It appears that the evangelical vision of the united 
human race was not able to overcome the contradictory racial cosmology of the era, but I am not able to 
find details of this case. I thank Will Womack for sharing his draft paper.  
124 When, in 1830, President Andrew Jackson pushed the Indian Removal Act, despite the opposition of 
many missionaries, evangelism to Native Americans became extremely difficult. It is possible that many 
evangelists changed the mission fields from North America to overseas. A particularly detailed study of 
missionary responses to Indian Removal can be found in (MacLoughlin 1984). 
  
 175 
Scottish champlain attached to the British East India Company, published the sermon “The Star 
in the East.” Buchanan declared that “the time is come for disseminating the knowledge of 
Christianity in the heathen world,” and he specifically identified as a specific priority “the 
translation of the Bible into almost all the languages of Asia” (Buchanan 1811, 26). In 1806, an 
interdenominational letter was circulated among the American churches, calling for support for 
William Carey’s translation of the Bible into South Asian languages (Brumberg 1980, 32).125 
Adniram and Ann Judson became the first missionaries from the United States to be sent from an 
organization dedicated to foreign mission. In 1813, they arrived in Myanmar, a country not yet 
ruled by a European power.  
 The evangelism in heathen frontiers was propelled was propelled by a strong sense of 
eschatological urgency but it also became a unifying cause. The imaginary of frontier provided 
the otherwise discordant Protestants in the United States with a common purpose. In the same 
year (1813), the Baptist delegates from eleven different states met in Philadelphia to discuss the 
formation of an organization dedicated to the foreign mission. This was the first time that these 
Baptists from various states gathered and met in person (Merriam 1900, 13). Prior to the 
formation of the foreign missions, the Baptists were “scattered . . . and also divided. The Baptist 
churches of different sections of the country had little communication with each other” (Merriam 
1900, 6).   
 “Evangelization,” as historian Joan Brumberg put it, “depended not only on the preaching 
of the Gospel, but on the dissemination of it in printed form. Mindful of this evangelical axiom, 
missionaries [took] an active role in developing, for every heathen nation, a Christian literature, 
                                                
125 The circulation of this request was facilitated by the orthodox Calvanist journal The Panoplist and by 
The Connecticut Evangelical Magazine. 
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in the vernacular, with the Bible at its heart” (Brumberg 1980, 65). Myanmar was the first real 
testing ground for the modern vernacular evangelism. As soon as Adoniram and Ann Judson, the 
first evangelists sent from an American mission society, arrived in Myanmar in 1813, they 
devoted themselves to learning the Burmese language. In 1815, while he was still learning the 
language, the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions appointed the printer George H. Hough and his 
wife to equip the Myanmar mission with a press.126 The missionary and the printer signed an 
agreement together in 1816: “We agree … that our sole objet on earth is to introduce the religion 
of Jesus Christ into the Empire of Burmah; and that the means by which we hope to affect this 
are translating, printing, and distributing the Holy Scriptures; preaching the Gospel; circulating 
religious tracts, an promoting the instruction of native children” (Brumberg 1980, 65).  
In 1817, Judson published the first portion of his translation (500 copies of the Gospel of 
Matthew).127 This was the first time that the Burmese language was printed by press. The 
printing work by the Baptist missionaries was not limited to the one language. They printed in a 
number of languages they encountered in lower Myanmar. Since they worked along the 
Andaman coast, these included not only Mon and Karen but also Thai. The first printing press in 
Thai in took place in Moulmein in 1819 (Limapichart 2008, 27).128  
                                                
126 Two thousand dollars was appropriated to set up the press and another thousand for printing. 
127 In the same year, Judson also wrote the Grammatical Notices of the Burman Language, 3,000 copies 
of catechism in Burmese written by Ann Judson were also printed. These news delighted the 
Massachusetts Baptists, who wrote: “the PRESS, that powerful engine employed by Providence in the 
propagation of the truth, has been put in motion in this land of darkness. We confidently hope that these 
first fruits of the mission … will be succeeded by a rich harvest of immortal soul” (Brumberg 1980, 66). 
When, later in his life, Judson gave an address before the American and Foreign Bible Society, he 
reiterated that for “all missionary operations to be permanently successful [they] must be based on the 
written word” (Brumberg 1980, 65). 




 News from the heathen frontiers were avidly consumed back home through the 
circulation of evangelical texts. The American Baptist Magazine, originally established in 1803 
by the Massachusetts Baptists Missionary Society,129 became a monthly publication in 1825 
when Adniram Judson was imprisoned in Myanmar (Brumberg 1980, 257).130 The reports 
updating the plight of the American missionary hero captured in the land of an oriental despot 
became a most sensational news story of the time. By the mid-1830’s the development of 
Christian denominational newspapers to disseminate news, like Judson’s story, was “a 
distinguishing characteristic of the evangelical community, North and South, and on the frontier” 
(Brumberg 1980, 88). The 19th century westward expansion of the United States was taking 
place as the these stories were arriving from mission frontiers around the world.  
 Protestant evangelism was a main driver in the mass literacy campaign and and the 
development of popular media in antebellum America. The Sunday school movement began 
about 1820 and it was an important arm of the larger effort to educate and Christianize the 
country (Brumberg 1980, 93). In the first half of the nineteenth century, especially during its 
second quarter, the circulations of newspapers and other periodicals increased dramatically.131 
Each of the major publishers then was associated with a specific Christian denomination.132 It 
was also in this period that Protestant evangelism drove higher education in America, as each 
                                                
129 At the time of the foundation, it was called “The Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Magazine.” The 
name changed to “The American Baptist Magazine” in 1817. 
130 Judson was imprisoned for seventeen months during the war between Britain and Myanmar. 
131 Between 1825 and 1850, the number of American periodicals and the total production of books 
increased by 500 percent (Brumberg 1980, 88). 
132 For instance, Harpers was associated with the Methodists, Appleton with the Episcopalians, Moroe 
and Frances with the Unitarians (Brumberg 1980, 260). 
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denomination built a number of colleges and universities in New England, New York and 
Ohio.133 
2.3. Mission to Myanmar’s tribal frontiers 
Of all the languages that the Protestant missionaries printed in Myanmar during the early 
nineteenth century, it was Sgaw Karen, a tribal language, which made the most transformative 
impacts among its speech communities. When the Protestant missionaries arrived in Myanmar, 
the Karen tribal people showed exceptionally enthusiastic responses, while the lowland 
Buddhists—the Burmans and the Mons—showed little interest. Judson, who made persistent 
efforts among the Burmese people, said that converting one hundred Karens was easier than 
converting two Burmans (Maung Shwe Wa 1963, 133). The varied responses led the 
missionaries to alter the focus towards tribal peoples. The American missionaries were delighted 
to hear about the Karen prophetic myth that their “white brother” would one day bring back their 
“lost book.” They considered the Karens to be a lost tribe from Israel.134     
 The American missionaries came up with orthographies for the Sgaw Karen language 
and produced catechisms and Bible translations. It is doubtful that the content of the scripture 
immediately appealed to the Karen peoples. Regardless, Protestant missions certainly gained a 
distinguished status among the tribal people because of its unique ability of vernacular print 
                                                
133 Congregationalists built Amherst, Middlebury, Western Reserve, Oberlin and Marietta. Presbyterians 
established Union, Hamilton, New York University, University of Buffalo, Elmira and Muskingum. 
Baptists founded Colby, Colgate, University of Rochester, Alfred, Vassar and Denison. The Methodists 
organized Wesleyan, Baldwin-Wallace and Ohio Wesleyan. Episcopalians made Trinity, Hobart and 
Kenyon. Fordham University was the only Catholic institution in New England and New York prior to 
1850. See (Tewksbury 1965). 
134 This theory was first proposed by Francis Mason (1799-1874) in 1833. Mason was an English-born 
missionary from Massachusetts. He arrived in Myanmar in 1830. On this Ikeda presents a detailed 
discussion in (Ikeda 2012). For a historical study of the “ten lost tribes of Israel” with a global scope, see 
(Benite 2009).  
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press. Shawy Bau, a Karen Baptist pastor in Bassein District recollected his own initial contact 
with printed tracts as follows:   
The first we heard about the new religion was, that Shway Weing had begun to worship 
God. Then we heard that he had a little book that told about God and the way to worship 
him; and straightway we had so strong a desire to see the book, that we could hardly stay 
at home; and we were talking about it, and wishing to see it, all the time. By and by we 
got a book and one looked at it, and another looked at it, and said it was very nice, and 
then we looked at it again, one after another, and then we held it up between our hands, 
and worshipped it, and said to the book, ‘O Lord! O Lord!’ for we thought God was in 
the book (Carpenter 1883, 30).135  
 
William Womack’s detailed historical study shows that when and where printed materials of any 
kind were rarely available it was not uncommon that a book became an object of worship 
(Womack 2005). While they practically enjoyed a monopoly of printing technology in Myanmar 
during the early nineteenth century, American Baptist missionaries gained unique prestige by 
simply being able to print a massive amount of materials in various languages.   
2.4. The role of lowland Karen 
By the mid 1830s, the Karen became a clear majority of the converts in Myanmar. In 
1836, nearly two thirds of the new converts recorded in the country were Karen. Although the 
Karen are often associated with the mountainous region along the Thailand-Myanmar borderland 
today, the reports from the American Baptist missions clearly show that the centers of Karen 
missions were in the coastal regions from today’s Rakhine State in western Myanmar to Dawei 
(Tavoy) in southeastern Myanmar. There were—and still are—many Karen settlements in the 
lowlands in these coastal regions including the Irrawaddy Delta. It was these lowland Karen 
settlers that first welcomed and replicated the missions. 
                                                
135 Womack 2005 presents other similar incidents in his dissertation on Karen history. Comparable 




Table 1. Number of baptisms prior to 1835 (based on Maung Shwe Wa 1963: 128-129) 
Location  
(mission stations) Karen 
Burman & 
Mon Foreigners Total 
Moulemein  118 104 181 403 
Dawei (Tavoy) 253 13 8 274 
Yangon (Rangoon) 35 55 2 92 
Ava 0 12 0 12 
Other 0 4 0 4 
Total 406 188 191 785 
 
Table 2. Number of baptisms in 1936 (based on Maung Shwe Wa 1963: 128-129) 
Location  
(mission stations) Karen 
Burman & 
Mon Foreigners Total 
Moulemein  29 9 16 54 
Dawei (Tavoy) 88 3 0 91 
Yangon (Rangoon) 206  0 206 
Ava 0 7 0 7 
Other 323 19 16 358 
Total 729 207 207 1143 
  
 The history of the Karen Baptist Convention illustrates how the church communities first 
spread in across the coastal and delta regions in lower Myanmar. The Karen Theological School 
was first founded in Moulmein on the Andaman coast. Of the students there about one-third 
came from Moulmein, and the rest came from Yangon coastal town of Dawei that Karen-
language materials were printed for the first time. Of the very long stretch of Karen communities 
scattered from the Bay of Bengal to the Andaman Coast across the Irrawaddy Delta, Thandwe 
(Sandoway) in today’s Rhakine State and Pathein (Bassein) in the Irrawaddy Dela would become 
the epi-center of the Karen evangelism; countless missions to various frontiers across Myanmar 
were dispatched from these coastal bases. As the missions shifted the focus from the Burmans to 
the Karen, the Baptists built field stations around the Delta (Yangon and Pathein) and also in the 
interior (Toungoo, Shwegyin, Henzada, Maubin, and Loikaw). 
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A man called Ko Tha Byu (circa 1778–1850) has come to represent the success of the 
Karen vernacular frontier evangelism. He was a “heathen convert,” who became a tireless and 
effective missionary. In 1827, Ko Tha Byu happened to be hired as a household servant by the 
Judsons. He began to receive religious teaching and within a year he was sent to assist an 
American missionary (George Boardman) at the new mission station in Dawei. He was baptized 
there and he quickly established himself as a passionate and effective evangelist, tirelessly 
making trips to mission frontiers. He is said to have converted 1270 people.136 American 
Baptists called him “the Karen apostle.” The evangelical narrative of this man—the 
transformation of a criminal slave to an exemplary missionary—quickly became a legend 
(Mason 1843).  
The missions produced an enormous amount of vernacular printing in Sgaw Karen. In 
1842, they began printing a Karen-language monthly, called The Morning Star (Has Tu Hgaw in 
Karen) (Womack 2005, 121–122). By 1850, the Baptists made a sort of Karen encyclopaedia, 
titled: Thesaurus of Karen Knowledge Comprising Traditions, Legends or Fables, Poetry, 
Customs, Superstitutions, Demonology, Therapeutics, etc., Alphabetically arranged to form a 
Complete Native Karen (Sgaw) Language Dictionary with definitions, examples or illustrations 
of usage of every word (Womack 2005, 5).    
 The missionaries did not immediately endorse ethno-linguistic diversity. Archival records 
often suggest that on the contrary the evangelists—both American and Karen—initially imagined 
that the Karen was a large ethno-linguistic category to which a wide variety of tribal groups 
across Myanmar belonged as smaller groups. At this stage, there was no clear demographic, 
                                                
136 This number is commonly cited in the grey literature including the Wikipedia entry on Ko Tha Byu. I 
have not been able to find a source in printed literature. 
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linguistic, or geographical information about the Karen. Although their mission was called the 
“Karen Home Mission,” no one knew where the Karen “home” country ended and where a 
“foreign” country began. Given the intricate mosaic of ethno-linguistic diversity, Karen 
missionaries encountered various non-Karen peoples from the very beginning. But the boundary 
between Karen and non-Karen remained ambiguous. In the beginning of the vernacularization 
process, it was difficult to differentiate one vernacular from another vernacular, and it took both 
the American and Karen frontier missionaries many decades to appreciate the exceptional 
linguistic diversity across the hill regions of Myanmar.137  
For instance, when the American missionary Eugenia Kincaid encountered the Kachin 
people in 1837 around Bhamo—near China—and observed that “in the distant highlands are 
multitudes of Kakhyens [Kachins]” he presumed that they were actually a sub-group of the 
Karen (quoted in Tegenfeldt 1974, 82). Upon this “discovery” of what was supposedly a Karen 
sub-group, a Karen mission team was dispatched to this northern region as part of the “home 
mission.” It turned out to be a fruitful confusion for the evangelists, for evidently it excited the 
Karens to take up the mission enthusiastically. In 1859 the first Karen volunteers went up to 
Bhamo with Kincaid (Tegenfeldt 1974, 82).138 Although they realized that the northern 
highlanders were not a Karen people, their enthusiasm did not wane. From 1876 on, the Karen 
sent a series of missionaries to the Kachin region. The first missionaries to stay among the 
Kachin and learned Kachin languages were Karen missionaries.  
                                                
137 See Appendix 1 for the list of languages spoken in Myanmar to which the Christian Bible has been 
translated so far. It should be noted that many Karen (Kayin) and Chin Christians use the Myanmar 
language Bible. 
138 I have not been able to identify the names of the two Karen missionaries. 
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A similar pattern of Karen inter-ethnic evangelism can be observed in their mission to 
Kengtung in eastern Shan region, in which a series of Karen evangelists encountered Lahu 
people. Telford, an American Baptist missionary, reported in 1927:  
For years the Karen churches of Bassein have sent evangelists and pastors to the Lahus, 
for whose financial support the Karen churches have assumed entire responsibility. The 
services over a period of years by such men as Po Tun, Ba Te, Chit Swe and numerous 
others, live as a fragrant memory in the hearts of the Lahus. (quoted in U Zan and 
Sowards 1963, 318).139 
 
Ba Te was one of very few Karen missionaries who wrote in English about his ethnographic 
observations. In 1905 he wrote about “a connecting link between the Karen and Muhso [Lahu] 
traditions.” He analyzed a popular Lahu myth according to which the Lahu once had a sister, 
who separated and departed southward. Ba Te was convinced that the Lahu’s lost sister was 
certainly the Karen people. The Karen missionary-cum-ethnologist concluded: “As regards the 
common origin of the Karens and Lahus in the distant past, there seems to be very little room for 
doubt.” He wrote: “So far as my observations of their [the Lahu’s] manners, habits and character 
is concerned, I can only say how many times I said in my heart, ‘They are Karens,’ while 
watching them talk, laugh, work and play” (Ba Te 1905).140 It appears that in the early days, the 
missions benefitted from such ambiguity of ethnic boundaries. But over time, ethno-linguistic 
boundaries were more sharply drawn as the missionaries came up with orthographies, and 
printed vernaculars—with the resultant visualization of the differences.141  
                                                
139 The linguistic accomplishment of Ba Te, who was in fact a practicing lawyer, was acknowledged by 
the British colonial researcher W. W. Cochrane in his book The Shans (Cochrane 1915, 115). 
140 I am grateful to Tatsuki Kataoka for a copy of this hard-to-find 1905 article. This article is also 
mentioned in an intriguing paper by Walker 2008: 223. 
141 The first printing of Kachin (Jinghpaw) language was in 1895, and that of the Lahu was 1924. 
(Bradley and Bradley 1999) presents a detailed account on the standardization on Lisu and Lahu.  
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Like the American missionaries, the pioneering Karen evangelists were also noted for 
their linguistic skills. Of the Karen missionaries on the above list, Ba Thaw, who worked among 
the Lisu, is particularly well-known for his linguistic contributions. Arriving in Myitkyina (in 
today’s Kachin State) in 1911, he worked primarily with lowland Lisu communities in Manhkrin 
(near Myitkyina). Based there he made extensive evangelical campaigns among the Lisu people, 
who were scattered in northern Myanmar and Southwestern Yunnan. He worked with J. O. 
Fraser of the China Inland Mission to work out a Lisu orthography. And he himself translated a 
gospel and catechism to Lisu. Until he died in Myitkyina in 1967, this Karen evangelist never 
left his mission field. Today, Lisu Baptists are evangelizing among a Naga people near the India 
border. Figures like Ko Tha Byu, Ba Te, and Ba Thaw illustrate the uniquely centrifugal 
dynamics of Protestant vernacular evangelism. These lowland Karen Baptists in the coastal 
regions played a catalytic role in carrying out pioneering evangelical campaigns to upland 
regions.  
The first Kachin (Jinghpaw) language periodical, Jinghpaw Shi Laika, was published in 
1914 by the American Baptist Mission. The monthly magazine included world news and church 
news. The Baptist missionaries also introduced textbooks for learning Jinghpaw: Kachin Readers 
for the first four years of primary education. They also published a book on hygiene, upon the 
British government’s request. In 1918 they printed at least two school textbooks in Jinghpaw for 
mission schools: Geography of Burma and Elementary Arithmatic. After the Second World War, 
there were more publications in the Jinghpaw vernacular than ever. The vast majority of them 
were Christian literature, including A History of the Christian Church, The Sermon on the Mount, 
and Satan, as well as biographical sketches of missionaries and Kachin leaders, and studies of 
Kachin traditional history and customs. In 1956, Catholic churches in Kachin started Jinghpaw 
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language publication with Jinghpaw Kasa (Kachin Messenger), a monthly magazine (Tegenfeldt 
1974, 272). In the following year (1957), the Kachin Baptist Convention established its own 
publication house, the Hanson Memorial Press, and resumed the publication of the monthly 
magazine Jinghpaw Shi Laika, the monthly publication, which had been suspended for the 
Second World War (Tegenfeldt 1974, 225). The Kachin literature publications continue to be 
dominated by the Protestant publications.  
 
Conclusion  
In the age of print press and mass literacy, Protestantism reformulated Christianity—and 
indeed introduced a new translocal religion—by arguing that all languages were created equal 
and that translation from one language to another was entirely possible without distorting the 
content. Rejecting the idea of “God’s language,” Protestants began translating the Bible into 
vernaculars. They created a translingual, transcultural, and translocal religion. With this move, 
countless mission frontiers opened up in the imagined geography of Protestant evangelism. As 
Benedict Anderson has remarked, “[during] the colossal religious propaganda war that raged 
across Europe for the next [i.e. seventeenth] century … Protestantism was always fundamentally 
on the offensive, precisely because it knew how to make use of the expanding vernacular print-
market” (B. R. O. Anderson 2006, 40). Protestantism continued to be on the offensive over all 
other religions when the “propaganda war” reached the global scale in the nineteenth century, 
because outside the European world the advantages of vernacularism proved to be even greater. 
Protestant vernacular missions—and the Catholic missions that imitated their evangelical 
method—spread strongly in a-literate societies. Protestant vernacularism effectively elevated the 
status of tribal languages vis-a-vis the already established vernaculars (such as, in the context of 
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mainland Southeast Asia, Burmese, Thai, Khmer, and Chinese). The emergence of the scripture 
in a vernacular translation impressed many people not necessarily through its content but its form. 
The facts that there was a book in “our” language and that there are numerous copies of it were 
for many often a reason good enough for joining the new religion. Initially the books themselves 
became objects of worship as fetishes, but over time becoming Christianity came to represent 
what a scholar has called “multiple conversion: of pagan to Christian, of speech to writing, and 
of the alien to the comprehensible” (Errington 2001, 21).  
News about heathen converts from tribal frontiers, such as a Karen region in lower 
Myanmar, played a crucial role in the formation of Protestant publics back in the trans-Atlantic 
world. The vernacular missions were driven by the ethnographic imaginary of a tribal heathen as 
a people-to-be-converted (as the representation of the Karen as a lost tribe of Israel illustrates) 
and the imaginative geography of a frontier as a place-to-be-converted. The “heathen convert” 




Chapter 7. Divine comedy of Kachin frontiers 
 
Introduction 
In this final chapter, we shift the focus to the late twentieth century and examine how the 
Kachin people themselves have been creating their own frontiers and how they narrate their own 
frontier comedy.  
The Kachin people are always portrayed as the victim of a great frontier tragedy. 
Countless reports—by NGOs, academics, and reporters—have described them as victims of 
human rights abuses, religious prosecutions, agribusiness enterprises, and extractive industries. 
When I visited Kachin communities, I heard these stories by the Kachin people themselves. 
Usually I was introduced to a person who had the experience of handling inquisitive foreigners, 
and I would be given stories of how the Kachin people were suffering because of the brutal 
Myanmar government, the selfish Chinese businessmen, and so on. The overseas Kachin 
communities such as those in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo, where many Kachins were officially in 
the process of obtaining a refugee status, have well-experienced representative persons, who can 
handle inquisitive foreign visitors well.   
There have been thousands of news articles and news reports about the Kachin people 
and their tragedies. As I introduce Kachin comedies, I do not dispute these tragic stories. The 
plight of the Kachin has been indisputably tragic. In this chapter, however, I call for attention to 
the simple fact that the Kachin people do not usually tell these tragedies among themselves. 
Among them it goes without saying that they suffer from various misfortunes. Precisely because 
this tragedy is so well understood, they actively generate and share comic narratives—hopeful 




Kachin Frontier Evangelism 
As I mentioned, one thing immediately striking about Kachin Christianity is its vigorous 
associational activities. Protestantism introduced new ways of making associations to the Kachin, 
who have implemented and refined the methods. We shall first examine how Kachins have 
conducted frontier mission and built new grassroots networks across the Kachin region.   
Kachin evangelical associations 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the first Christian missions to the Kachin region 
were carried out by Karen Baptists based in the Irrawaddy Delta in the 1870s. Gradually, the 
Baptists established mission bases in lowland towns in the Kachin region such as Bhamo and 
Myitkyina, and the ownership of the missions was gradually transferred from the visiting Karen 
missionaries to the native converts. By 1910 there were evangelical campaigns based in the 
Kachin region itself. The first team consisted of ten Karen and Kachin male preachers based in 
Myitkyina. The team was divided to five pairs, all of whom were sent to remote areas, visiting 
more than one hundred villages (Tegenfeldt 1974, 148). The first All-Kachin Annual Meeting 
took place in 1910 in Bhamo, and the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) was born out of the 
meeting. The evangelical campaign program was soon officially adopted by the Myitkyina 
District Baptist Association, which was formed in 1913. In the following year, 1914, the Kachin 
Baptist Mission Society was established (Tegenfeldt 1974, 151).  
Protestant missionaries were particularly skilled at putting together large public 
gatherings.142 Tegenfeldt himself reported that “big meetings” were very effective to attract non-
Christians (Tegenfeldt 1974, 152). In 1923, the tri-annual meeting of the Kachin Baptist 
Convention took place in Namkham. There were 2,143 attendants. The four-day Golden Jubilee 
                                                
142 And they were also very good at counting and recording numbers and using statistics. On the use of 
statistics in Christian evangelism, see Spyer 1996. 
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(for the 50th anniversary of the first Christian mission to Kachin) event in Bhamo in 1927 
claimed 6,890 attendants. The Jinghpaw language report, Jinghpaw Jubeli Laika, proudly 
reported that it proved to be the largest Christian assembly ever held in Burma and that the event 
was practically all managed by Kachin members (Tegenfeldt 1974, 170–171).  
While missionaries and campaigners traveled far and wide to remote corners in the 
mountains, rural villagers too made long trips to towns in order to attend events. The churches 
even the highlanders’ journeys beyond the Kachin region to lowland centers in the Burmese 
world as well. In 1920, the Burma Baptist Convention was held in Mandalay and more than two 
hundred Kachins attended (Tegenfeldt 1974, 159). It was probably the first time that hundreds of 
Kachin men and women voluntarily traveled together to Mandalay as a group, proudly 
presenting themselves as “Kachin” to a large non-Kachin crowd.  
The new sociality of Christian fellowship appealed especially to women who had enjoyed 
fewer opportunities to travel far and socialize publicly beyond the kinship-based network.143 The 
Christian assemblies had a large number of female attendants from the very early stage of 
Kachin Christianity. Women organized and led their own meetings, which were held separately. 
An American missionary, who lived for many years in Myitkyina, described a scene and 
recorded a conversation between two women as follows:  
When the Kachins had their Jubilee in 1927 the women had a great meeting. There were 
about one thousand women at this meeting. A Kachin woman presided While the meeting 
was in session and they were discussing their problems, two women sitting together 
suddenly grasped each other’s hand and said … “Isn’t this wonderful? Why we are 
sisters! I don’t know who you are and you don’t who I am, but it doesn’t make any 
difference. We are still like sisters. We never could have done this if we had not been 
Christians” (Tegenfeldt 1974, 172).  
                                                
143 For an exceptionally insightful and sensitive study of female mobility and upland Christian network in 
northern Thailand, see Hayami 2007. 
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Although this is a self-applauding statement written by an American missionary, it contains a 
degree of truth. Christian congregations facilitated the encounters between strangers who did not 
have any kinship or place-based connections.144 This seems to explain why, from the beginning, 
woman dominated the congregations, and they continue to do so even today.145  
Church as a national space 
Although evangelism was active in certain areas in the Kachin region, it was during the 
insurgency period (1961-1994) that it became a truly nation-wide and nation-defining activity 
among the Kachin. Ethnic insurgency broke out as soon as the post-colonial, independent state of 
Myanmar was born. The new Myanmar state declared independence from the British in 1948, 
and the Karen rebellion quickly followed in 1949, and they almost took over Yangon the capital 
of the fledging Myanmar state. Numerous other groups formed their own armies. The Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) and its civilian arm, Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) were 
formed in 1961. 
The Kachin insurgency broke out first in Lashio, in northern Shan State, and it spread 
like fire across the Kachin region. The new Kachin “revolution” (shanglawt in Jinghpaw) 
attracted youths in particular: teenage boys slipped away from home or ran away from school in 
order to meet organizers in the jungle, and moved on to training grounds. The Kachin rebel 
forces quickly assumed control over much of the Kachin region within a few years (Lintner 1997, 
131; Tegenfeldt 1974, 72). 
Over time, the Kachin insurgency government established four separate regions in 
northern Myanmar: three in Kachin State, and one in northern Shan State. In these areas, the 
                                                
144 In his exposition of the modern public sphere, Michael Warner identifies this gathering of “strangers” 
as a central component (Warner 2002)  
145 I have attended Christian services in various locations (both Protestants and Catholic), and on average 
80% of the attendants are female. 
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Kachin Independence Organization became the government; they built and ran courts, police 
forces, schools, hospitals and so on.146 According to Lintner, by the early 1980s, the Kachin 
insurgency territory encompassed nearly 40,000 square kilmeters. More than 300,000 people 
lived under the KIO’s administration. The Kachin government ran five high schools, ten middle 
schools, and 119 primary schools, with altogether 31,881 pupils and 592 teachers (Lintner 1997, 
146).147 
According to Tegenfeldt, when the insurgency broke out in the early 1960s, the Kachin 
Baptist leaders “remained largely neutral, feeling quite helpless to do anything about the war. 
Those who participated in partisan activities could be taken to custody by the government for an 
indefinite period, or subject to retaliation from the insurgency side. Individuals and churches 
tried to steer the tortuous path of neutrality.” Tegenfeldt, for one, “regrets that during that time 
the Kachin Christians did not more openly shoulder their scriptural responsibility to be 
peacemakers” (Tegenfeldt, 249). 
 Ironically, the churches grew during the insurgency because of this layer of neutrality. 
The membership of the Kachin Baptist Convention, the largest denomination in the region, 
increased from roughly 35,457 in 1962 to over 330,687 in 2012.148 This is a remarkable increase, 
especially because during this period the Kachin Baptist Convention was actually split into two 
                                                
146 This territorial dynamic was not at all unique to the Kachin region. Indeed it was common across the 
upland areas that surround the central plains of the Irrawaddy river basin. According to Martin Smith: 
“The deep forests and rugged highlands of Burma have been ideal terrain for waging guerrilla war. With 
support from local communities and government infrastructures frequently non-existent, until the 1990s 
insurgent groups were able to move around relatively freely in as much as one third of the country” 
(Smith 2007: 17). 
147 In the 1990s, the Kachin government also created subsidiary companies. For example, Buga Company, 
one of the larger companies, was built for infrastructure and construction projects. During the ceasefire 
period, Buga Company in fact constructed the hydropower dam to generate and distribute electricity to 
Myitkyina. The clients of this service included the Myanmar government offices. 
148 The 1962 figure is found in Tegenfeldt 1974, 261. The 2012 figure is found in a brochure I received at 
the Kachin Baptist Convention in Myitkyina; it is reproduced here in this chapter.   
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organizations, and the numbers above only cover the bigger of the two. The numbers also do not 
include other organizations; the Catholic, the Anglican, the Assemblies of God, the Seventh-day 
Adventist and others also increased their memberships during this period.  
 A reason for this remarkable growth during the insurgency was that the churches 
maintained a neutral position and thereby provided a very rare social space open to Kachin 
people regardless of their political backgrounds. When the insurgency broke out in the early 
1960s, the church leaders, especially foreign missionaries in Myanmar, sincerely asserted that 
they were apolitical and that they were not supporting the rebels. At the same time, the church 
 
Map 6. “Main armed groups in northern Burma.” The five yellow (and arrowed circles in the northernmost 
region represents the KIA territories (from Kramer 2009: arrows added.)  
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members were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the “revolution.” Because of this genuine 
ambivalence, caused by the rift between the apolitical leaders and the politicized lay members, 
the churches were able to build extensive networks.149  
It is worth emphasizing that the Myanmar government remained generally lenient 
towards Christians for a long time. During the first two decades of insurgency, the Socialist 
government did not favor any particularly religion. During this period, Christians served 
prominent posts within the Myanmar government. They included Lahpai Khun Nawng, a Kachin 
man who was the head of the country’s Defence Services Academy throughout the 1960s. When 
he retired from the government in 1972, at the age of 65, (Lahpai Khun Nawng 2004, 61–84), he 
launched his own independent, non-denominational mission on his own. Despite his Christian 
evangelism, he was appointed by President Ne Win to the National Council, the highest official 
body in the country in 1978. In fact, this body included four Christians (a Kachin, a Karen, a 
Burman). After 1988 it became increasingly difficult for non-Buddhists to be hired or promoted 
by the post-1988 government.   
It is also worth noting that the KIA itself never officially endorsed Christianity. Although 
the KIA was founded by Baptists, the insurgency movement wasn’t able to maintain an exclusive 
Baptist identity for a long time. This was partly because the army needed to recruit as many 
people as possible regardless of religious affiliation, but it was also because the insurgents were 
not able to maintain communication links with the churches.  
Lahpai Khun Nawng’s memoir presents a glimpse into the insurgents’ isolation.150 In 
1975, upon hearing that his father was seriously ill, he took the risk and visited his home village 
                                                
149 The growth of Christianity in Korea during the Japanese colonial period shows the same pattern. The 
church leaders, who communicate directly with the colonial authorities, try not to get the churches 




in Sinlum, which was in a “black zone.” With the assistance of the Kachin Baptist Convention, 
he was able to reach his father’s house. To his great disappointment the funeral was over by the 
time Khun Nawng arrived: “The elders said that they had no choice as it was not safe for any 
large gathering to take place.” He observed: “The people of Sinlum were frightened, discouraged, 
and desperately finding ways to flee the area. … They felt exposed to danger from both sides” 
(Lahpai Khun Nawng 2004, 72). During his stay, however, Khun Nawng was kidnapped by the 
Kachin Independence Army and taken to the army headquarters. There, according to his memoir, 
the KIA’s officer’s interrogation of Khun Nawng quickly turned to the officers’ interrogation of 
the former’s Christian faith:  
I asked how strong their faith was, as Christians. No one spoke out but Awng Shin … 
said, “We have been abandoned by the Church, outcast because we are insurgents. But I 
regularly listen to the FEBC (Christian radio programme from Manila).” I then made a 
request, “Since I am here, kindly give me permission to preach the Gospel to your people.” 
They all kept silent. I presumed that since the Battalion was made of many 
denominations and non-Christians, they were unwilling to risk the unity of the troops by 
giving me permission to preach (Lahpai Khun Nawng 2004, 77). 
The Kachin Independence Army did not identify itself as a Christian, not to mention Baptist, 
organization. And within the organization, there were many non-Christians. Therefore, the 
Myanmar government itself did not consider, at least in the 1970s, that there was dangerous 
affinity between Christianity and insurgency. The church leaders themselves did not collectively 
take a side between the Myanmar government and the Kachin insurgency. 
Because the churches were able to convince the Myanmar government that they were not 
political, they were able to hold large public events continuously at various locations during the 
long period of civil war. Because it was otherwise extremely difficult to have a large gathering 
during the war, a large number of members came to the church-related events. The longer the 
                                                                                                                                                       
150 This personal memoir was put together by Laphai Khun Nawng himself. I thank his daughter Nang 
Kai for answering my questions. 
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war dragged on, the more people joined the church meetings. When the Burma Baptist 
Convention held its annual meeting in 1968 in Myitktkyina, 6,500 people attended the main 
Sunday service (Tegenfeldt 1974, 73). When, four years later, in 1972, the Kachin Baptist 
Convention was able to hold a meeting in Kutkai in northern Shan State, the number of 
attendants even reached 12,000 (Tegenfeldt 1974, 73).  
The church networks grew especially when the Kachin military efforts suffered and the 
future of the “revolution” looked dimmer than ever. In 1975, the founders of the Kachin 
Independence Army were assassinated by fellow Kachin men under mysterious circumstances. It 
wasn’t clear who killed the leaders of the nationalist movement and for what purpose. This event 
casted serious doubts about the prospect of the Kachin revolution. The crisis was, however, 
followed by the largest nation-wide event sponsored by the church. In 1977, the Kachin Baptist 
Convention organized the Centennial Celebration (100th anniversary of the first Christian 
mission to Kachin). The Myanmar government and the Kachin Independence Army agreed on a 
temporary armistice, allowing this event to proceed peacefully. Even the people from the KIA-
controlled regions (such as the Triangle region and Hukawng Valley) were allowed to travel to 
Myitkyina. This 1977 Jubilee event facilitated an extremely rare opportunity for the Kachin 
people divided across war zones to reunite after fifteen years of continuous war. The number of 
officially registered attendants was a staggering 73,421 people.  
 The 1977 Jubilee event was also visually most grand and spectacular. The highlight of 
event was the mass baptism of 6,214 Kachin people, involving 100 pastors, on the banks of the 
Irrawaddy River in the north of Myitkyina (Yaw Ba Tangbau Lasaw 1995, 146). This event also 
marked the first time that the Kachin Baptists endorsed the traditional Manau dance, in which 
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tens of thousands of people participated in celebration.151 Historically, the Kachin dance and 
song had been suppressed by church leaders, especially by the foreign missionaries, because they 
often made references to spirits, which Protestantism categorically rejected. In the early 1970s, 
however, the Catholic church, which was more lenient towards local spirits, began to host a 
traditional Manau dance as part of a church event for fun. The dance was a huge success, 
drawing a large crowd. In 1977, the Baptists decided to host a stupendous Manau dance festival 
as part of the Centennial Jubilee.  
 I have seen black-and-white photos of the mass conversions and church-hosted Manau 
dances at various places in the Kachin region. Upon my inquiry, people would excitedly tell me 
how spectacular the event was. As Appadurai has noted in “Playing with Modernity: The 
Decolonization of Indian Cricket,” “indigenization is often a product of collective and 
spectacular experiments with modernity” (Appadurai, 90). In the case of Kachin, the primary 
vehicle of the “modernity” has been Christianity. As Christians, the Kachin people made 
collective and spectacular self-representations.   
With the 1977 Centennial celebration, the Kachin Baptist Convention also kicked off a three-
year project of frontier evangelism. This campaign, called the 3/300 Mission (masum ning 
masumtsa sasana) required 300 youths to dedicate three years to frontier missions. The youths 
were not seasoned preachers. In fact many of them had troubling personal backgrounds such as 
drug addiction. I was told that they even included former prostitutes. These youths, without 
receiving any salary, were divided to groups and were assigned to different areas across Kachin 
State and Shan State. They spent one year at one place and moved on to a different location each 
                                                
151 On the history of this well-known Kachin dance, see Sadan 2002. 
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year—for three years. The young missionaries travelled on foot and slept in villages (Mading 
Hkaw Sau 1990). 
 
Figure 8. The baptism of 6,213 converts at the 1977 Centennial Celebration (Kachin Baptist Convention 
n.d., 16) 
 
 This three-year campaign turned out to be the most successful mission ever conducted 
by the Kachin. They were able to visit villages that had not been visited by the Kachin Baptist 
Convention since the civil war broke out back in 1961. A number of Kachin people excitedly 
told me how a series of miracles made sure that the mission was successfully carried out across 
the Kachin region. 
 A story I often heard relates a miracle that protected a team of young missionaries who 
were walking through a field filled with land mines. While animals had been blown up and the 
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soldiers were fearful, the young evangelists walked across the whole field unscratched. I was told 
that even the Myanmar military troops stationed nearby were shocked and impressed. These 
stories of miracle circulated widely among the Kachin people like headline news, and the 
campaign achieved the status of a legend. The largest physical structure built by the Kachin 
people is a tower in Myitkyina that commemorates the 3/300 campaign. On its website the KBC 
claims that virtually all Kachin have been converted to Christianity thanks to this project (Kachin 
Baptist Convention n.d., 2)152  
 
Christian National Networks Across War Zones 
Every Kachin person I have talked with about the 1961-1994 period of war told me that a 
most difficult thing was that they were not able to travel. Tagenfeld reported in his 1972 book 
that the war had resulted in a complete disruption of communication and travel in many areas. 
Traveling between a government territory and an insurgent territory became practically 
impossible for most people. Villagers in the insurgency area did not dare to travel to a 
government-held town, even if KIA would give them permission; they were afraid that they 
would be suspected as spies (Tegenfeldt, 248). Many Kachins spent some time in jail on 
suspicion of aiding the insurgents (Tegenfeldt 1974, 73). Kachins in government service too had 
real reason to fear for their lives; they didn’t dare to travel to an insurgency area. Some have 
been assassinated.153  
                                                
152 The people I talked to stressed the divine power, but upon more specific queries, they also 
acknowledged that a key to the success was that this campaign consisted of very young people. They 
travelled completely unarmed, and typically the mission teams consisted of both men and women. So 
even the Myanmar government authorities regarded them to be apolitical and innocent youngsters. 
153 Ba Kaung presents a rare article on a case of a Kachin man with the KIA assassinating a Kachin man 
with the Myanmar army (Ba Kaung 2010). 
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Across the Kachin region, rural villages suffered tremendously as they were coerced by 
both Myanmar and Kachin troops for goods and services. The Myanmar soldiers would march 
through the villages during the day, and the insurgents would quietly move through during the 
night. They demanded food, hospitality, and labor. Adult male villagers were coerced to navigate 
the troops and/or carry the supplies as porters. Villagers were constantly subject to intense 
scrutiny. Too obvious cooperation with one side often meant retaliation from the other. Both 
government forces and rebel troops burned villages as punishment.  
The villagers suffered especially from the Myanmar army’s ruthless counter-insurgency 
tactic called “four-cuts” (pya key pya in Burmese). This tactic borrowed elements from various 
counter-insurgency measures, especially the British effort in the Malayan Emergency. The “four-
cuts” would sever the support lines to insurgency military units—“cut” off access to food, funds, 
information and recruitment—by making the surrounding rural areas uninhabitable. The 
Myanmar government would declare rebel-held areas as “black” and contested areas as “brown.” 
Then they would relocate the civilians in these areas to government-controlled “white” areas. 
Villages in the black and brown areas were burnt down and they became “free-fire zones,” where 
the government troops were authorized shoot anyone on sight (Grundy-Warr and Yin 2002; 
South 2008, 86–87).  
The “brown zones” became the de-facto boundaries separating the Kachin territory from 
the Myanmar territory. The insurgency areas suffered from the separation. Since there were 
hardly any telecommunication lines available in the Kachin region, information did not travel, 
unless people carried it themselves. Many Kachin civilians moved voluntarily to government-
controlled areas for safety and communication. As early as in 1966, the Kachin Theological 
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College in Kutkai in northern Shan State found it impossible to continue the operation because of 
the war, and they moved to Myitkyina. 
 
City as a frontier: Zau Mai’s Story  
During my research I spoke with a Kachin man, whom I call Zau Mai here. I heard a 
detailed story of how he grew up in an insurgency area and eventually relocated to a 
government-controlled town.154 His story illustrates how separate the two territories—the 
Kachin insurgency and Myanmar government areas—were, and how the churches operated the 
only network across the boundary between the two territories. Zau Mai was was born in the early 
1970s in an area completely ruled by the insurgency. His village had about 20 families, about 80 
people, in total. Almost all of the families there were farming in the mountains. His father 
worked for the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the insurgency government, as a 
civilian officer—mostly as the head of a KIO school—for more than twenty years. 
Zau Mai first went to the elementary school in the insurgency village. The Kachin 
insurgency schools used the same text textbooks as the Myanmar government schools. They 
implemented the same curriculum as the government schools in Myanmar, but the language of 
instruction was Jinghpaw. At the end of the fourth grade, the whole class had to take the same 
exam as in Myanmar. In addition to the standard curriculum, the insurgency schools taught 
Jinghpaw language and a course called “Civics,” which was mostly about the Kachin revolution. 
Burmese was taught as a compulsory foreign language. Most children in Zau Mai’s village failed 
to graduate from the four-year primary school. Out of Zau Mai’s class, only two students 
                                                
154 I interviewed Zaw Mai on three separate occasions in 2011 and 2012. 
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graduate. Of the two, only one—Zau Mai—passed the exam at the end of the fifth grade and 
entered the sixth grade.  
From the fifth grade on, Zau Mai had to attend a school in another village, which was 
seven hours of walk from his own village. He stayed at a boarding house attached to the school. 
Zau Mai’s family was not Christian, but he became attracted to Christianity while attending this 
school, of which most of the teachers were Christian.  
Because everyone spoke Jinghpaw, the students didn’t speak Burmese at all at the 
insurgency schools—except during the Burmese language class. The school in his village had no 
native Burmese speaker. The second school, the bigger school had one native Burmese speaker, 
a Burman from Myanmar, who taught the language. I asked Zau Mai how a Burman ended up a 
teacher at a school in the Kachin insurgency territory. He told me that in fact the man had been a 
prisoner in Myanmar. One day, he escaped the prison and he fled from the government territory 
to an insurgency territory. When he crossed a large river, the de facto boundary, and entered the 
Kachin forests, he was captured by the Kachin army. After interrogation, the KIO decided that he 
was not a spy and assigned him to teach Burmese at one of the primary schools.  
 The villagers in the insurgency territory constantly suffered from the lack of material 
supply. This became a serious issue to Zau Mai’s family when, in 1991, his father, then 51 years 
old, became gravely ill. The medicine he needed was not available in the insurgency territory; it 
was only available in a city in Myanmar. Because his illness was life-threatening, he asked the 
insurgency government if he could retire from his position and move to Myitkyina. He was given 
permission and also a travel permit, which he had to carry and show to the Kachin authority 
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during the journey through the insurgency territory.155 Zau Mai’s family—four of them—
walked for seven days to make the dangerous trip to Myitkyina.  
When the family eventually arrived at Myitkyina, Zau Mai tried to enter a government 
school in town. But he did not have any proper document to prove his education status. It didn’t 
help that he barely spoke Burmese. He couldn’t possibly let the government know that his family 
had just moved from an insurgency territory. Because the family didn’t know what to do, Zau 
Mai had to move back to the old KIO school. 
One day Zau Mai’s father had a chance to speak with a deacon at a Baptist church in 
Myitkyina and fortunately found out that the deacon was going to attend a church conference in a 
small town located at the edge of the Myanmar government territory. Zau Mai’s father explained 
his son’s situation to the deacon, and when the deacon went to the town for the conference, he 
talked to the headmaster of the local government school, who also came to the same conference. 
Having understood Zau Mai’s predicament, this headmaster agreed to forge a document stating 
that Zau Mai had successfully finished the sixth grade at his school. The deacon brought that 
letter to Zau Mai’s father back in Myitkyina. With that letter, Zau Mai was able to properly 
transfer to a government school. It was very difficult for him to keep up at the new school 
because his Burmese was poor. He told no one that he was from an insurgency area. When he 
was asked, he presented the prescribed, official story, saying that he was from a rural area in 
Kachin State and that was why his Burmese was poor.  
When he was giving me this account, Zau Mai stressed that what this school master did 
was very dangerous, because, if found out by the Myanmar government, he would have been in 
                                                
155 Although Zau Mai did not tell me so, I suspect that his father was allowed to move to Myitkyina 
partly because at this late stage of the war (in 1991) the ceasefire was becoming a very strong possibility. 
When the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) collapsed in 1989, the KIA lost its major supply line for 
arms. For a history of this region at the end of the CPB, see (Lintner 1990).  
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serious trouble for forging an official document. But during my research I heard similar stories 
from others who had to move from a Kachin insurgency territory to the Myanmar government 
territory. Their travels and moves were typically assisted by a church network. This network 
connected the individuals who never met each other in person. The schoolmaster who forged the 
document for Zau Mai never met Zau Mai’s father, not to mention the young boy himself. 
Typically church leaders functioned as connectors between Kachin individuals who never met, 
because they had by far the widest contacts across the region. The school principle took the risk 
because, according to Zau Mai, he wanted to help a fellow Kachin boy; he was convinced that it 
was important for the Kachin nation [amyusha in Jinghpaw] to have educated youths. Zau Mai 
and his family were extremely grateful to the deacon and the principle, and they became active 
members of the church. This was how a common cause of a long-distance community was 
identified and pursued by a group of individuals who never met each other in person. Indeed this 
was how a national community was imagined and acted upon by the Kachin people.  
 Prior to the creation of Christian networks, the highlanders in this region certainly had long-
distance networks but they were based on kinship. Long-distance mobility was facilitated by 
clan-based relations. An anecdote shared by Leach illustrates the extraordinary power of the clan 
network: “In 1942 a Gauri acquaintance of mine from East of Bhamo [near China] found himself 
in a Singfo village in Assam [in India] 250 miles from home, but it took him only a day or so to 
persuade his hosts that he was one of their relatives” (Leach 1960: 66). Leach explains this 
dynamics as follows: “Individuals are regarded as representatives of particular lineages and 
particular places and they are classed on that account as friend or foe” (Leach 1960, 66). The 
highlanders of the region classified themselves based on the clan lineages and the places. There 
was no over-riding category that encompassed the varieties of clans and places, until the larger 
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ethno-linguistic category of Kachin (Jinghpaw or Jinghpaw Wunpawng) emerged. When the 
highlanders found themselves to be a minority in the new political territory of Myanmar, they 
realized that the clans would not be as useful in the new era and forged a trans-clan, supralocal 
network to facilitate their long-distance affairs. Substantiating the new category, the Kachin 
people (Jinghpaw Wunpawng myusha), required a new mechanism of long-distance mobility and 
associational membership. Christianity provided this mechanism.       
 
Use of Evangelical Narrative 
The achievement of Kachin Protestant associationism during the insurgency has been 
remarkable, but this social movement has received almost no attention from academic scholars. 
This is mainly because the Kachin people speak of these achievements not so much as their own 
but as the result of divine interventions. As a result, we have two disconnected bodies of 
accounts about the Kachin insurgency society: the evangelical accounts, produced by the Kachin 
themselves, on one hand, and secularist reports written by academics, activists, and researchers, 
on the other hand. In this last section of this chapter, I would like to suggest a reading of the 
Kachin evangelical rhetoric. Conversion narratives are constantly told aloud among the Kachin 
people. I listened to many of them as I sat through Sunday worship services. Being neither 
Kachin or Christian, I found it difficult to comprehend the appeal of their comic narratives. 
Sadan is right to say that it is not “subtle.” The lack of subtlety didn’t bother me very much; in 
fact I found it rather refreshing. But I found the conversion stories to be utterly boring, because 
the plots were 
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entirely predictable from the very beginning. For a long time, I had no clue as to why the Kachin 
people were telling these stories because they sounded all the same to me. What is the point of 
telling essentially the same story over and over?  
During the narration of the story at a congregation, I would try to look interested but my thoughts 
would wander. I often wondered what a spy from the Myanmar government would do during 
these stories, because I was told that at a major Kachin church there was a spy attending the 
service; his job was to monitor and record if anyone, especially a pastor, might criticize the 
government. I often wondered how a spy could endure such mind-numbing stories. I thought: 
only the Kachin could stay awake for something like this. Then I realized that was precisely the 
point. The long narrations of these predictable stories effectively demarcate the real members 
from the pretenders (like me and my imaginaries spies falling asleep during the service). 
 I found the conversion stories to be very formulaic, and I found the narrations to 
be repetitive. I was hoping to find a hidden political allegory or a secret mtaphor buried in the 
story, but the Kachin I consulted that I was wrong to look for anything hidden. Eventually it 
occurred to me that the key to understand the repetition of the similar conversion stories among 
the Kachin is to stop examining the content; instead I should consider the narration as a form and 
understand each act of narration as an endorsement of this particular form chosen by the group. 
By performing the same narrative, the narrator is expressing her endorsement of the community. 
The act of conversion narration then represents a mutual endorsement between a narrator and the 
rest of the community. The narrations are important because they are acts—speech acts—that 
confirm the membership of the community. By performing the same story, the narrator approves 
the community. That is, the narration of conversion story serves the emerging community as a 





Figure 6. A contemporary Jinghpaw-language publication showcasing recent evangelical trips 









my imaginary spies) from the community (Kachin Christians) and unites the members of the 
community as insiders.156  
 Scholars of evangelical rhetoric (such as Susan Harding and Peter Stromberg) have 
shown that a conversion narrative is not a simple descriptive recollection of a past experience; on 
the contrary, the narration itself is an essential component of the conversion (Harding 2000; 
Stromberg 1993). In fact, conversion consists of repeated performances of a conversion story. 
The conversion, seen this way, is always an ongoing process, which consists of repeated 
performances of a conversion story. The Kachin people are doing this at a collective level. 
 In fact, the content of the story reveals this collective, community-formation aspect of the 
conversion narration, when it narrates the conversion of the Kachin people as a group. Here is 
one example of the story—or rather the history—of the Kachin people, told by a Kachin elder: 
Over one and a half centuries ago, Kachin folks were illiterate people living without the 
knowledge of God . . .  they were poor and they were simply surviving their hard life in 
the jungle that was on the rugged mountains. They had low culture and low standard of 
living . . . Since they were illiterate, they had little interest on education and for the 
advancement on social life (Tertius Doi 2009, 52). 
This passage comes from a 76-page booklet, self-published by the author for limited circulation 
in 2009. The author, calling himself “Tertius Doi,” was a prominent Kachin public figure, who 
had occupied civilian offices in the Myanmar government. I was given a copy by one of his 
relatives. I eventually met the author, who stressed that I must not disclose his name.157 Because 
the narrative presented in this booklet captures the qualities of the stories I heard myself told 
verbally from various Kachin people, I use this text as a representative case for my analysis. 
                                                
156 This is the dual role of ritual boundaries (Seligman et al. 2008, 13). 
157 While the author told me not to mention his name, the booklet itself, most puzzlingly, presents his 
face photo as the author in addition to a chronology of his life. He told me that he wrote the booklet in 
English so that those who don’t read Jinghpaw can learn about the Kachin people.   
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The book’s last section “Petition” opens as follows: “O Lord! We Kachin folks thank 
thee for thy grace that we have been transformed from savage life to be rather civilized. One and 
a half centuries ago we were wild people but we have been cultured to become the children of 
Jesus” (Tertius Doi 2009, 66). This is a very common way for a Kachin person to narrate the 
history of the Kachin people. In my experience, it is consistently the Kachin people who speak 
most unhesitatingly about the tribal backwardness of the Kachin people; they speak frequently of 
their savageness and barbarism. This talk of the backward Kachin, however, is always followed 
by the story of modern achievements made by the modern Christianized Kachin. The above 
quote continues as follows: 
We have been taught to know the Lord Jesus more and more. We received Kachin 
literature invented by pioneer Missionaries which has helped us along our journey here.... 
Some of us have become school teachers and some are serving as evangelists….  Youth 
have entered military service to be the celebrated soldiers, second to none [serving] in 
world wars (Tertius Doi 2009, 66).   
Notice here how the pronoun changed from “they” (referring to the pre-conversion stage of the 
“poor” Kachin) to “we” (referring to the converted Christian Kachin). The narrative is also 
dramatized by the geographical transition from “hard line in the jungle” to the “celebrated 
soldiers . . . in world wars” in this narrative. This geographical transition continues as the author 
presents his vision of a future Kachin city:  
Oh Jesus Christ! … Give us … a city of skyscraper[s and] condominiums. … We would 
equip the city with a chapel and a city hall at the central square. … The City would be 
christened the ‘New Jerusalem’ … This New Jerusalem would be quite larger than 
Hebron… It would be … Zion for the Kachins (Tertius Doi 2009, 69–70). 
  
This transformation from pre-modern backwardness to post-conversion modernity is a hallmark 
of the Kachin evangelical historiography. The pre-modern backwardness and the modern 
progress form an inseparable pair in the history of the Kachin people. The narration functions to 
create simultaneously the pre-conversion stage of backward tribalism and the post-conversion 
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stage of modern people.158 From the Christian rhetoric of conversion, the Kachin have acquired 
a useful trope for narrating the history of themselves as a people who have transformed 
themselves. The evangelical narrative thus provides the Kachin with a form for the Kachin 
mythico-history. In other words, the Kachin conversion narrative serves them as a national myth. 
Those who accept this myth are welcomed by the community as legitimate members.  
The political nature of the evangelical historiography is veiled by the ritualistic nature of 
the narrative performance and the ambiguity of the intended audiences. Because the national 
myth is couched in a ritual-like religious language of conversion, it circulates widely among the 
Kachin people without being subject to government censorship. Through the circulation of these 
narratives, the Kachin establish themselves as a distinct people, a collective subject, despite the 
lack of sovereign territory. Who are the intended audiences of the Kachin conversion narratives? 
It is very ambiguous. Petition of the Sluggard illustrates this point. Petition of the Sluggard is 
certainly an appeal to God, as the title indicates, and therefore the intended listener is certainly 
God. The content of this book, however, is actually a highly eclectic mixture of various genres. It 
presents many images, including the face photos of notable Kachin individuals, as if it is a 
history book. In footnotes, the author disputes the prevailing interpretations of certain historical 
events. This Kachin booklet does many things other than petitioning God: it delivers a thinly 
veiled political criticism of the existing political regime, expresses a lament for certain failures in 
the Kachin history, glorifies the modern transformation of the Kachin people, urges strong 
solidarity and unity among all upland groups in the region, presents visions and plans for the 
future of the Kachin nation, including a rather elaborate vision urban planning with an estimate 
                                                
158 Discussing the historical narratives of the Dega refugees from central Vietnam, Thomas Pearson gives 
a very similar analysis; see Pearson 2009.   
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budget (30 million US dollars). All of these are ultimately packaged as an appeal to God, 
punctuated by the repetition of “Oh Lord!” and “Oh Jesus Christ!”  
The ambiguity of evangelical speech proved to be extremely useful to the Kachin people 
in the time of insurgency. Here I should emphasize that this ambiguity has been made possible 
by the genuinely non-political or extra-political dimensions of Kachin Christianity. That is, the 
useful ambiguity is not a result of a conscious political strategy. Rather, it has been achieved 
somewhat accidently. When I shared with my Kachin friends my interpretation that the 
Christianity proved to have strategic values for the Kachin nationalist cause, they denounced my 
analysis vehemently. They insist that their faith is above politics and insist on the purity of their 
faith. The ambiguity proved to be politically useful precisely because it was not strategically 
calculated. If it was a purely strategic calculation, then it would be easier for the government 
authority to target and suppress the activity as a political action camouflaged as a religious one.  
This imaginary of “frontier” is expressed in the Jinghpaw language in “shawng” or 
“shawng lam.” Roughly speaking, “shawng” means front, forward, or ahead. “Lam” means line 
or way. “Shawng lam” could be literary translated as frontline or way forward. Because “shawng” 
carries both spatial and temporal senses, like the English word “front,” it can refer to a place or a 
time. If we search “shawng lam” on the internet, we find many results reflecting both its spatial 
and temporal sense; it might refer to a place in front or a time in the future.   
 “Shawng lam” is also used for evangelical missions. Mission frontier is “sasana shawng 
lam.” “Sasana” of course comes from the Sanskrit/Pali/Burmese word “sasana,” which means 
primarily “the teaching [of the Buddha].” I have been told by Kachin elder pastors that this word 
was chosen to translate “mission” in Jinghpaw. “Sasana” has been thoroughly naturalized in the 
Jinghpaw lexicon. The word frequently mentioned in printed Jinghpaw texts, because missions 
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produce many publications. “Sasana” in Jinghpaw refers to the activities of spreading 
Christianity. The Kachin Baptist Convention carries out “shawng lam sasana”—frontier missions. 
The mission frontiers may be very rural areas in remote mountains or urban centers; they can be 
places within Myanmar or they can be abroad.”  
Since the war broke out in 2011, “shawng lam” has come to be used frequently 
emphatically in the military sense. It is used as a shorthand for “shawng lam majan”—frontline 
war. A good majority of the online search results about “shawng lam” today are about the 
ongoing war. Kachin news sites are filled with “shawng lam shiga” (frontline news). Many talk 
about “shawng lam brang” (frontline soldiers). “Shawng lam sasana” (frontier mission) and 
“shanwg lam majan” (frontline war) are often evoked together. Video clips about “shawng lam” 
not only juxtapose images of soldiers fighting and praying but they also mix images from both 
frontiers of the war (soldiers in a battlefield) and frontiers of the mission (rural villagers 
congregating). These music video clips, filled with scenes from the war, often present typically 
evangelical images of Jesus in the middle of the song.  
When “shawng” and “ “shawng lam” is used in the temporal sense, it means what lies ahead of 
us in time; that is, it means future quite straightforwardly. The Kachin would often speak about 
“myu sha ni (our people)” and “my sha ni a shawng lam” (our people’s future).  And when they 
speak about their collective future, they bring up “Karai” (God). According to the evangelical 
logic/rhetoric, we should worship God because our future is in the hands of God. From the 
Jinghpaw-Kachin perspective, one of the distinct appeals of the evangelicalism is that it presents 
a trajectory that connects their present-day activities with the future. This trajectory is facilitated 






      
Figure 7. Images of “shawng lam” (frontline/frontier) from a Youtube video clip. The title “Shawng lam 





Once the war began on 2011, pro-KIA songs became very popular among the Jinghpaw-
Kachin. One of the most popular songs was “Gasat” (fight). This war song starts with the 
evocation of “my sha ni” (our people) and it refers to “shawng”:  
Gasat 
 
Myu sha ni e, asai rum na ten du sai, sak 
jahkrung na ten mung ya rai sai... 
 
Makyin jinghku, mayu dama, kahpu 
kanau yawng hkra yawng hkra, gahkyin 
da na ten rai sai....  
ahkyak htum ai ten du sai... 
 
Myu sha ni e....pu gang sin machyi ra sai, 
mahtai lu na ten mung ya rai sai.... 
 
 
Tsaw myit rawng yang, wunpawng jet 
yang,  
mahkawn shabrang kadai hkum nga... 
 
Yawng rawt sa na ten rai sai,  
yawng myit hkrum na ten du sai... 
 
Machyi ai ten mung anhte machyi na.. 
Pyaw ai ten mung anhte lu na re 
Hpawt ni mung hkrap nga ra na nrai.... 
Shawng de Karai chye nga ai......... 
Hkrit ai myit hpe ga hta htu lup kau let..... 
 
Gasat.....myu sha yawng a matu gasat,  
Teng man lam a matu gasat, 
Anhte mungdan lu hkra gasat,  
Nang si yang, ngai si ai 
Nang hkrung yang, ngai hkrung ai 
Anhte yawng rau rai..... 
 
Fight  
Our people, it’s time to combine our 
blood, it’s the time to keep our lives 
 
It’s time to gather all our clans, relatives, 
brothers and sisters... 
 
It’s a critical time for us... 
 
Our people ... all of us feel the pain when 
one of us is in hurt. 
It’s time to give an answer. 
 
If you have love, if you are a real Kachin 
[wunpawng]  
Don’t stay back. 
 
It’s time for us to go ahead 
It’s time for us to unite 
 
When we feel pain, we all feel it together,  
We will achieve happiness together 
Tomorrow we will no longer cry,   
God knows what is ahead of us... 
Bury your fear in the ground. 
 
Fight for all our people 
Fight for justice 
Fight until we achieve the independent 
If you die, I die too 
If live, I live too 
We are all together 
“Gasat,” among other pro-KIA songs, were produced anonymously. I was told by a Kachin 
friend, who played it on her mobile phone, that every Kachin knew this song.  
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 “Shawng”—what lies ahead of us—is the glorious future that will be achieved through 
fighting (“gasat”) and mission (“sasana”). “Shawng” or “shawng lam” also refers to the places—
frontlines—where the fighting and the mission are taking place today. Like the English word 
frontier, “shawng” is predominantly used in the comic, hopeful sense; and it is also used not for 
individual actions but for collective activities.     
 
Conclusion  
 The Kachin people have adopted the rhetoric of the conversion narrative and the frontier 
imagery to tell their story as a nation. With the evangelical rhetoric, they have been telling each 
other where they came from, what they are going through, and where they are getting in the 
future. The rhetoric of evangelism has been a vital source of the Kachin self-representation. 
Almost every Kachin person with whom I discussed the history of Kachin Christianity told me at 
one point or another something like “We Kachins are all Christians today.” This is obviously 
false. Not every Kachin is Christian, and in fact every Kachin knows it. But the point of the 
categorical reference of this kind is the factuality of the statement. Rather it is a speech act, with 
which the speaker performatively reifies “Kachin” as if it was an entirely unproblematic category. 
It is an act of strategic essentialism (Spivak 1988, 13). This might have an explanatory value 
beyond the Kachin case. Lalsangkima Pachuau’s study of northeast India, especially Mizoram, 
shows a very similar pattern of elective affinity between an insurgency movement and frontier 
evangelism (Pachuau 2002). Needless to say, however, not every disfranchised people or an 
insurgency community endorses Christianity. For the kind of collective conversion to take place 
among such a large number of people, multiple factors must coalesce at a particular juncture to 
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create a “perfect storm.” In the Kachin case, such coalescence took place during the 1961-1994 






Michael Walzer opened his first book The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the 
Origins of Radical Politics by saying: “I began this book hoping to write sympathetically about a 
human choice which I thought strange and disturbing” (Walzer 1965, vii).” In the book, Walzer 
showed how Calvinist thought led to the emergence of radical politics of the modern era.159 In 
this study, I too have attempted to write sympathetically about the choice that the Kachin made, 
which I thought strange and disturbing. I hope I have give an account of the practice and rhetoric 
of the Kachin evangelism in such a way that what initially appears to be a puzzling behavior 
becomes more sensible to the reader. I also hope to have shown that political movements like the 
Kachin insurgency cannot be explained unless we take into account the profound impacts of 
frontier Protestantism.  
 Protestant doctrines of vernacularism and universal priesthood have enabled the 
formation of a decentralized and fluid network that can withstand the shocks of a long war. The 
doctrine of universal priesthood allows each local congregation to make autonomous decisions 
and helps maintain a resilient, decentralized network of congregations. Vernacular evangelism— 
the circulations of print materials in particular—allowed the Kachin people to imagine a trans-
clan and supralocal community of their own. They have built a large, 300,000 strong voluntary 
organization, which often acts like a civilian government. During the long era of insurgency, 
which continues to this day, it is the church networks that keep connected the increasingly 
scattered and dispersed members of the Kachin nation and sustain its unity and solidarity. The 
                                                
159 This perspective has been explored further by Craig Calhoun and Michael Young, who in their 
respective studies stress the developments in the 1830s in the United States (Calhoun 2012; Young 2006).   
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Baptist churches have played a central role in the creation and facilitation of the spatially 
extensive and fluid nation.  
Today the Kachin people consider themselves as a group of pioneers. They indigenized 
Christianity through the practice of frontier missions such as the 3/300 Mission Campaign and 
the relentless narrations of frontier conversions. The missions and narrations together produce a 
powerful comic cosmology of frontier. By sharing this comic imaginary, they are able to imagine 
themselves as a fate-sharing community despite the long distances that spatially divide its 
members. The collective conversion to Christianity has been an effort to achieve this community. 
This project involves circulating hymns and prayers, recording conversion statistics, operating 
membership-based associations such as the Baptist convention, offering summer language 
courses, holding fun events like music concerts, beauty contests, sports competitions, and 
narrating their mythico-histories. 
Evangelism plays a central role in the collective self-definition and self-representation 
among the Kachin. I argue that the Kachin conversion itself—both at individual and collective 
levels—can be understood as a collective speech act. By converting to Christianity, one commits 
to carry out certain speech acts regularly—including the narration of a conversion story. The 
repetition of the standardized narration establishes a necessary ritual act—necessary for the 
group formation. The new ritual draws new social boundaries to demarcate what it includes and 
excludes. It is remarkable that the Kachin people have made such rituals out of Protestantism, a 
religion that has most systematically rebuked rituals.  
How the Kachin people imagine themselves as pioneers illustrates the remarkable 
elasticity of the modern geographical imaginary of frontier. It is not only American politicians or 
global entrepreneurs who enjoy the frontier imaginary. Disenfranchised peoples like the Kachin 
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in northern Myanmar too find this imaginary indispensable. They have appropriated the narrative 
rhetoric of self-transformation. They have adopted the narrative of modernity by fashioning 
themselves as a people who have transformed themselves through Christianity: We used to be 
tribal but now we are modern. By conducting missions into remote places and by story-telling 
such activities, they have discursively established their own frontiers.   
Frontier narrative and conversion story naturally go together because they are both 
fundamentally about transformation. The Kachin have chosen the Protestantism because it would 
allow them to be frontier pioneers. Protestantism made Christianity exceptionally accessible and 
mobile. As Webb Kean has pointed out in “Locating Protestantism,” Protestantism has no 
locality, because its mission is to circulate its ideas, practices, institutions, and truth-claims 
everywhere (Keane 2007, 45–46). This lack of locality is precisely the unique appeal of 
Protestantism to the Kachin. The Kachin have come to understand themselves as a Christian 
people who speak the Jinghpaw language. With this new identity, the Kachin people have made 
it possible for them to be Kachin regardless of their locations.   
In other words, Protestantism has spread among the Kachin (and many other 
disenfranchised peoples) because it provides them with doctrines and techniques that are useful 
for continuously reproducing frontiers. Protestants are able to form exceptionally 
decentralized—if not anarchic—networks, which have proven to be useful for a people without 
territory. The network nation of the Kachin evangelism, extended far beyond the upland region, 
challenges the Zomia proposal put forward by James Scott. The Kachin community today—as 
well as the communities of other upland peoples—is spatially far more dynamic and extensive 
than a map of Zomia can capture. While many Kachin people regard an upland region as a kind 
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of homeland, they are actively traveling and migrating beyond Zomia. For many Kachin people, 
a lowland city represents their frontier today.  
Rather than placing these places and peoples in the prescribed “tribal slot” (Li 2000), I 
call attention to the efforts made by the so-called tribal people to move around and beyond the 
confines of imposed categories—both temporal and spatial. Jared Diamond has the highland 
society in New Guinea represent “the world until yesterday” (J. M. Diamond 2012). It has 
become a popular thing to bemoan the death of the tribal society and to assign ourselves the task 
of rescuing and reviving the tribal wisdom. Against this trend, I urge scholars to analyze the 
present-day efforts of the so-called tribal peoples by observing the forms of self-representation 
and self-fashioning.   
 
In this study, I have conducted an investigation of frontier as a concept-metaphor. 
“Frontier” is not yet a full-fledged concept, but the new sense of “frontier” appears to be slowly 
yet steadily taking over the old meaning. Surely it will still take time for “frontier” to become a 
more general concept—like “religion,” “modernity” or “identity,” if it ever reaches that level. I 
have argued that it is meaningful to investigate such immature concepts-in-formation, because 
they may reveal unique pre-theorized insights. I have framed such inarticulate understanding, 
pre-theorized yet widely-circulating, as “imaginary,” and sought to analyze “frontier” as a 
popular imaginary that is unique to our time.  
In order to examine this imaginary it is necessary to interrogate narratives of frontier. 
Although the academic trend has been to move away from narrative, especially the Turnerian 
narrative of the US-American frontier, I suggest that we investigate these popular stories in order 
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to understand it as a social imaginary. My analysis reveals that frontier narratives are stories of 
transformation, and frontier is used to signify a site or process of transformation.  
The frontier imagination emerged first in the United States of America as part of the 
discursive self-centering of the new country in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
“frontier thesis” provided the young nation with a novel spatial cosmology, a mythico-geography, 
which narrated the country’s transformation from a colonial periphery to a modern imperial 
power. The collective narration of this spatial transformation was an act of self-fashioning.  
 As the primary purpose of the frontier comedy was to discursively establish the United 
States as the post-European center, the narrative regarded the Native Americans as irrelevant. 
When there was at all a sense of uncertainty as to whether or not colonial settlers would prevail, 
overcoming the primitive tribes was regarded as heroic and pioneering. When this uncertainty 
was no longer, the heroic narrative came to be castigated as chauvinistic and insensitive towards 
the indigenous people. In the latter half of the twentieth century, some US-American historians 
even thought “frontier” was an inherently prejudicial term.   
Frontier, however, became a very popular metaphor, not because we live in a 
fundamentally racist world but because there is a widespread awareness that the tribal world—
what some have called the Fourth World160—has been thoroughly transformed in the modern era. 
We are aware that such transformation has taken place not only in the United States but also in 
countless places, including the Kachin world between China and Myanmar, where tribal societies 
encountered modernity. The frontier metaphor rests on the certainty that where modernity—the 
bureaucratic state, mature capitalism, distance-demolishing technology, the rule of law, the 
                                                
160 For example, Anthony Walker (A. R. Walker 1995)  
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discourse of global norms—enter a tribal sphere, there is no contest; the tribal land is always 
overwhelmed by the forces of modernity.  
This certainty of tribal defeat is achieved partly because, as Johannes Fabian pointed out 
in Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, being tribal is by definition equated 
with being premodern (Fabian 2002). Being tribal—and being remote and marginal—is also by 
definition equated with the non-European—or the “rest of the world.” Being tribal, therefore, has 
no space in the modern Westernized world—except as somebody or something whose days are 
numbered. A tribe is doomed to perish in the narrative of transformation called modernization 
and Westernization. Edmund Leach as an anthropologist understood that his task was to study a 
tribal society as pre-modern and non-Western; he excluded Christianity from his study because 
he understood that there was no such thing as a Christian tribe.   
The colonial frontier and the imperial metropole are mutually constitutive. In Of 
Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier, John and 
Jean Comaroff characterize a modern civilization frontier as follows: “the civilizing mission was 
no mere exporter of finished products and final truths. The frontier was also integral to the 
making of the European metropole, to the rise of modernity at home, to the forging of new 
translocal horizons (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, xvi). This mutuality is found also in the 
relationship between evangelical base and frontier. The frontier was, from the very beginning, 
integral to the making of the North-Atlantic, especially North American, evangelical culture. 
Unlike imperialism and colonialism, however, Protestant evangelism, with its insistence on 
decentralized grassroots network, does not allow centers to remain centers; it doesn’t even allow 
a frontier to remain a frontier for a long time. The evangelical urgency requires a frontier to 
become a new mission base and to identify a new frontier as soon as possible. Frontiers must 
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reproduce themselves elsewhere. The evangelical geography must repeat itself until it reaches 
the end of space. Kachin and other upland peoples of Southeast Asia have taken advantage of 
this repeatability of evangelical frontier.       
Some of us expect or hope that a tribal society will transform themselves by embracing 
secularism in order to cope with the challenges of modernity. Such expectation reveals how 
common and widespread vision of self-transformation is today. Fenella Cannell has suggestd the 
possibility that our understanding of modernity itself has a root in the Christian idea of 
confessional self, which relies on the narrative of conversion: “Insofar as it implies an 
irreversible break with the past, after which the world is utterly transformed in mysterious ways, 
it is itself modeled on the Christian idea of conversion” (Cannell 2006, 39). We commonly 
characterize modernity as an era that is radically discontinuous from the premodern and the 
medieval. We live with the mythical narrative that we have transformed our lives (through 
democracy, capitalism, seucularism, etc.) and as a result we are modern autonomous citizens. 
The Kachin evangelical narrative is not so much as an exception to the norm but a variant of the 
globalized narrative of modernity. We live with similar narratives, using the frontier imaginary. 
“Frontier” has emerged as a popular term because it helps us narrate dramatic change. 
The anthropological literature reflects this shift clearly. It used to be that when anthropologists 
talked about frontier, the theme was usually about ethnic minority in a political periphery (Keyes 
1979; Renard 1987,Wilson and Hanks 1985). Today when anthropologists talk about “frontier,” 
the theme is no longer ethnicity in a borderland; it is usually the “neoliberal frontiers” (Comaroff 
2009; Chalfin 2010). Scholars of Southeast Asia are discussing “capitalist frontiers” (Tsing 
2003; Laungaramsri 2012) and “resource frontiers” (Barney 2009), whether they are “coffee 
frontiers” (Tan 2000) or “frontiers of land control” (Peluso and Lund 2011). Scott’s Anarchist 
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History is an exceptionally ambitious narrative of transformation among these studies of frontier. 
The narrative turn of “frontier”—from a spatial analysis to a history of enclosure—reflects our 
concern with discontinuity, confirming the observation made by Harri Englund and James Leach 
that anthropologists increasingly find themselves engage in meta-narratives of rupture (Englund 
and Leach 2000).  
In the Predicament of Culture James Clifford noted that we are “condemned to oscillate 
between two metanarratives” as “there is no master narrative that can reconcile the tragic and 
comic plots of global cultural history” (Clifford 1988, 17, 15). The persistence of the 
irreconcilable plots indicates our profound ambivalence about the speed and nature of 
globalization—about the ruthlessly expansive power of the state and capitalism. There is indeed 
no single master narrative, but perhaps “frontier” is a master metaphor that facilitates the 







Appendix   
 
Table 1: The Associations of the Karen (Kayin) Baptist Convention (2012)161   
No Name of the association Year of  
foundation 
1 Hpa-an Mawlamying   1840 
2 Pathein MyaungMya 1850 
3 Yangon 1854 
4 Hinthada 1854 
5 Shwe Gyin-KyaukGyi (Hsaw Hti) 1854 
6 Taungoo (Pa Ku) 1856 
7 Taungoo (Bwe Moh Bwe) 1856 
8 Dawei- Myeik 1857 
9 Taungoo (KerKoKerBar) 1883 
10 Pyi-Thayawaddy 1887 
11 Kayah Moh Bwa 1888 
12 Pa-pun (Hmu Draw) 1903 
13 Nyaung lebin 1923 
14 Upper Myanmar 1930 
15 Myaung Mya 1968 
16 Myeik 1978 
17 Kayah Poo 1983 
18 Bago-Yangon 2008 
19 Kyar Inn 2008 
20 Myro 2008 
 
Table 2: Karen Baptist missionaries to the Kachin region 1876 – 1962 
(Sources: Tegenfeldt 1974: 366, James Paul Humphries 2011: 14-22, and personal communication 
with the Kachin Baptist Convention) 
 Name Period Duration Main Location 
1 Bogalay 1876-1877 6 months Bhamo, Bumwa 
2 S’Peh 1877-1887 (or longer) 10+ years Bumwa 
                                                
161 I thank Saw Thamoo at the Kayin Baptist Convention for providing me with this list. 
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3 Koteh 1878-1892 14 years Bhamo 
4 Naythah 1878-1879 1 year Bhamo 
5 Shwe Gyaw 1879-1919 40 years Myitkyina 
6 Maukeh Ya La (Maw Keh) 1879-1898 19 years Bhamo 
7 Shwe So 1892-1937 45 years Myitkyina 
8 Kan Gyi 1895-1925 30 years Sima, Gagam (near Myikyina) 
9 Po Nyo 18951911 16 years Sanka (near Myitkyina)  
10 John Thwe 1898-1900 (or longer) 2+ years Bhamo 
11 Tha Dwe 1899-1929 (or longer) 30+ years Bhamo 
12 Kyaw Dwe 1906-1936 30 Years Bhamo 
13 Ba Thaw 1911-1952 41 years? Myitkyina, Sadon; worked with the Lisu) 
14 Po Win 1911-1960 49 years?  
15 Tha Htoo 1917?-1962? 45 years? 
Manhkring 
(Myitkyina); worked 
with the Lachit and the 
Lhaovo 
16 Po Zan 1918-1927 9 years ? 
17 Sein Nyo 1924- 1937? 14 years? Putao, Myitkyina; worked with Rawang 
18 Tha Loo 1948-1955 7 years  
19 Po Pe 1956-1958 2 years  
20 Edigin 1958-1962 4 years  
 
Table 3. Bible translations to languages spoken in Myanmar (Myanmar Bible Society 2012) 






1 Myanmar (Judson) 1815 1832 1835 
2 Myanmar (Comtemporay Version)   1984 2005 
3 Sgaw Kayin 1839 1843 1853 
4 Sgaw Kayin (Comtemporay 
Version) 
  1995 2003 
5 Pwo Kayin 1847 1852 1883 
6 Shan 1871 1882 1892 
7 Jinghpaw 1895 1912 1927 
8 Jinghpaw (Comtemporay Version)   2006 2009 
9 Mon 1843 1847 1928 
10 Mara/Lakher 1912 1928 1955 
11 Mizo/Lushai 1898 1916 1959 
12 Lisu: Hwa 1921 1938 1968 
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13 Lisu (Comtemporay Version)     1986 
14 Hmar 1920 1959 1968 
15 Kuki 1924 1942 1971 
16 Paite 1940 1951 1971 
17 Kom 1954 1976   
18 Tedim Chin 1915 1932 1977 
19 Haka Chin 1920 1940 1978 
20 Biate 1949   1985 
21 Rawang 1954 1974 1986 
22 Lahu 1924 1952 1989 
23 Bawm Chin 1961 1977 1989 
24 Falam Chin 1933 1951 1991 
25 Zou Chin   1967 1992 
26 Akha 1939 1968 2002 
27 Siyin Chin   2002 2004 
28 Wa 1934 1938 2004 
29 Asho Chin 1921 1954 2008 
30 Lhaovo/Maru 1940 2003 2009 
31 Lacid   2006 2010 
32 Ngochang   2004 2010 
33 Gangte 1952 1959 2010 
34 Pali 1827 1835   
35 Lu 1921 1933   
36 Lisu: Hsiahsiah 1912 1951   
37 Vaiphei Chin 1917 1957   
38 Khumi Chin 1935 1959   
39 Pa O 1912 1961   
40 Khiangmunggan   1980   
41 Konyak Naga   1980   
42 Anal Naga 1949 1983   
43 Tangkhul   1990   
44 Tangsa Naga 1982 1992   
45 Mro 1934 1994   
46 Daai Chin   1996   
47 Ngawn Chin 1951 1996   
48 Zanniat Chin 1972 1997   
49 Hrangkhol   1997   
50 Cho Chin   1999   
51 Matu   1992   
52 Hawa Naga   2000   
53 Salong (Mawken) 1913 2000   
54 Zotung 1951 2003   
55 Ta Aw   2005   
56 Zaiwa  1939 2009   
57 Zyphe   2010   
58 Kayah 1997 2010   
59 Karen Bghai/Bwe 1857     
  
 228 
60 Simte 1907     
61 Singpho 1907     
62 Maghi 1914     
63 Yunnan Shan 1931     
64 Khun 1938     
65 Awa Khumi Chin 1939     
66 Kadu 1939     
67 Riang Lang 1950     
68 Hallam 1960     
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